Renu Arora v. Arvinder Singh

-1IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH RENU ARORA ..Petitioner

Versus

ARVINDER SINGH ..Respondent

Reserved on: 29.04.2026

Pronounced On : 21.05.2026 Uploaded on: 29.05.2026 Whether only the operative part of the judgment is pronounced? NO Whether full judgment is pronounced?

YES CORAM: HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUDEEPTI SHARMA

Present:

Mr. Rajesh Narang, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Viren Sibal, Advocate and Mr. Shayon Sen, Advocate for the respondent.

* * * SUDEEPTI SHARMA , J.

1.

The challenge in the present revision petition is to order dated 19.05.2025 passed by learned Appellate Authority, whereby, petitioner is directed to vacate the demised premises.

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE 2.

Brief facts of the case as per the pleadings before learned Rent Controller are that respondent was owner/landlord of property bearing No.B12-560 situated at Hotel First, Chowk Subhani Building, Brown Road, Ludhiana. Petitioner had taken on rent shop no.2 on the ground floor forming part of the said building shown as red in the site plan from respondent on 01.04.2010. The terms and conditions of tenancy were orally agreed which

-2were later on reduced into writing vide Memorandum of Rent Agreement dated 23.07.2010 which was signed by both the parties in presence of witnesses. As per the agreement, monthly rent of Rs.600/- was payable by petitioner to respondent. Petitioner had further agreed to increase the rent by 10% after every three years. Thus, there existed a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Respondent sought ejectment of petitioner on the grounds that the shop in dispute was urgently and bonafidely required by respondent for the use and occupation of his son Japjot Singh. Respondent as stated had two sons i.e. Japjot Singh aged 22 years and Ekamjot Singh aged 12 years.

Japjot Singh is stated to be working with respondent, who was running a hotel by the name of 'Hotel First' in the same property and was getting salary from him and thus was dependent on him for his living. Japjot Singh as stated had got married and he wanted to settle independently in his life and to start his own business of spare parts of two wheelers in the shop in question. The above said shop was in the area, which was a hub for the business of spare parts of two wheelers and there was lot of scope for Japjot Singh to establish the said business there. Thus, respondent required the shop in question for the use and occupation of his son Japjot Singh. 3.

It was further averred that besides the shop in question, there was one shop under tenancy of M/s Muthoot Finance (shown as blue in the site plan) and another shop which was at the backside of property under the tenancy of Ashok Bajaj M/s J.D.S Oswal (shown as green in the site plan). The remaining property (shown as yellow in the site plan) was being used for the business of hotel being run by respondent under the name of 'Hotel First'. The shop in question shown as red in the site plan is stated to be the

-3most suitable for respondent's son as it was on the main road i.e. Brown Road. Respondent and his son Japjot Singh did not own or occupy any other such premises nor they had vacated any such premises without sufficient cause before Rent Controller at Ludhiana. He filed petition under section 13 of The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 for eviction of petitioner from Shop No.2 measuring 14.1/2' x 7.1/2' forming part of property no.B-12-550, Ground Floor, Hotel First, Chowk Subhani Building. Brown Road, Ludhiana shown as red in the site plan attached: with the direction to the petitioner to hand over immediate vacant possession of the above said shop to the respondent on the basis of oral and documentary evidence. The petition filed by him was dismissed vide order dated 11.08.2023 passed by learned Rent Controller at Ludhiana. He filed appeal against the same which was allowed by learned Appellate Authority vide order dated 19.05.2025. Hence, the present civil revision petition. SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PARTIES 4.

Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that in order to prove bonafide requirement, respondent should be the owner and not landlord. He further contends that person who files the petition should prove his ownership. And bonafide necessity of the owner is to be seen and not of the landlord. Further that respondent concealed the fact of alternate premises and the respondent does not fulfill the three requirements as per section 13(3)(a) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. He, therefore, prays that the present civil revision petition be allowed and order dated 19.05.2025 be set aside.

