Rajeev Kumar v. State Of Haryana And ANR

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

Reserved on: 05.12.2024

Date of Pronouncement: 17.12.2024

Rajeev Kumar ... PeƟƟoner

Versus

State of Haryana & another

...Respondent (s)

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP CHITKARA Present:- Mr. Sanjay K. Saini, Advocate for the peƟƟoner.

Mr. Aashish Bishnoi, DAG, Haryana.

Mr. H.S.Sandhu, Advocate for respondent no.2.

*** ANOOP CHITKARA, J.

FIR No.

Dated Police StaƟon SecƟons 03.05.2024 Saha, District Ambala 420/406/506 IPC The peƟƟoner, arraigned as accused in the above capƟoned FIR, has come up before this Court under SecƟon 482 CrPCfor quashing of the FIR and all consequenƟal proceedings based on the compromise with the aggrieved person(s). 2.

During the pendency of the criminal proceedings, the accused and the aggrieved person(s) have compromised the maƩer, and its copy is annexed with this peƟƟon as Annexure P-2.

3.

AŌer that, the peƟƟoner came up before this Court to quash the FIR, impleading the aggrieved persons as respondent no.2.

4.

Pursuant to order of this Court dated 07.11.2024, the aggrieved person(s) (Respondent no.2), appeared before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala and stated that there would be no objecƟon if the Court quashes this FIR and consequent proceedings. The relevant extract of the report of the concerned Court reads as follows:

Name of the reporƟng Court Mr. Vivek Chaudhary, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ambala

Criminal Case no.

before trial Court FIR No.110 dated 03.05.2024, PS-Saha, District Ambala, under SecƟons 420/406/506 IPC 1.

Names of the complainant/ vicƟms(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) Jagdish Gulai 2.

Dates on which the statement(s) of the complainant/ vicƟms(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) were recorded 21.11.2024 3.

Has the idenƟty of the complainant/ vicƟms(s)/ aggrieved persons(s) been verified?

Yes 4.

Whether all the vicƟms/ all the aggrieved persons have compromised the maƩer?

Yes 5.

Is there pressure, threat, or coercion upon the vicƟm(s)/aggrieved person(s)/complainant?

No 6.

Names of the accused person(s) Rajeev Kumar 7.

Dates on which the statement(s) of the accused persons(s) recorded 21.11.2024 8.

Whether all the accused have compromised the maƩer? If no, then the names of the accused who have compromised.

Yes 9.

Whether proclamaƟon proceedings are pending against any accused?

No 10.

Has the police report been filed or not?

No 11.

NoƟce of accusaƟon /Charges have been framed or not?

No 12.

SecƟons of statutes invoked in the maƩer 420/406/506 IPC 13.

Whether the court is saƟsfied with the genuineness of the compromise?

Yes ANALYSIS & REASONING:

5.

Despite the severe opposiƟon of the State's counsel to this compromise, the following aspects would be relevant to conclude this peƟƟon: - a) The accused and the private respondent have amicably seƩled the maƩer between them in terms of the compromise deed and the statements recorded before the concerned Court;

b) A perusal of the documents reveal that the seƩlement has not been secured through coercion, threats, social boycoƩs, bribes, or other dubious means;

c) The aggrieved person has willingly consented to the nullificaƟon of criminal proceedings;

d) There is no objecƟon from the private respondent in case present FIR and consequent proceedings are quashed;

e) In the given facts, the occurrence does not affect public peace or tranquillity, moral turpitude or harm the social and moral fabric of the society or involve maƩers concerning public policy;

f) The rejecƟon of compromise may also lead to ill will. The pendency of trial affects career and happiness;

g) There is nothing on the record to prima facie consider the accused as an unscrupulous, incorrigible, or professional offender; h) The purpose of criminal jurisprudence is reformatory in nature and to work to bring peace to family, community, and society; i) The exercise of the inherent power for quashing FIR and all consequenƟal proceedings is jusƟfied to secure the ends of jusƟce. 6.

In the present case, the offences in the present FIR are compoundable under SecƟon 320 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). 7.

In C.B.I., New Delhi v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., CalcuƩa, 1996(5) SCC 591, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [26]. AŌer giving our careful consideraƟon to the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the respecƟve counsel for the parƟes, it appears to us that for the purpose of quashing the complaint, it is necessary to consider whether the allegaƟon in the complaint prima facie make out an offence or not. It is not necessary to scruƟnise whether the allegaƟons are likely to be upheld in the trial. Any acƟon by way of quashing the complaint is an acƟon to be taken at the threshold before evidences are led in support of the complaint. For quashing the complaint by way of acƟon at the threshold, it is, therefore, necessary to consider whether on the face of the allegaƟons, a criminal offence is consƟtuted or not.

