Baljinderpal Singh & ORS v. Inderjit Kaur & ORS

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

RSA-1408-2013(O&M) Date of decision: 25.09.2025 Baljinderpal Singh & Another ...Appellant(s) Vs.

Inderjit Kaur & Others

...Respondent(s)

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NIDHI GUPTA Present:- Ms. Shivani Jaglan, Advocate for Ms. Aashna Gill, Advocate for the appellants.

Mr. Kanwal Goyal, Advocate for respondent No.1.

*** NIDHI GUPTA, J.

Present second appeal has been filed by the plaintiffs against the concurrent judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below whereby suit filed by the appellants for possession of the suit property measuring 21 kanal 2 marlas, has been dismissed by both the Courts below. 2.

Brief facts of the case as pleaded in the plaint are that Puran Singh son of Santokh Singh was the real brother of Mohinder Singh, who is husband of Inderjit Kaur/defendant. Therefore, defendant Inderjit Kaur is the sister-in-law/Bhabhi of Puran Singh. Puran Singh had died on 05.08.1993. Plaintiff No.1 is the widow and the plaintiffs No.2 to 5 are the sons and daughters of deceased Puran Singh. It was pleaded case of the plaintiffs that

Puran Singh was owner of sufficient agricultural land including the suit land. After the death of Puran Singh, the plaintiffs had become owners of his entire estate including the suit land. Plaintiffs or Puran Singh had never gifted or sold the suit land to defendants. However, the defendants were in possession of the suit property without the consent of the plaintiffs. As such, their possession over the suit property was without any right, title or interest. Plaintiff No.1 on her behalf and on behalf of the remaining plaintiffs had asked the defendant about a month back to hand over vacant possession of the suit land but the defendant had refused the request of the plaintiffs. Hence, present suit was filed on 01.08.1996.

3.

Upon notice, the defendants had appeared and filed written statement contesting the suit. It was contended by the defendants that Puran Singh was not the owner of the suit land at the time of his death as, vide Consent Decree dated 31.05.1985, Puran Singh had admitted the claim of Inderjit Kaur/defendant. It was contended that Puran Singh had suffered the decree dated 31.05.1985 voluntarily and had given the suit land to the defendant in pursuance and in terms of the Family Settlement of the year 1982. Thus, the defendant was owner in possession of the suit land with which the plaintiffs had no concern. The suit was also time-barred. Accordingly, dismissal of the suit was prayed for. 4.

Replication was filed by the plaintiffs denying the submissions made in the written statement and reiterating those made in the plaint.

5.

From pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed: - "1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners of the suit property having inherited the same from Puran Singh? OPP

2. Whether the defendant is owner in possession of the suit property on the basis of judgment and decree dated 31.5.85, passed by Sh. Jethu Ram Singla, PCS, Sub Judge, Ist Class, Patiala in Civil Sit No. 30 of 9.1.85? OPD

3. Whether the decree referred above is a result of impersonation, if so, its effect? OPP

4. Whether the suit is not maintainable? OPD

5. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from filing the present suit by their act and conduct? OPD

6. Whether the suit is within limitation? OPP

7. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the suit property? OPP

8. Whether the defendant is entitled to special, if so to what amount? OPD

9. Relief."

6.

On the basis of pleadings and oral & documentary evidence adduced by the parties, vide judgment and decree dated 16.04.2009, the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Patiala had dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. The Civil Appeal filed by the plaintiffs No.2 and 3, was also dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Patiala vide judgment and decree dated 11.10.2012. Hence, present second appeal by the plaintiffs. 7.

It is inter alia submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the learned Courts below were in patent error in non-suiting the appellants on the ground that the appellants had not challenged the decree

dated 31.05.1985. Learned counsel submits that the said decree could not be challenged in the suit as, at the time of filing the suit the appellants had no knowledge of the same. The plaintiffs had got knowledge of the said decree dated 31.05.1985 only through the written statement filed by the defendant in the present suit. It is a matter of record that in the replication filed by the appellants, said decree dated 31.05.1985 has been specifically denied; and it has been specifically averred that any such decree even if proved 'may be a result of impersonation' and the same was not binding upon the plaintiffs. 8.

It is submitted that in view of the specific pleading/denial of the appellants in the replication qua the Consent Decree dated 31.05.1985, issues No.2 and 3 were framed regarding the ownership of the appellants. Moreover, the fact that the alleged Consent Decree was procured by fraudulent means/impersonation is also proven from the fact that the learned counsel who had represented Puran Singh in the previous suit namely Madanjit Singh Attli had categorically admitted in his crossexamination as DW2 that in the said Civil Suit, service was not effected upon Puran Singh. Furthermore, Puran Singh was a resident of Delhi. As such, perusal of the decree dated 31.05.1985 shows that Puran Singh was not even present at the time of passing of the said decree. Even the alleged Family Settlement of 1982 relied upon by the defendants has not been placed on record by them. The defendant has also not appeared in the witness box to prove her case, and in such circumstances an adverse inference has to be

drawn. No doubt, her husband Mohinder Singh has appeared as DW1; however, even he has admitted in his deposition that the alleged Family Settlement of 1982 was not reduced into writing. Thus, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are based on conjectures and surmises and on a clear misreading of the evidence. Learned counsel for the appellants very ably argues that in the above facts, the alleged Consent Decree could not have been relied upon and the same could not have been held to create any right, title or interest in the suit property in favour of the defendants. 9.