-45.

He relies on judgment passed by Hon'ble The Supreme Court titled as "Dr. Ambica Prasad Vs. Md. Alam and another, 2015(3) SCC 13" to support his arguments.

6.

Per contra, learned counsel for respondent contends that learned Appellate Authority has rightly allowed the appeal filed by the respondent. He, therefore, prays that the present civil revision petition be dismissed. 7.

In support of his arguments, he relies upon the following judgments:- i.

CR-1662-2020 titled as M/s R.D. Sales Corporation and another Vs. Anoop Singh Gill.

ii.

Kanahaiya Lal Arya Vs. Md. Ehshan & Ors., 2025 SCC Online SC 432.

iii.

Bhajan Lal Vs. Rajender Prasad Jain, 2024 SCC Online Del iv.

Murlidhar Aggarwal (D.) through his LR. Atul Kumar Aggarwal Vs. Mahendra Pratap Kakan (D.) through LRs. & Ors., 2025 INSC 564 v.

Shiv Swarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, 1999(6) SCC 222 8.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the file of this case with their able assistance. 9.

Before proceeding further it would be apposite to reproduce relevant statutory provisions of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The same are reproduced as under:- Section 2(c) :- "2(c) "landlord" means any person for the time being entitled to receive rent in respect of any building or rented land whether on his own account or on behalf or for the benefit, of any other person, or as a trustee, guardian, receiver, executor or administrator for any other person, and includes a tenant who

-5sublets any building or rented land in the manner hereinafter authorised, and, every person from time to time deriving title under a landlord;"

Section 13(3)(a):- 13(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession - (i) in the case of residential [ * * * ] building if - (a) he requires it for his own occupation;

(b) he is not occupying another residential [*****] building, [*****] in the urban area concerned; and (c) he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said ubran area;

[(d) it was let to the tenant for use as a residence by reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord, and the tenant has ceased, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be in such service or employment: Provided that where the tenant is workman who has been discharged or dismissed by the landlord from his service or employment in contravention of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he shall not be liable to be evicted until the competent authority under that Act confirms the order of discharge or dismissal made against him by the landlord.] 10.

Adverting to the contention of the petitioner that in order to establish the bona fide requirement, the respondent was first required to prove his status as landlord of the premises in question. In this regard, the cross-examination of the respondent clearly shows that the property was earlier owned by a family trust and is presently owned exclusively by him.

-6Moreover, the documents placed on record also substantiate the ownership of the respondent over the demised premises. Thus, the material available on record sufficiently establishes that the respondent is the owner-landlord of the property and, consequently, entitled to receive rent and maintain a petition for ejectment of the tenant.

11.

Furthermore, even if the contention of the petitioner that the respondent is not the owner of the premises is taken into consideration, the same does not merit acceptance. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the term "landlord" in an inclusive manner and specifically encompasses a trustee within its ambit. And further, Section 13(3)(a) of the East urban Rent restriction Act 1949 provides that a landlord may apply to the Rent Controller seeking an order directing the tenant to hand over possession of the premises. Therefore, a trustee who is receiving rent can also file a petition for ejectment against the tenant.

12.

So far as the judgment referred to by learned counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the same is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case.

13.

In the present case, the eviction petition was filed by respondent on the ground of personal necessity for his son who had got married and wanted to start his independent business of spare parts in the said shop. It would be apposite to reproduce the relevant portion of order dated 19.05.2025 passed by learned appellate authority Ludhiana which is as under:- "11. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire judicial record carefully.

-712. It was vehemently argued by learned counsel for appellant/petitioner that learned Rent Controller wrongly dismissed the petition holding that petitioner could not prove his title over the shop in dispute as the sale deed was in the name of Family Trust of petitioner and he was not authorised by the trustees by passing any resolution to file the petition for personal necessity. It was further argued that learned Rent Controller wrongly observed that petitioner had alternate accommodation available during pendency of petition which was put to auction for rent by him rather than starting business for his son in the said accommodation.