[29]. In the facts of the case, it appears to us that there is enough jusƟficaƟon for the High Court to hold that the case was basically a maƩer of civil dispute. The Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and the said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the concerned Companies. Even if an offence of cheaƟng is prima facie consƟtuted, such offence is a compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits insƟtuted by the Banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of cheaƟng. It is also to be noted that long Ɵme has elapsed since the complaint was filed in 1987.

It may also be indicated that although such FIRs were filed in 1987 and 1989, the Banks have not chosen to insƟtute any case against the alleged erring officials despite allegaƟons made against them in the FIRs.

suits insƟtuted by the Banks have been compromised on receiving payments, we do not think the said complaints should be pursued any further. In our view, proceeding further with the complaints will not be expedient. In the special facts of the case, it appears to us that the decision of the High Court in quashing the complaints does not warrant any interference under ArƟcle 136 of the ConsƟtuƟon. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals.

8.

In Nikhil Merchant vs C.B.I. & Anr, Cr.A 1302 of 2008, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, [22]. Despite the ingredients and the factual content of an offence of cheaƟng punishable under SecƟon 420 IPC, the same has been made compoundable under Sub-secƟon (2) of SecƟon 320 Cr.P.C. with the leave of the Court. Of course, forgery has not been included as one of the compoundable offences, but it is in such cases that the principle enunciated in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) becomes relevant.

[23]. In the instant case, the disputes between the Company and the Bank have been set at rest on the basis of the compromise arrived at by them whereunder the dues of the Bank have been cleared and the Bank does not appear to have any further claim against the Company. What, however, remains is the fact that certain documents were alleged to have been created by the appellant herein in order to avail of credit faciliƟes beyond the limit to which the Company was enƟtled. The dispute involved herein has overtones of a civil dispute with certain criminal facets. The quesƟon which is required to be answered in this case is whether the power which independently lies with this Court to quash the criminal proceedings pursuant to the compromise arrived at, should at all be exercised?

[24]. On an overall view of the facts as indicated hereinabove and keeping in mind the decision of this Court in B.S. Joshi's case (supra) and the compromise arrived at between the Company and the Bank as also clause 11 of the consent terms filed in the suit filed by the Bank, we are saƟsfied that this is a fit case where technicality should not be allowed to stand in the way in the quashing of the criminal proceedings, since, in our view, the conƟnuance of the same aŌer the compromise arrived at between the parƟes would be a fuƟle exercise. 9.

In Shakuntala Sawhney v Kaushalya Sawhney, (1979) 3 SCR 639, at P 642, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the finest hour of JusƟce arises propiƟously when parƟes, who fell apart, bury the hatchet and weave a sense of fellowship or reunion. 10.

In the light of the judicial precedents referred to above, given the terms of compromise, placement of parƟes, and other factors peculiar to the case, the contents of the compromise deed and its objecƟves point towards its acceptance.

11.

In Himachal Pradesh Cricket AssociaƟon v State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018:INSC:1039 [Para 47], 2018 (4) Crimes 324, Hon'ble Supreme Court holds "[47]. As far as Writ PeƟƟon (Criminal) No. 135 of 2017 is concerned, the appellants came to this Court challenging the order of cognizance only because of the reason that maƩer was already pending as the appellants had filed the Special Leave PeƟƟons against the order of the High Court rejecƟng their peƟƟon for quashing of the FIR/Chargesheet. Having regard to these peculiar facts, writ peƟƟon has also been entertained. In any case, once we hold that FIR needs to be quashed, order of cognizance would automaƟcally stand viƟated."

12.

Considering the enƟre facts, compromise, and in the light of the abovemenƟoned judicial precedents, I believe that conƟnuing these proceedings will not suffice any fruiƞul purpose whatsoever. In the facts and circumstances peculiar to this case, the Court invokes the inherent jurisdicƟon under secƟon 528 BNSS/482 CrPC and quashes the FIR and all subsequent proceedings qua the peƟƟoner. The bail bonds of the peƟƟoner are accordingly discharged.

PeƟƟon allowed in the terms menƟoned above.

(ANOOP CHITKARA) JUDGE 17.12.2024 JyoƟ Sharma Whether speaking/reasoned :

Yes Whether reportable :

No