It is further submitted that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate that it had been specifically averred that there could not be any family settlement with Inderjit Kaur in respect to the suit land which belonged to Puran Singh. Furthermore, the said family settlement, if any, cannot in any manner be a valid one in the absence of the appellants being a party to the same. There is no reason on record for the execution of this consent decree/family settlement to the exclusion of the wife and children of Puran Singh. This fact has been completely ignored by the Ld. Courts below. 10.

It is contended that in the above circumstances the said Consent Decree is unreliable. More-so, in view of the fact that it is not a registered document. It is submitted that it has wrongly been held that no registration was required of the consent decree dated 31.05.1985. It is argued that in view of the fact that there could not have been any family settlement between Puran Singh and the respondent; and the fact that the plaintiffs

have been excluded, registration of this decree was imperative. In support of her contentions, learned counsel relies upon judgment of this Court in Hardevi v. Hukam (Punjab and Haryana) : Law Finder Doc ID # 634460, wherein it is held that: - "A. Registration Act, 1908 Section 17 Consent Decree - Property involved is worth more than Rs. 100/- - Registration of - Is essential - Unregistered consent decree is not recognizable in the eyes of law - AIR 1996 S.C. 196 relied.

B. Family settlement - Respondents had got suffered a collusive decree by misrepresenting the facts to the daughter of deceased landowner on the pretext of getting a Power of Attorney to manage her land - Suit filed by her dismissed - Appeal against - Land in question which has devolved upon successors from the common ancestor cannot be a part of the family settlement, where sister transfers her share in favour of her brother as there is no pre-existing right qua the property of sister in favour of her brother and vice versa - Impugned order set aside - Appeal allowed."

11.

Learned counsel also relies upon judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, (SC) 1995(5) SCC 709, in particular para 18 and para 19 thereof: - "18. The legal position qua Clause (vi) of Section 17(2) can, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, be summarised as below :

(1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp and frustrate the law relating to registration, would not require registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration.

(2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first time right, title or interest in immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- upwards in favour of any party to the suit, the decree or order would require registration.

(3) If the decree were not to attract any of the Clauses of subsection (1) of Section 17, as was the position in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court's cases, it is apparent that the decree would not require registration.

(4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise, as was the position in Lahore case, benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because of compromise in question.

(5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the "subject matter of the suit or proceeding", Clause (vi) of sub-section (2) would not operate, because of the amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its origin in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council, according to which the original clause would have been attracted, even if it were to encompass property not litigated.

19. Now, let us see whether on the strength of the decree passed in Suit No. 215 of 1973, the petitioner could sustain his case, as put up in his written statement in the present suit, despite the decree not having been registered. According to us, it cannot for two reasons: (1) The decree having purported to create right or title in the plaintiff for the first time that is not being declaration of pre-exsisting right, did require registration. It may also be pointed out that the first suit cannot really be said to have been decreed on the basis of compromise, as the suit was decree "in view of the written statement filed by the defendant admitting the claim of the plaintiff to be correct." Decreeing of suit in such

a situation is covered by Order 12 Rule 6, and not by Order 23 Rule 3, which deals with compromise of suit, whereas the former is on the subject of judgment on admission.(2) A perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the first appellate Court held the decree in question as "collusive" as it was with a view to defeat the right of others who had bona fide claim over the property of Ganpat. Learned Judge of the High Court also took the same view."

12.

It is accordingly prayed that the impugned judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below, be set aside. 13.

Per Contra learned counsel for the respondents/defendants vehemently opposes the submissions made on behalf of the appellants and submits that first and foremost, even after getting knowledge of the Consent Decree through the written statement filed by the respondents, the appellants had failed to amend the Civil Suit. Accordingly, at no stage have the appellants sought a declaration against the Consent Decree. Therefore, in the subsistence of the said Consent Decree, present suit of the appellants for possession of the suit land, cannot be decreed. 14.

It is further submitted that in the replication, it has been stated by the plaintiffs that Puran Singh had been impersonated. However, the appellants were unable to prove any impersonation. It is only now at the time of argument that a new plea has been raised by the appellants that presence of Puran Singh at the time of decree dated 31.05.1985 is doubtful. Therefore,

appellants have changed their stance from time to time. Moreover, even the said plea is proven to be false from the record. 15.

As regards requirement for registration of the said decree, ld. counsel relies upon recent judgment dated 17.02.2025 passed by this Court in Bhagal (Since Deceased) v. Bulla (Since Deceased), (Punjab And Haryana) :Law Finder Doc ID # 2696768, wherein judgment in Bhoop Singh supra relied upon by the appellant, has been duly considered and clarified, and it has been held that:- "A consent decree based on a bona fide family settlement cannot be challenged in a subsequent suit on the ground of incorrect facts or lack of registration unless fraud or misrepresentation is specifically pleaded and proven.

