Raj Kumar v. Charanjit Kaur And Others

[1]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Date of decision: 01.07.2026 Raj Kumar ...Appellant

Versus

Charanjit Kaur and others

...Respondents

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK GUPTA

Present:

Mr. Narender Kaajla, Advocate for the appellant. Mr. Sanjeev Kodan, Advocate for the Insurance Company.

**** DEEPAK GUPTA, J. (ORAL) The present applica4on (CM-3754-CII-2026) has been filed under Sec4on 5 of the Limita4on Act seeking condona4on of 1285 days' delay in filing the accompanying appeal.

2.

The appeal arises out of the award dated 11.02.2016 passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Sangrur in MACT Case No.31 of 2013 4tled "Charanjit Kaur and others versus Dalvir Singh and others". Vide the said award, compensa4on of ₹10,37,000/- along with interest was awarded to the claimants on account of the death of Bahadur Singh in a motor vehicular accident. Although the liability to sa4sfy the award was fastened upon the Insurance Company in the first instance, recovery rights were granted in its favour against respondents No.1 and 2, namely the driver and owner of the offending vehicle, on the finding that the driver was not holding a valid and effec4ve driving licence at the relevant 4me. 3.

Aggrieved only by the grant of recovery rights in favour of the Insurance Company, the owner of the offending vehicle has preferred the present appeal aBer a delay of 1285 days.

4.

Learned counsel for the applicant-appellant submits that the

[2] appellant is a rus4c farmer and was unaware of the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal. It is contended that the counsel engaged before the Tribunal had assured the appellant that since all the documents pertaining to the vehicle were valid, he need not be concerned about the outcome of the case. It is further submiCed that the appellant came to know about the recovery rights only aBer he was served in the appeal preferred by the claimants, namely FAO No.471 of 2017, wherein he appeared through another counsel on 16.10.2019. ThereaBer, some further 4me was consumed in arranging the statutory deposit of ₹25,000/- required for filing the appeal. On these premises, prayer has been made for condona4on of delay.

5.

I have heard learned counsel for the applicant and have perused the record.

6.

The applica4on does not deserve acceptance.

7.

It is well seCled that though the expression "sufficient cause" occurring in Sec4on 5 of the Limita4on Act is to receive a liberal construc4on so as to advance substan4al jus4ce, such liberal approach does not dispense with the requirement of explaining the delay by furnishing a bona fide, reasonable and sa4sfactory explana4on. The applicant must explain the delay for the en4re period and demonstrate that despite exercising due diligence, he was prevented by circumstances beyond his control from approaching the Court within the prescribed period.

8.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj versus Special Land Acquision Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, has held that limita4on may some4mes operate harshly, but the Courts have no power to extend the prescribed period on equitable grounds unless sufficient cause within the

[3] meaning of Sec4on 5 is established. Likewise, in P.K. Ramachandran versus State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556, it has been held that the law of limita4on has to be applied with all its rigour and Courts cannot condone delay merely on sympathe4c considera4ons. Similar principles have been reiterated in Office of the Chief Postmaster General versus Living Media India Limited, (2012) 3 SCC 563, wherein it has been observed that negligence, inac4on or lack of bona fides cannot cons4tute sufficient cause for condona4on of delay.

9.

Examining the present case on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles, this Court finds that the explana4on furnished by the appellant is wholly unsa4sfactory.

10.

A perusal of the award dated 11.02.2016 reveals that the appellant-owner was duly represented before the learned Tribunal through his engaged counsel. Once a li4gant chooses to contest proceedings through an advocate, the knowledge of the proceedings and the judgment rendered therein is ordinarily aCributable to the li4gant himself. Therefore, the plea that the appellant remained unaware of the findings recorded in the award merely because he is a rus4c farmer, cannot be accepted. A bald allega4on that the counsel had assured him not to worry about the outcome of the case is equally insufficient, par4cularly when no material whatsoever has been placed on record to substan4ate such asser4on. 11.

Even otherwise, according to the appellant's own showing, he admiCedly acquired knowledge regarding the grant of recovery rights when he appeared in the connected FAO No.471 of 2017 on 16.10.2019. Despite such admiCed knowledge, the present appeal was s4ll not ins4tuted within a reasonable 4me thereaBer. The explana4on that further 4me was consumed in arranging the statutory deposit of ₹25,000/- is vague and

[4] wholly unsubstan4ated. No par4culars have been furnished indica4ng when the amount was arranged, what prevented the appellant from filing the appeal immediately thereaBer, or how the remaining period of delay stands explained.

12.

Significantly, the applica4on is completely silent regarding substan4al stretches of 4me. Thus, the explana4on neither covers the en4re period of delay nor reflects due diligence on the part of the appellant.

13.

The law of limita4on is founded on considera4ons of public policy so as to bring certainty and finality to judicial proceedings. Once valuable rights have accrued in favour of the opposite party by lapse of 4me, such rights cannot be defeated unless sufficient cause, as contemplated under Sec4on 5 of the Limita4on Act, is established. The discre4onary jurisdic4on vested in the Court cannot be exercised in favour of a li4gant who has remained indolent and has failed to act with reasonable promp4tude.

14.

In the considered opinion of this Court, the reasons assigned by the appellant neither cons4tute sufficient cause nor inspire confidence so as to jus4fy condona4on of an inordinate delay of 1285 days. Entertaining such a stale appeal in the absence of any sa4sfactory explana4on would virtually defeat the very object of the law of limita4on. 15.

Consequently, finding no merit in the present applica4on, the same is hereby dismissed and consequent thereto, the appeal itself is dismissed being barred by limita4on.

01.07.2026 (DEEPAK GUPTA) Yogesh JUDGE Whether speaking/reasoned:- Yes/No Whether reportable:- Yes/No