It was argued that respondent had already admitted the landlord-tenant relationship as well as ownership of petitioner in her reply to the petition, therefore, it was not open to respondent to dispute title of petitioner over the property in dispute. It was contended that learned Rent Controller did not appreciate the fact that petitioner's son was filing income tax returns showing his income from salary. He was being paid by petitioner and as such his son was in a need of the shop in dispute to start his spare parts business. It was argued that Ex.

P1 was not the rent note/lease deed rather it was the memorandum of terms and conditions agreed upon between the parties at the time of renting out the shop in dispute but learned Rent Controller wrongly held that the said document being unregistered could not be read into evidence as there was no requirement for registration of memorandum. Prayer for acceptance of appeal was made.

-8on the ground that relationship of landlord and tenant was not established; Anil Kumar and another versus Makhan Singh Grewal 2018 (2) RCR (Rent) 519 , Natha @ Jeewan Saini versus Ashok Kumar and another 2016(4) RCR (Rent) 377, Diwan Singh (since deceased) through LRs versus Karam Singh 2020 (2) RCR (Rent) 247, wherein it was held that landlord is the best judge of his requirement and tenant cannot dictate terms regarding the same; Bhag Singh versus Ram Niwas Singla (Additional District and Session Judge) Hissar Civil Revision No.1429 of 1991 decided on 03.05.

1993, RR Enterprises through its proprietors versus Pratibha Lal 2010 (66) RCR (Civil) 384, wherein it was held that the written agreement being memorandum of terms and conditions already agreed upon terms and conditions with delivery of possession did not require registration and could be the basis for eviction on expiry of the lease period; Kamaljit Singh versus Sarabjit Singh 2015 (3) SCC (Civil) 682, Oriental insurance Company Limited versus Sudesh Bansi 2007 (2) RCR (Rent) 296, Sunita versus Samay Singh Chaudhary 2022 (2) RCR ( Rent) 520, wherein it was held that tenant was estopped from denying the title of landlord; Gaurav Gupta versus Gurdeep Singh 2016 (2) RCR (Civil) 657, Ranjodh Singh versus Shama Tank CR No.8455 of 2015 decided on 17.02.

-9required started some business during pendency of petition, that in itself was not the ground for dismissing the eviction petition as he was not supposed to sit idle for decades to wait the outcome of litigation.

13. Per contra learned counsel for respondent strenuously argued that learned Rent Controller rightly dismissed the petition as petitioner had filed the petition on the ground of personal necessity but could not prove his title or authority to file the eviction petition for need of his son who was already having income from salary as well as other sources. It was argued that the rent note Ex. P1 was not registered and therefore could not be looked into even for the collateral purpose of proving possession over the shop in dispute. It was contended that there was concealment by petitioner as he did not disclose about other property belonging to him which applied for auction by petitioner for rent. The personal necessity as projected by petitioner was not bona fide and for mere desire of a landlord, eviction order could not be passed.

Reliance was placed on judgments in cases titled as Shankar Lal versus Madan Lal 2011 (1) RCR (Rent) 139, Randhir Singh Rohila versus Rajbir 2015(4) PLR 325, Lavneesh Gulati versus Anita Rani 2021 (2) RCR (Rent) 539 wherein it was held that petition was liable to be dismissed if the landlord did not disclose about the other properties owned and possessed by him as it was concealment on his part; Sheela versus Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, 2002 (1) RCR (Rent) 351, Smt.

-10ground of personal need. Dismissal of appeal was prayed for.

14. In the present case, petitioner had filed a petition against respondent claiming himself to be landlord/owner of the shop under tenancy of respondent on the ground of personal necessity for his son Japjot Singh who had got married and wanted to start his independent business of spare parts in the said shop. The said tenancy was oral, but later on the terms and conditions of tenancy were incorporated in a memorandum of writing. On the other hand, respondent had taken stand in the reply that the said rent note was unregistered and could not be written into evidence, and that another shop in the same building was lying vacant but the fact had not been disclosed by petitioner. Though ownership and landlord tenant relationship were admitted in the written statement, it was submitted by respondent that the need as projected by petitioner was not bona fide.