XXX

16. Merely because summons were not issued, would not mean that the decree was a result of a fraud. Reference can be made to the judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of ' Jai Lal v. Chattar Singh and Others', 2004 (4) RCR (Civil) 775, wherein such a view was taken:

"5. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going through the records of the case I do not find any merit in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is correct that summons were not issued as the decree was passed on the very next date of the filing of the suit but it could not be disputed that the decree was passed on the basis of written statement filed by Smt. Ram Kaur admitting the claim of the plaintiffs and who also appeared before the court admitting the claim of the plaintiffs. Therefore, merely because summons

were not issued will not make the decree suffered by Smt. Ram Kaur as illegal or one suffering from fraud." Still further, in the case of 'Lichhami Devi and Other v. Bharpai and Others' (supra), it was held that a consent decree can be challenged in a subsequent suit on the ground of fraud etc. but not on the ground that facts pleaded in the suit leading to the consent decree were incorrect meaning thereby that the family settlement could not be called into question in a subsequent suit: "8. I have carefully considered the aforesaid contentions, but find myself unable to accept the same. Learned counsel for the appellants tried to pick up the word 'relinquishment' in isolation. On the other hand, consent decree was suffered on the basis of family settlement, whereby share of Fatta was relinquished in favour of defendants no.

1 and 2 herein. Thus, family settlement was the basis of the consent decree in question. Courts in India have always recognised the concept the family settlement among Hindus. In the instant case, the family settlement was between Fatta and his real nephews i.e. defendants no.1 and 2 herein. Said family settlement did not require compulsory registration. In the subsequent suit, said family settlement is not required to be proved again. Consent decree can be challenged in subsequent suit on the ground of fraud etc., but not on the ground that facts pleaded in the suit leading to the consent decree were incorrect. Court in subsequent suit cannot go behind the earlier decree (because that decree settles rights of parties) and find out as to whether the earlier consent decree was passed on right or wrong facts.

Subsequent court is not entitled to go into facts to find whether on that basis, earlier consent decree could be passed or not. This view finds support from judgment of this Court in the case of Harpal and others v. Smt. Ram Piari and others reported as 1981 P. L. J. 492. Such challenge in subsequent suit is also barred by principle of estoppel and res judicata. Judgments of this Court namely Smt.

Devi and others v. Smt. Lichhman and others reported as 1978 P. L. J. 379 and Smt. Har Kaur v. Smt. Dhappan (died) and others reported as 1986 P. L. J. 94 support this view." The argument that there was no dispute and, therefore, no family settlement could have been arrived at, therefore, falls to the ground. Even otherwise, a bare reading of the plaint shows that a family settlement had been arrived at between the parties. No doubt, it looks little odd that the entire land was given to one brother. However, this alone would not make the family settlement illegal and arbitrary and in any case, such a family settlement cannot be called into question in a subsequent suit and a decree, as noted above, could be challenged only on the ground of fraud. Still further, in the case of 'Lali Devi and Others v.

Jai Singh and Others', (supra), a Co-ordinate Bench while dealing with a challenge to a consent decree on the ground of fraud held that where a statement had been made in the Court also and the previous suit had not been decreed only on the basis of a written statement, it was difficult to accept a plea of fraud. It was held that a statement made in Court carries authenticity and that if challenge to such decrees are accepted, there would be no end to litigation and no lis would attain finality. It was held that no sanctity would be attached to the proceedings of the Court and the whole system of administration of justice would collapse. It was held that it was not uncommon that such consent decrees are suffered voluntarily and later on, the persons suffered such decrees, change their mind and challenge the same on different ground.

"9. Plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove the alleged fraud in passing of consent judgment and decree dated

15.04.1996. The said consent judgment and decree were passed not only on the basis of admission made in written statement filed by defendants of suit No. 281 of 1996 but also on the admission made by the said defendants by making statement in Court itself. Plea of the plaintiffs of the present suits that their thumb impressions/signatures had been obtained on blank papers on one pretext or the other, if substantiated, could possibly be accepted if there had been admission in written statement only. However, admission by making statement in Court stands on altogether different footings. Statement made in Court carries authenticity. It cannot be said that the said Statement was recorded on blank paper already bearing thumb impressions/signatures of makers of the said statement. Such a contention cannot be entertained at all.

If such contention is accepted, then there will be no end to litigation. No lis would attain finality. No sanctity would be attached to the proceedings of the Court. The whole system of administration of justice would collapse. It is not uncommon that such consent decrees are suffered voluntarily and later on, the persons who suffered such decrees, change their mind and challenge the same on different grounds. It is only where fraud is established beyond reasonable doubt that such consent decree can be set aside. Fraud when pleaded in civil case is also required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt just like criminal charge. In the instant case, very strong evidence of exceptional quality is required to prove the alleged fraud because defendants of suit No.

281 of 1996 had even made statement in Court admitting the claim of plaintiffs of that suit and, therefore, fraud is reasonably ruled out. Plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove the alleged fraud."

17. The argument that such a transfer would amount to an oral gift and, therefore, the decree would require registration is devoid of merit. The plaint duly mentioned about a family settlement having been arrived at and, therefore, there was a

pre-existing right and it was not a settlement in presenti. The law governing the concept of registration would be the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of 'Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, (1995) 5 SCC 709, wherein it was laid down as under: "18. The legal position qua Clause (vi) of Section 17 (2) can, on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, be summarised as below:-

(1) Compromise decree if bona fide, in the sense that the compromise is not a device to obviate payment of stamp and fhistrate the law relating to registration, would not require registration. In a converse situation, it would require registration.

