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High Court of Punjab and HaryanaCRR/2090/2022disposed of

Bhagwant Rai v. Manmohan Singh

2025-09-09Mr. Justice Sanjay Vashisth11 pages

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"(28) To conclude, it can safely be said that there can never be any hard and fast category which can be prescribed to enable the Court to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. The only principle that can be laid down is the one which has been incorporated in the Section itself, i.e., "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court" or "to secure the ends of justice".

(29) In Mrs. Shakuntala Sawhney v.

Mrs.

Kaushalya Sawhney and others, Hon'ble Krishna Iyer, J. aptly summoned up the essence of compromise in the following words:

"The finest hour of justice arrives propitiously when parties, despite falling apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship of reunion."

(30) The power to do complete justice is the very essence of every judicial justice dispensation system. It cannot be diluted by distorted perceptions and is not a slave to anything, except to the caution and circumspection, the standards of which the Court sets before it, in exercise of such plenary and unfettered power inherently vested in it while donning the cloak of compassion to achieve the ends of justice.

(31) No embargo, be in the shape of Section 320(9) of the Cr.P.C., or any other such curtailment, can whittle down the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

(32) The compromise, in a modern society, is the sine qua non of harmony and orderly behaviour. It is the soul of justice and if the power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is used to enhance such a compromise which, in turn, enhances the social amity and reduces friction, then it truly is "finest hour of justice". Disputes which have their genesis in a matrimonial discord, landlord-tenant matters, commercial transactions and other such matters can safely be dealt with by the Court by exercising its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. in the event of a compromise, but this is not to say that the power is limited to such cases. There can never be any such rigid rule to prescribe the exercise of such power, especially in the absence of any premonitions to forecast and predict eventualities which the cause of justice may throw up during the course of a litigation.

(33) The only inevitable conclusion from the above discussion is that there is no statutory bar under the Cr.P.C. which can affect the inherent power of this Court under Section 482. Further, the same cannot be limited to matrimonial cases alone and the Court has the wide power to quash the proceedings even in non-compoundable offences notwithstanding the bar under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., in order to prevent the abuse of law and to secure the ends of justice.

9.

In this regard, counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment(s) of:

i) Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, (2014) 6 SCC 466; and Ramgopal and another v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC Online SC 834;

ii) a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Sube Singh and another v. State of Haryana and another, 2013 (4) RCR (Criminal) 102; and iii) a recent judgment passed by this Court in the case of Lakhbir Singh v. State of Punjab and another (CRA-S2065-SB-2007, decided on 14.02.2023 : Law Finder Doc ID #2138925).

(SANJAY VASHISTH)  