15. The expression 'bona-fide requirement' has not been defined in the Rent Act but Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Raghunath G. Panhale (Dead) by LRs versus M/s Chagan Lal Sundarji and Co. 1999 (8) SCC 1 had held that requirement of landlord must be both reasonable and bonafide and it was observed as hereunder :- " The requirement must, therefore, be both reasonable and bona fide. The word `reasonable', in our view, connotes that the requirement or need is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be a mere desire. The Word `requirement' coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than a mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity. Aitken v.

-11Shaw, (1933) S.L.T, 21; Novile v. Hordy, 90 L.J. Ch, 158. A reasonable and bona fide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand and a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. It may be a need in presenti or within reasonable proximity in the future. The use of the word `bonafide' is an additional requirement under Section 13(1)(g) and it means that the requirement must also be honest and not be tainted with any oblique motive."

In another case titled as Shiv Sarup Gupta versus Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta AIR 1999 Supreme Court 2507, the Hon'ble Apex Court had observed as hereunder:

" The words 'need' and 'require' both denote a certain degree of want with a thrust within demanding fulfillment. 'Need' or 'requirement' qualified by word 'bona-fide' or 'genuine' preceding as an adjective is an expression often used in Rent Control Laws. 'Bona-fide or genuine need' of the landlord or that the landlord 'genuinely requires' or requires bona-fide' an accommodation for occupation by or use for himself is an accepted ground for eviction and such expression is often employed by Rent Control legislation draftsman. The two expressions are interchangeable in practice and carry the same meaning. Xxxxx Thus, the term bona-fideor genuinely refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by 'requires' is much more higher than in mere desire. The phrase 'required bona-fide' is suggestive legislative intent that a mere desire which is outcome of whim or

-12fancy is not taken note of by the Rent Control Legislation. Xxxxx The Judge of facts should place himself in the arm chair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself - whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona-fide."

16. To prove his petition, petitioner Arvinder Singh himself stepped into the witness box as PW1 and deposed as per the averments of his petition. In his crossexamination, he stated that Ex. P1 was not registered. He had shown the entire ground floor of the building in the site plan Ex. P2 but had not shown the first and second floor of the same. He stated that he had purchased the property number 260-61-62 and 560 at different times vide 8 sale deeds Ex. R1 to Ex. R8. The said sale deeds were in the name of Narinder Family Trust Imphal which came into existence in the year 1986. In the said Trust Jatinder Kaur, Gurvinder Kaur, Jaswinder Singh, petitioner, along with his father Mahinder Singh and mother Narinder Kaur. Trust deed was prepared.

The said trust was registered and there was no resolution passed by the members of the Trust in his favour for filing the petition. It was a profitable Trust registered since 1982 at Imphal. There was no document to show that his son Japjot Singh was getting salary from him from his hotel. He was getting a salary of Rs.22,000/-per month. He stated that the blue portion in the site plan was rented out to Muthoot Finance in the year 2010. The green portion in the said site plan Ex.P2 was in possession of M/s JDS Oswal since 1987- 88. As per the salary account of Japjot Singh of October 2019, Ex.

-13Rs.22,000/- from Hotel First. Hotel First was a Family Trust property. It was petitioner's proprietorship concern. Japjot Singh, son of petitioner for whose requirement the petition was filed. It was examined as PW2. He deposited that he wanted to settle independently by taking up a business venture of spare parts for two wheelers and there was scope of the said business in the market in the shop in dispute. In his cross-examination, he stated that he was getting salary from his father since he attained the age of 18 years. He brought on record his Income Tax Returns for the years 2017-18 till 2021-22, as Ex. R10 to Ex. R15. He admitted his income mentioned in Ex. R14 to be Rs.4,40,400/-. He stated that he was not doing any independent business rather was working in the hotel of his father.