(2) If the compromise decree were to create for the first time right, title or interest in immovable properly of the value of Rs. 100/- upwards in favour of any party to the suit, the decree or order would require registration.

(3) If the decree were not to attract any of the Clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 17, as was the position in the aforesaid Privy Council and this Court's cases, it is apparent that the decree would not require registration.

(4) If the decree were not to embody the terms of compromise, as was the position in Lahore case, benefit from the terms of compromise cannot be derived, even if a suit were to be disposed of because of compromise in question.

(5) If the property dealt with by the decree be not the "subject matter of the suit or proceeding", Clause (vi) of subsection (2) would not operate, because of the amendment of this clause by Act 21 of 1929, which has its

origin in the aforesaid decision of the Privy Council, according to which the original clause would have been attracted, even if it were to encompass property not litigated."

18. The test would, therefore, be as to whether a right has been conferred in presenti or there was a preexisting right. In the present case, the plaint itself shows that there was a pre-existing right and, therefore, the decree would not require registration. Even otherwise, a party to the decree cannot challenge the same on the ground of registration. The judgment in the case of 'Siri Bhagyvan v. Smt. Murti Devi (dead) through LRs and Others' (supra), which had been relied by learned counsel for the plaintiff would not be applicable because in that case, it had been found by the Court that no family settlement had taken place and under these circumstances, the legal effects of such a decree were seen and it was held that it would then amount to an oral gift requiring registration. In the case of Rajjo v.

Jawahar Singh', 2007 (2) RCR (Civil) 62, a Co-ordinate Bench held that a party who suffers a consent decree cannot challenge the same on the ground of non-registration and it can challenge the same only on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation: "11. The only question that now survives is as to whether a party, who has suffered a consent decree, can challenge it on the ground of non-registration. In my opinion, the party, who has suffered the decree, can challenge it on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation alone and not on the ground of non-registration. Either the concerned party denies the very genesis of the decree by saying that it was the result of fraud, misrepresentation and that there was no intention to suffer the decree, but to say that after suffering the decree that the same was not registered is not permissible.

judgment reported as 2000(1) RCR (Civil) 122: 2000(1) Civil Court Cases 188 (P&H), Parveen Kumar v. Shiv Ram alias Sheo Ram that the person, who has suffered the decree, cannot challenge it on the ground of nonregistration. The decree can be challenged only on the ground of fraud, misrepresentation or if it has been passed by the Court of incompetent jurisdiction. The party who suffers the consent decree is estopped by his own conduct to challenge the same except on the grounds mentioned above. There has to be sanctity accorded to the statements made before the Courts. It was so held by the Supreme Court in the judgment reported as 2001(4) RCR (Civil) 106 (SC): AIR 2001 SC 2790, Salkia Businessmen's Association and others v. Howrah Municipal Corporation and others, wherein it was observed as under:

"The memorandum and terms of the compromise in this case became part of the orders of the High Court itself when the writ petition was finally disposed of in terms of the compromise reached between the parties notwithstanding that there was no verbatim reproduction of the same in the order. While so, it is beyond one's comprehension as to how any violation of terms of compromise could have been viewed by the Court as a matter of mere contract between parties and under that pretext absolve itself of the responsibility to enforce it, except by doing violence to the terms thereof in letter and spirit If Courts are not to honour and implement their own orders, and encourage party litigants - be they public authorities, to invent methods of their own to short circuit and give a go-bye to the obligations and liabilities incurred by them under orders of the Court - the rule of law will certainly become a casually, in the process - a costly consequence to be jealously averted by all and at any rate by highest Courts in States in the Country."" 16.

Learned counsel submits that therefore, the Consent Decree was not required to be registered. Ld. counsel accordingly prays for dismissal of the present appeal.

17.

No other argument is made on behalf of the parties. I have heard learned counsel and perused the case file in great detail. 18.

In the present suit, the plaintiff has not challenged the Consent Decree dated 31.5.1985. Although the learned counsel for the appellants has very ably tried to impress upon this Court that even in absence to challenge to the Consent Decree dated 31.05.1985, the rights of the plaintiffs are maintained, however, this Court is not persuaded. The rights of the respondent flow from the Consent Decree dated 31.5.1985. In the absence of any challenge to the said Decree, and in the subsistence of the said Decree, suit of the plaintiffs for possession, cannot be maintained. Even argument of the appellants that the trial court had framed Issues no.2 and 3, is devoid of merit as the same cannot be a substitute for a declaration made in accordance with law in respect of the Decree.

No reasons have been given by the appellants as to why they failed to amend the suit. On the other hand, as will be demonstrated hereinbelow, the respondents have irrevocably established the passing of the Consent Decree dated 31.5.1985. In such a situation, failure to challenge the Consent Decree dated 31.5.1985 is fatal to the case of the appellants. 19.

It has further been contended by the appellants that the Decree dated 31.5.1985 was procured by the respondents through impersonation of Puran Singh. Onus to prove the said alleged impersonation was upon the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs have failed

to do so as, plaintiffs have led no evidence in affirmative to prove Issue No.3. As such, the alleged impersonation of Puran Singh is merely a bald allegation, which is not proved on record.

