Naresh v. Union Of India And ORS


     




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  7.There is no dispute that the 1996 Act is a 'Special law' and that Section 34 provides for a period of limitation different from the prescribed under the Limitation Act. The question then is - is such exclusion expressed in Section 34 of the 1996 Act? The relevant extract of Section 34 reads : 34 " Application for setting aside arbitral award - \

(1) and (2) xx xx xx

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral Award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal :

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."

xx xx xx $2As for as the language of Section 34  of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are 'but not thereafter' used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2)  of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5  of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the

 Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

%%%%%%

18. In the circumstances and for the reasons earlier stated we answer the question posed at the outset in the negative. The appeal is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs. &  

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