There were two more shops under tenancy in the same property but no eviction petition had been filed against them. Both PW1 and PW2 categorically testified that PW2 required the shop in dispute as it was the most suitable shop for starting business of spare parts of two wheeler as it was on road and it was a huge spare parts market around.

17. One of the main contentions raised by learned counsel for respondent was that petitioner was not the owner and he had no authority to file the petition on the ground of personal necessity as only the owner could seek eviction of tenant on the said ground. Even learned Rent Controller had observed in the order under challenge that petitioner was not the owner as the property was owned by the Family Trust. Therefore, he had no authority to file the petition for seeking eviction on the ground of personal necessity as he was not authorised by the trustees. Reliance was placed by learned counsel for respondent on Sheela versus Firm Prahlad Rai judgment (supra)

-14wherein Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that only owner-landlord could maintain suit for eviction on the ground of personal necessity and the person filing the petition on the said ground had to prove ownership apart from landlordship. The said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case as the petition was filed in the cited case law under Section 12 (1)(f) Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act 1961 which reads as under:- "(f) that the accommodation lead for nonresidential purpose is required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned."

It was observed in the said judgment that clause (f) contemplates a claim for eviction being maintained by an owner-landlord and not a landlord merely. Whereas there is no such provision in The East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. Another judgment of Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court in Smt. Ram Piari case (supra) was relied upon by learned counsel for respondent but the said law is not applicable to the facts of the present petition as in that case, question was involved as to whether the person who had inducted the tenant could only file the petition or the real owner could also file the petition for eviction. It was observed that in the said case there was no dispute inter-se between the person who inducted the tenant originally and the real owner of the property, therefore, it could not be held that the owner was not the

-15landlord of the property for the purposes of the Act. In the present petition, respondent had admitted petitioner to be landlord and owner in the written statement. Otherwise, also a tenant cannot dispute the title of the landlord and further it was not proved by respondent that there was any dispute between petitioner and any of the trustees of the said Family Trust for the demised property. Therefore, the observation of learner Rent Controller that petitioner had no authority to file the present petition is not in consonance with the settled law in Kamaljit Singh judgment (supra) that tenant cannot question, the title of landlord and is estopped from raising the said dispute under Section 116 of Evidence Act. Moreover, RW1 Kiran Kumar, husband of respondent stated in his crossexamination that his wife used to pay the rent to petitioner.

18. It was emphatically argued by learned counsel for respondent that there was concealment on the part of petitioner as he had concealed the fact that he had other properties and had made tender to rent out another shop which was proved by RW2 Ankur Mahajan who brought the record regarding the said bid. As per the record brought by RW2, it was mentioned in Ex. RW2/1 that the total covered area of ground floor of the building was 1279.45 square feet and the carpet area was 1080 square feet. As per the property tax return RW2/2 and TS1 copy from the year 2019-2020 of the property bearing number BXII560/260/261/262/1 was measuring 293.5 square yards as per Ex. RW 2/3. It was stated by RW2 that the requirement by Central Bank of India was carpet floor area of 1200-1800 square feet for office and 64 to 100 square feet for its ATM. It is noteworthy here that as per the memorandum of conditions of rent Ex.P1 qua demised

-16premises is in the area measuring 21 2/3 square yards whereas the property which petitioner had sent the tender to Central Bank of India was for the property measuring 1080 square feet as carpet area. Even the site plan of shop in dispute Ex. P2 and the site plan of the proposed area on the bid Ex. RW2/1 indicate that both the properties were different. Moreover, the tender pertained to the year 2021, which was during pendency of the petition for a much larger area than that of demised shop. It was specifically mentioned in the petition as well as in the evidence of petitioner that the shop in dispute was a part of multi storied building on Brown Road where petitioner's son wanted to start his independent business of spare parts.