20.

The appellants have then doubted the presence and participation of Puran Singh in passing of decree dated 31.5.1985. However, even the said contention of the appellants is factually incorrect. The record irrevocably establishes that the Civil Suit No.30/Ex. D-5 was instituted by the defendant Inderjit Kaur on dated 09.01.1985 seeking a declaration to the effect that Inderjit Kaur is owner in possession of the suit property; pursuant to which DW2 Madanjit Singh Attli, Advocate had put in appearance on behalf of Puran Singh on 11.03.1985; and had filed Vakalatnama and written statement (Ex.D1), which had been duly signed by Puran Singh and DW2 Madanjit Singh Attli, Advocate; whereafter Puran Singh himself had recorded his statement in Court on 07.05.1985 (Ex.D-2); whereupon Consent Decree dated 31.05.1985 (Ex.D3) was passed.

Ex D5 is the certified copy of plaint in Civil Suit No.30 dated 09.01.1985 filed by defendant against Puran Singh. Claim is on the basis of family settlement from 1982 onwards. Ex D1 is the written statement filed by Puran Singh admitting the claim of defendant. Ex. D2 is the statement suffered by Puran Singh in the Court of Sub-Judge, First Class, Patiala. DW-1 Mohinder Singh (younger brother of Puran Singh) has admitted the signatures of deceased Puran Singh on the case file of Civil Suit No.30 dated 09.01.

by the Court. DW-2 M.S Attli Advocate categorically deposed that Puran Singh had engaged him in Civil Suit No.30 in which he filed written statement and his Vakalatnama. He identified his signature as well as that of Puran Singh in the summoned filed. Hence, the Court came to conclusion that there is no impersonation, and that written statement was filed by Puran Singh, and he also suffered a statement in the Court. 21.

Argument of the plaintiffs that DW2 has stated that service/summons were not affected upon Puran Singh is not only unsubstantiated but is based on a misreading of the statement made by DW2 Madanjit Singh, Advocate. who has merely stated that "...no service affected through Court on Puran Singh is there in the said file decided on 31.5.85 showever I filed by Vakalatnama on 11.3.85. ......" Firstly, merely because Service affected upon Puran Singh was not available on case file would not imply that Puran Singh was not properly represented; especially in view of the fact that Puran Singh himself had recorded his statement before the Court on 07.05.1985 (Ex.P2/D2). Thus, argument of learned counsel for the plaintiffs to the effect that it has been acknowledged by DW2 that summons were not effected upon Puran Singh, are misconceived. A complete reading of the evidence of DW2 would reflect that no adverse admission has been made by DW2. Rather, he has admitted that Puran Singh had recorded his statement on 07.05.1985 pursuant to which the decree was passed.

22.

A perusal of the statement made by DW2 shows that he has clearly stated that he had been engaged by Puran Singh in the Civil Suit No.30; that he had appeared before the learned Sub-Judge, First Class, Patiala on 11.03.1985 and filed Vakalatnama and written statement etc. Statement of Madanjit Singh reads as follows: - "I am practising as an advocate and in District Court Patiala since 1981-82. I was engaged by Puran Singh defendant in suit titled as Inderjit Kaur Vs. Puran Singh. I appear in the Court of Sh. G.R.Singla Sub-Judge, 1st Class Patiala. I appeared on 11.3.85 and filed the Vakalatnama and written statement in the Court. I have seen the Vakalatnama which is signed by defendant Puran Singh and is also signed by me. Which I have seen in the summoned file. I have seen the written statement in the summoned file.

Which bears my signatures and that of Puran Singh deft. I had obtained the said signatures in my presence on the vakaltnama and also on the written statement. The certified copy of the written statement is Ex.D1. Puran singh also made statement in the Court on 7.5.1985. I have seen the said statement recorded in that Court from the summoned filed. Which is signed by Puran Singh deft. of that suit and the same was identified by me. The certified copy of the said statement is Ex.P2.

23.

Thus, contention of the appellants that Puran Singh was not represented before the learned Sub-Judge, is a blatant misconstruction of the statement made by Madanjit Singh Attli, Advocate DW2. It is also clear from the above that the said Consent decree was not passed in a single day to cause suspicion and has been passed only after the ld. Court had satisfied

itself. Furthermore, merely because Puran Singh and Madanjit Singh Attli, Advocate were not known to each other, would also not in any manner affect the case of the respondents. Thus, this argument of learned counsel for the appellants stands rejected.

24.

It is also noteworthy that Puran Singh himself during his lifetime from the time of passing of the Consent Decree on dated 31.05.1985 till the time of his death on 05.08.1993, had not challenged the said decree. The genuineness of the said Decree is evident from the fact that even mutation in favour of the defendant was entered in 1988 in the Revenue Records showing the defendant to be owner in possession of the suit property. Needless to say, if Puran Singh had not willingly executed the said Decree, and was in any manner aggrieved of the same, he would have laid challenge to the Consent Decree during his lifetime. 25.

It has next been contended by learned counsel for the appellants that the Consent Decree was not valid document as it was not registered. In support, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon judgments in Hardevi (supra) passed by this Court in 31.07.2006; and Bhoop Singh (supra) passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 11.09.1995. However, the said judgments would also not be of help to the appellants as the same, besides being distinguishable on law and facts, are also in the teeth of a subsequent judgment dated 06.09.2006 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Som Dev v. Rati Ram, (SC) : Law Finder Doc ID #

123828, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court after examination of the entire relevant case law on the subject, had held that "Title to property acquired by way of family arrangement - Decree based on family arrangement does not require registration." The relevant extract of the said judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Som Dev supra is as under:- "6. We shall now advert to Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908. Sub-section (1) specifies what are the documents that are to be registered. An instrument of gift of immovable property, an instrument which purports to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, whether in present or in future any right, title or interest in immovable property, the value of which exceeds Rs.

100/-, any instrument which acknowledges the receipt or payment of consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extinction of any right title or interest, leases of immovable property from year to year or for a term exceeding one year and instruments transferring or assigning any decree or order of court or any award where such decree or order or award operates to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property, the value of which exceeds Rs. 100/-. Sub-section (1A) provides that agreements for sale to be used to claim protection of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act entered into after 24.9.2001 require registration. Sub-section (2) excludes.

from the operation of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17, the various transactions described therein under various clauses. We are concerned with clause (vi) therein.

"Any decree or order of a Court except a decree or order expressed to be made on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than which is subject matter of the suit or proceeding". (emphasis supplied) It may be noted that going by clause (vi), a decree or order of court need not be registered on the basis that it comes within the purview of Section 17(1)(b) or 17(1)(c) of the Act as an instrument purporting to or operating to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in immovable property. It may further be seen that a compromise decree also does not require registration in terms of clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the Registration Act unless that decree takes in immovable property valued above Rs.

100/-, that is not a subject matter of the suit or the proceeding giving rise to the compromise decree. In other words, only if the compromise also takes in any property that is not the subject matter of the suit, it would require registration. If the compromise is confined to the subject matter of the suit, it would not.

It may be noted that Section 43 of the Registration Act of 1864 and Section 41 of the Registration Act of 1866 provided that when any civil court should by a decree or order, declare any document relating to immovable property, which should have been registered, to be invalid or when any civil court should pass a decree or order affecting any such document and the decree or order should create, declare, transfer, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest under such document to or in the immovable property to which it relates, the court should cause a memorandum of the decree or order to be sent to the Registrar within whose district the document was originally registered.

Act of 1871. But in the Specific Relief Act, 1877, Section 39 was introduced providing that where an instrument is adjudged void or voidable under that section and ordered to be delivered up and cancelled, the court should send a copy of its decree, if the instrument has been registered under the Registration Act, to the officer in whose office the instrument had been so registered and such officer should note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the effect of its cancellation. But under the 1887 Act, decrees and orders of courts and awards were exempted from registration. They were also not mentioned in Section 18 which related to documents of which registration was optional. Sargent, CJ in Purmananddas v.

Vallabdas, (ILR 11 Bombay 506), explained the position as follows: "The application (for execution) was refused on the ground that the decree was an instrument, which created an interest in immovable property, and could not be given in evidence for want of registration. Provision was made for the registration of such a decree by Section 42 of Act XX of 1886, but that section was not reenacted in Act VIII of 1871. If, therefore, it required registration under the Act, it could only be as an 'executed instrument' under Section 17, a description which is scarcely applicable to a decree. Moreover, it is to be remarked that Section 32 deals only with the presentation of a 'copy' of a decree, the optional registration of which is expressly provided for by section 18 of the Act.

Upon a true construction of the Act of 1871, read with reference to Act XX of 1866, such a decree, we are strongly inclined to think, did not fall within Section 17. However, Act Ill of 1877, which is now in force, expressly excludes such decrees, whether passed before or after the Act, from the operation of compulsory registration, and the decree is, therefore, now admissible in evidence."

In Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni & Ors., [I.L.R. 22 Madras 508], the Privy Council held :

"The razinamah was not registered in accordance with the Act of 1877; but the objection founded upon its non-registration does not, in their Lordships' opinion, apply to its stipulations and provisions in so far as these were incorporated with, and given effect to by, the order made upon it by the Subordinate Judge in the suit of 1885. The razinamah, in so far as it was submitted to and was acted upon judicially by the learned Judge, was in itself a step of judicial procedure not requiring registration; and any order pronounced in terms of it constituted res judicata, binding upon both the parties to this appeal who gave their consent to it."

In Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari Company Limited, (46 Indian Appeals 240), the Privy Council again held that a consent decree did not require registration even if it compromised immovable property other than that which was the subject matter of the suit and that the consequences provided for by Section 49 of the Act would not follow. It was in the light of this decision of the Privy Council, that by virtue of Section 10 of the Transfer of Property (Amendment) Supplementary Act, 1929, which came into force on 01.04,1930, clause (vi) of Section 17(2) of the Registration Act was amended and re-enacted in the present form, thus, excluding decrees and orders of courts including compromise decrees from registration because of Section 17(1)(b) and (c), if they related only to the subject matter of the suit or if the compromise did not take in any property outside the subject matter of the suit. (See Mulla on Registration Act, Tenth Edition)"

26.