It was mentioned categorically that the other shops/parts of the building were either under tenancy of different tenants or self occupied by petitioner where he was running his hotel. Hence, there is no concealment on petitioner's part with regard to other properties as asserted by respondent. Rather, the shop in dispute is as admitted by RW1, on the road where many shops with regard to spare parts of vehicles were being run and as such the said shop would be suitable for petitioner's son for starting his spare parts business Moreover, landlord is the best judge of his requirements and tenant cannot dictate terms to landlord to take up alternative accommodation as was held in Anil Kumar case (supra), Natha Singh case (supra), Diwan Singh case (supra), Gaurav Gupta case (supra), Ranjodh Singh case (supra) and Kirpal Singh case (supra).

Hence, the case law relied upon by learned counsel for respondent regarding concealment are not applicable to the facts of the present case.

-1719. It was strenuously argued by learned counsel for respondent that Japjot Singh son of petitioner was already having his income as per tax returns Ex. R1 to Ex. R8 which showed that he was running his own business and as such was not dependent upon petitioner as projected by him. Both PW1 and PW2 had stated in their cross-examination that PW2 Jagjot Singh was working in the hotel of petitioner and was getting a salary. It is settled law that if the petition is filed on ground of personal necessity for son of the landlord, the said son is not expected to sit idle till the decision of petition and if he is doing some work and getting income, it cannot be said that the need of petitioner was not bona fide as was held in Chuni Lal Chaudhary's case (supra).

20. It was vehemently argued by learned counsel for respondent that Ex.P1 was rent note which was unregistered and as such cannot be read into evidence even for collateral purposes. Perusal of Ex.P1 indicates that it was merely a memorandum of agreement qua rent (yadasht ikrarnama babat kiraiya) which is not compulsorily registrable document in view of law laid down in Bhag Singh judgment (supra) and RR Enterprises judgment (supra). Moreover, RW1 had admitted Ex.P1 to be correct.

21. Reference here can be made to a judgment by Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court in case Anil Kumar Vs. Harpal Singh Banwait and another 2008(1) RCR (Rent) 638 wherein it was had held that "a landlord who establishes prima facie existence of his necessity is entitled to raise a presumption in law that his need is bonafide. Onus thereafter shifts to tenant that plea of landlord was malafide". No such evidence had been brought by respondent to show that petitioner's son was

-18not in a position to run the said business. Since petitioner being landlord was competent to seek eviction of respondent on ground of personal necessity for his married son who wanted to settle and set up an independent business in demised shop and the said requirement was bona fide, therefore, the findings and order passed by learned Rent Controller are set aside.

22. No other point was raised before this Court.

23. As a sequel to aforemade discussion, the appeal in hand is accepted and order under challenge passed by learned Rent Controller stands set aside. Petition filed by petitioner on ground of bona fide personal necessity stands allowed. Consequently, respondent is directed to vacate the demised premises within two months from date of this judgment. Memo of cost be prepared. Record of court of Rent Controller be remitted forthwith alongwith copy of this judgment. Appeal file be consigned to the record room."

14.

A perusal of the above shows that learned appellate authority has categorically dealt with evidence (oral as well as documentary) on record and passed a well reasoned order which does not require any interference by this court.

15.

As per Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, the landlord may apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, in case the rented property is required for his own use.

16.

In the present case, the shop is required by the respondent for his son to start the independent business of spare parts who does not own or occupy any other shop. In East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, in

-19the definition of landlord the word "trustee" is included and it is admittedly Family Trust of the petitioner. The only requirement as per Section 13 of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 is that the person asking for eviction/applying for eviction should be landlord. And the respondent is covered under the definition of landlord.

17.

It is settled law that landlord is a best judge of his requirement and tenant cannot put him to his own terms. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd., 1998(8) SCC 119, has held that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. 18.

The relevant para 14 of the Sarla Ahuja's case (supra), is reproduced as under:- "14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."