Reliance may also be placed upon judgments of this Court in Lichhami Devi v. Bharpai (P&H) : Law Finder Doc ID # 266703 and Murti v. Jai Ram (P&H) : Law Finder Doc ID # 266774, wherein it is held that Consent Decree cannot be challenged on ground of fraud, misrepresentation, etc.

Question of Family Settlement cannot be gone into, being barred by res judicata. Reference may also be made to judgment of this Court in Smt. Sunehri Devi v. Pritam Singh, (P&H) : Law Finder Doc ID # 118904, wherein it is held that semblance of relationship is enough for Family Settlement and Consent Decree. Family Settlement between siblings is permitted. The judgment of this Court in Gurdev Singh v. Kartar Singh, (P&H) : Law Finder Doc ID # 320, is also relevant wherein it is held that pre-existing right covers members of larger family, thus decree on basis of Family Settlement between them does not require registration. Reliance may further be placed upon judgment of this Court in Hari Singh v.

Gurcharan Singh, (P&H) : Law Finder Doc ID # 63103, wherein it is held that Consent Decree challenged by children on the ground that it requires registration. Held such plea available only to person suffering the decree and not to his legatees. In Som Dev v. Rati Ram, (P&H) : Law Finder Doc ID # 98733, this Court held that it is not required to go into existence of relationship in previous suit. 27.

Furthermore, argument of the appellants that the said Family Settlement was never placed on record by the respondents or that it has been admitted by DW1 Mohinder Singh, husband of the defendant, that the said Settlement was not reduced into writing, is also not of any use to the appellants, as clearly the said Family Settlement of 1982 has been acted upon. It is not denied by the appellants that pursuant to the said Family Settlement of 1982, and Consent Decree dated 31.5.1985, mutations were

entered in favour of the defendants in the Revenue Record in the year 1988. Admittedly, even the same have not been challenged by Puran Singh. 28.

It is lastly pointed out that the Handwriting expert examined by plaintiff as PW-2 has stated that signatures of Puran Singh are not on the disputed documents. However, the said report has been disbelieved by both the Courts below as: a) In cross-examination PW2 has stated/admitted that disputed signatures do not have any suspicious and quality defects; b) that disputed signatures are written by one and the same person having natural variation; c) And also admits that even standard signatures are written by one and same person having natural variations. Thus, the Courts below came to the conclusion that PW-2 in cross-examination has admitted that there are similarities in the disputed as well as standard signatures. 29.

The relevant findings of First Appellate Court are contained in Paras 22, 23, 24 of the judgment dated 11.10.2012, which read as follows:- "22. Now before proceeding further with this case, here I would like to mention that this court cannot sit as court of appeal upon the judgment dated 31.5.1985 passed by Sh. J.R. Singla, the then Sub Judge Ist Class Patiala. It is no body's case that the said judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985 of the learned Sub Judge was challenged in any manner by way of appeal, revision or review by any of the party thereto or by the plaintiffs after the death Puran Singh. So the judgment and decree of the learned Sub Judge has become final. Therefore, no question regarding the legality of judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985 can be entertained in the present case and if

that be so every judgment and decree will be challenged by way of separate suit on the point of law and fact. The perusal of judgment and decree passed by Sh. Sh. J.R. Singla, the then Sub Judge Ist Class Patiala dated 31.5.1985, it is clear that the same was passed upon the basis of a family settlement arrived between Puran Singh and Inderjit Kaur. As this Court cannot sit as Court of appeal upon this judgment, so the question as to whether there could be any family settlement between Puran Singh and Inderjit Kaur cannot be entertained in the present case. So also the authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants cited as Harichand (Dead) through Lrs. Vs. Dharampal singh 2007(3) Apex Court Judgments, 210 and Rajni Bajaj & Ors. V/s Ram Piari 2006(1) Civil Court Cases 711 are not applicable to the present case. Any finding qua the legality of family settlement arrived in between Inderjit Kaur and Puran Singh in this case may be in conflict with the judgment of Sh. J.R. Singla dated 31.5.1985 and the Same is not permissible at all under law.

23. However the question regarding any impersonation of deceased Puran Singh in the matter of judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985 can certainly be entertained. It is the plaintiffs, who came up with the plea of impersonation of deceased Puran Singh and certainly the onus to prove this fact was upon the plaintiffs. Here I do not find merits in the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants that it was for the defendant to show that there was no impersonation of deceased Puran Singh in the matter of judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985. In my considered judicial opinion, the onus was upon the plaintiffs to prove this fact. Issue No. 3 in this regard was specifically framed by the learned trial court and onus to prove

this issue was upon the plaintiffs. For that purpose, the plaintiffs were required to lead evidence in affirmative. Even if the plea of the plaintiffs is accepted that judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985 came into their knowledge only after filing of written statement by the defendant, even then, they were in the knowledge of passing of the judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985 before the commencement of trial. It is the plaintiffs, who had taken the plea of impersonation, so the initial burden to prove this fact was heavily upon them. In my considered opinion the burden to prove this fact could not otherwise be shifted upon the defendant. Therefore, it was highly incumbent upon the plaintiffs to lead evidence in affirmative upon the point of impersonation.