-2019.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joginder Pal Vs. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002(5) SCC 397, has held as under:- "24.We are of the opinion that the expression 'for his own use' as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly construed. The expression must he assigned a wider, liberal and practical meaning. The requirement is not the requirement of the landlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require the accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himself physically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the family or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is dependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of the landlord for his own use.

In the several decided cases referred to hereinabove we have found the pari-materia provisions being interpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband, sister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her son, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependents and kith and kin in the requirement of landlord as "his" or "his own" requirement and user. Keeping in view the social or socio- religious milieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a particular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be obligation of the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him to make him economically independent so as to support himself and/or the landlord.

To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the tenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of the landlord.

-21there is a close inter-relation or identity nexus between such person and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first query. Applying the abovesaid tests to the facts of the present case it is clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the landlord's son who is a chartered accountant. It is the moral obligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to contribute his best to see him economically independent. The landlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the son would run his office in the premises the possession would continue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the son would be the occupation by the landlord himself. It is the landlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the user would be by landlord for his son's office. The case squarely falls within the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.

33. Our conclusions are crystalised as under:

(1) the words for his own use as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. 1949 must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction.

(ii) The expression landlord requires for 'his own use', is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal 'emanations of the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as inter-relationship and inter-dependence eco economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs

-22and obligations of the society or region to which they belong.

The tests to be applied are: (i) Whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord's own requirement ? and, (ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as 'his own' occupation or user? The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as 'his own' and the person who would actually use the premises, (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward, and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The Court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord's claim. (iv) While casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life.

(v) In the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord for his own use within the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii)." 20.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ajit Singh and another Vs. Jit Ram and another, 2008(9) SCC 699, has held as under:- "9. It is an admitted position that the said shop is at Village Badheri, Chandigarh. Since the eviction granted by the appellate authority and reversed by the High Court in revision was on bonafide requirement of the appellants, it will be fit and proper that Section 13 (3) (a) (ii) of the Rent Act should now be referred to, which runs as under:

-23- "13. Eviction of tenant - (3)(a) A landlord may apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession; (1)...............

(ii) in the case of non-residential building or rented land, if (a) he requires it for his own use;

(b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land as the case may be; and (c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned;"

A plain reading of the aforesaid provision, namely, Section 13 (3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act would show that in order to get an order of eviction on the aforesaid ground, the landlord had to aver and prove that the landlord required the said shop for his own use as the said shop was a non-residential building. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, 2002(1) RCR (Rent) 582: [(2002)5 SCC 397], this Court considered the aforesaid provision in detail and interpreted the words "his own use" in regard to a non-residential building. In that view of the matter, it would be appropriate for us to refer to the aforesaid consideration by this Court in the aforesaid decision which crystallised the question as under:

"(1) The words "for his own use" as occurring in Section 13 (3)(a)(ii) of the Act must receive a wide, liberal and useful meaning rather than a strict or narrow construction.

(2) The expression landlord requires for "his own use" is not confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the landlord personally. The requirement not only of the landlord himself but also of the normal "emanations" of

-24the landlord is included therein. All the cases and circumstances in which actual physical occupation or user by someone else, would amount to occupation or user by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively enumerated. It will depend on a variety of factors such as interrelationship and interdependence economic or otherwise, between the landlord and such person in the background of social, socio-religious and local customs and obligations of the society or region to which they belong.

(3) The tests to be applied are: (i) whether the requirement pleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the landlord's own requirement; and, (ii) whether on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case, actual occupation and user by a person other than the landlord would be deemed by the landlord as "his own" occupation or user. The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the nature and degree of relationship and/or dependence between the landlord pleading the requirement as "his own" and the person who would actually use the premises; (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises and is put forward; and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim. The court on being satisfied of the reasonability and genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere ruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord's claim.

(4) While casting its judicial verdict, the court shall adopt a practical and meaningful approach guided by the realities of life. (5) In the present case, the requirement of the landlord of the suit premises for user as office of his chartered accountant son is the requirement of landlord "for his own use" within the meaning of Section 13 (3)(a) (ii)."

-2510. This judgment is the answer to the question posed before us. Here also, the requirement is made for the son who is admittedly the owner of the shop room and also the landlord, after the said shop was, by a family partition dated 26th of August, 1998, given to the son who also became the landlord after family partition and also he became the owner of the said shop by such family partition.

11. From the aforesaid decision of this Court, it is therefore, clear that this Court has laid down authoritatively that a non-residential premises, if required by a son for user by him would cover the requirement of words used in the Section, i.e. "for his own use" in reference to a landlord. Therefore, if "his own use" has been interpreted by this Court in the above-said manner, then the requirements as laid down in Section 13 (3)(a)(ii) (b) and (c) of the Act has to be interpreted in the same manner to hold that (a) the son of the landlord has to plead in the eviction petition that, (b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such building or rented land as the case may be; and (c) he has not vacated such a building or rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of the Rent Act, in the urban area concerned.

15. At this stage, an argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents may be considered. The learned counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of this Court in Hasmat Rai & Anr. v. Raghunath Prasad, 1981(2) RCR (Rent) 401: [(1981)3 SCC 103] and contended that a portion of the demised premises may also be used as a residential premises, which cannot be considered to be a commercial premises for the purpose of evicting the tenant under Section 13 (3)(a)(ii) of the

-26Rent Act. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, for the simple reasons, first, the decision in Hasmat Rai's case (supra) was based on M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 which confers on the authority to pass order of eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement on a different wording from the words used in East Punjab Urban Rent Registration Act, 1949. Furthermore, it may be reiterated that in order to obtain an order of eviction under Section 13 (3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act, the landlord has to prove, as noted herein earlier, that he required the said shop for his own use and the said shop was a non- residential building. In this case, admittedly the said shop is used for commercial purposes and therefore there was no question of the said shop being used as residential purposes or being used for a portion of residential purposes for residential use. That being the position, the aforesaid decision, in our view, is clearly distinguishable. Accordingly, the above decision of this court is of no help to the respondents."

21.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raghunath G. Panhale V. M/s Chagan Lal Sudarji and Company, 1999(2) RCR (Rent) 485 has enumerated the following guidelines:- i.) Requirement of landlord must be both reasonable and bonafide.

ii) The word "reasonable" connotes that requirement is not fanciful or unreasonable. It cannot be mere desire. iii) The word requirement coupled with the word reasonable means that it must be something more than mere desire but need not certainly be a compelling or absolute or dire necessity.

-27iv) A reasonable and bonafide requirement is something in between a mere desire or wish on one hand that a compelling or dire or absolute necessity at the other end. v) It may not be need in praesenti or within reasonable proximity in the future. The word bona fide means that need must be honest and not be trained with any oblique motive.

vi) Language of provision cannot be unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible for landlord get possession. Construction of relevant statutory provision must strike a balance between right of landlord and right of tenant.

vii) Court should not proceed on assumption that requirement of landlord was not bona fide and that tenant could not dictate to the landlord as to how he should adjust himself without getting possession of tenant premises"

CONCLUSION 22.

As per the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in above referred to judgments, bonafide requirement is explained, which means that need must be honest and not tainted with any oblique motive. 23.

Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that Rent Controller, should proceed with presumption that requirement is bonafide and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. 24.

Hon'ble Supreme Court has defined "for his own use" by holding that it would include the use of family members or a person, who is dependent on landlord or of whom landlord is dependent.

-2825.

In view of the above and law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as referred to above, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in order dated 19.05.2025 passed by learned Appellate Authority, Ludhiana and the same is hereby upheld. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. 26.

Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, are also disposed of. 21.05.2026 (SUDEEPTI SHARMA) Ayub/Saahil JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned :

Yes/No Whether reportable :

Yes/No