However, the record of the learned trial court clearly shows that no such effort was made by the plaintiffs in this regard. The plaintiffs tendered into evidence the jamabandi for the year 1972-73, Ex.P1, jamabandi for the year 1977-78 Ex. P2 and mutation Ex. P3 and closed their evidence. No evidence in affirmative was led by the plaintiffs that the judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985 was not suffered by Puran Singh. Therefore, the plaintiffs had failed to discharge the initial burden upon them to prove this fact.

24. Thereafter, the defendants in their evidence had examined Madanjit Singh Attli, Advocate, who was counsel for deceased Puran Singh in that earlier litigation before the court of learned Sub Judge and in my considered opinion, he could be the best possible witness to depose in favour of the defendant. The file of the case "Inderjit Kaur v/s Puran singh" was also summoned by the defendant in her evidence and Madanjit Singh Attli, Advocate, while going through this file, had categorically stated that he was engaged by Puran Singh defendant in the

suit titled as Inderjit Kaur v/s Puran Singh. He appeared in the Court of Sh. J.R Singla, Sub Judge first Class Patiala. He appeared on 11.3.1985 and filed the vakalatnama and written statement in the Court. He had seen the vakalatnama, which is signed by defendant Puran Singh and the same is also signed by him. He had also seen the written statement in the summoned file and stated that it bears his signatures and that of Puran Singh defendant. He had stated that he had obtained said signatures in his presence on the vakalatnama and on the written statement. He has proved the certified copy of written statement Ex. D1. he had also stated that Puran Singh made statement in the Court on 7.5.1985 He had also seen the statement recorded in that court from the summoned file, which was signed by Puran Singh and the same was identified by him.

The certified copy of the statement is Ex.P2. DW1 Mohinder Singh, who is brother of deceased Puran Singh also identified the signatures of deceased Puran Singh on the written statement and on the vakalatnama in favour of Sh. Madanjit singh Attli, Advocate. Now the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants are to the effect that DW1 Mohinder Singh has nowhere stated that Puran Singh signed in his presence upon the said documents and also Puran Singh was earlier not known to Madanjit Singh Attli, Advocate and in this manner both these testimonies failed to show that it was deceased Puran Singh, who signed these documents. No doubt DW2 has stated that deceased Puran Singh was not known to him and DW1 has stated that the documents were not signed by Puran Singh in his presence.

were identified by DW1 Mohinder Singh, who was brother of deceased Puran Singh. So DW1 Mohinder Singh identified the signatures of Puran Singh on these documents and thereafter there is testimony of Madanjit Singh Attli, Advocate, who has stated that Puran Singh signed in his presence upon these documents. Therefore, the cumulative effect of both these testimonies is to the effect that said documents bear the signatures of Puran Singh. Moreover, there is no reason forthcoming to doubt the testimony of Madanjit Singh Atli, Advocate, who was counsel for Puran Singh in the earlier litigation. Moreover, the said judgment and decree was not challenged by deceased Puran Singh during his lifetime.

The judgment and decree was passed in the year 1985 and Puran Singh died in the year 1993 and there is nothing on record to suggest that the judgment and decree was challenged by him during his life time. Moreover, brother of deceased Puran Singh stepped into witness box as DW1 and he identified the signatures of Puran Singh upon the various documents in that earlier litigation. Therefore, the defendant was able to prove her case before the learned trial court that Puran Singh suffered the judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985 in her favour before the Court of Sh. J.R. Singla, the then Sub Judge, Patiala. However, the matter does not end here." 30.

I am in complete agreement with the above reasoning of the learned first Appellate Court.

31.

Thus, to summarise, the present second appeal deserves to be dismissed as both the Courts below have concurrently found that: - Puran

Singh was actual owner of suit land; that Plaintiffs admit possession of defendant; that Possession of the defendant is admitted but it is not coming forth and there is no pleading by the plaintiffs as to how, when, and why defendant came into possession of suit property; that from 1988 onwards, defendant is being reflected as the owner in possession in revenue record; Yet, there is no challenge to either the Consent Decree dated 31.5.

1985, or even to the revenue record wherein mutation is entered in the name of the defendant; that, although in replication plea of fraud and impersonation has been taken but no evidence in affirmative was led by the plaintiffs in this regard; No declaration of their title is sought by plaintiff; and a simple suit for possession filed by plaintiff without consequential relief of declaration is not maintainable; even no declaration regarding the judgment and decree dated 31.5.1985, has been sought; therefore, no question regarding the legality of judgment and decree dated 31.05.

1985 can be entertained at this stage because if it is so permitted than every judgment and decree will be challenged by way of suit; the said judgment and decree is on the basis of a family settlement arrived between Puran Singh and Inderjit Kaur; Any finding qua the legality of the family settlement arrived between them is not permissible under Law; The suit is barred by limitation; The Judgement and decree dated 31.5.1985 does not require registration because: Defendant is not a stranger but is wife of brother Puran Singh; and being a consent a decree does not require registration.

32.

In view of the above discussion, no ground is made out to interfere in the impugned judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below. Present appeal accordingly stands dismissed. 33.

Pending application(s) if any also stand(s) disposed of. (Nidhi Gupta) 25.09.2025 Judge Sunena Whether speaking/reasoned:

Yes/No Whether reportable:

Yes/No