Sudhir Kant Bansal v. State Of Punjab And Others

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH CWP-27785-2025 (O&M) Date of decision: 23.09.2025 Sudhir Kant Bansal ....Petitioner

Versus

State of Punjab and others ....Respondents CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR

Present:

Mr. Namit Gautam, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Vikas Arora, DAG, Punjab.

Mr. Pradeep Sharma, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 6.

HARPREET SINGH BRAR J. (Oral) 1.

Prayer in this writ petition filed under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, is for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari, for quashing the impugned order dated 02.05.2024 (Annexure P-14) passed by respondent No.3, whereby the demand notice dated 03.02.2024 (Annexure P-13) filed by the petitioner in pursuance to the order dated 29.01.2024 (Annexure P-12) has been declined. Further a writ of mandamus has been sought, directing the respondents to release the arrears of pay for the period 12.11.2001 to 22.01.2002 and the compound interest on the delayed payment @ 18% w.e.f. 1978 and also the penal interest on the same in terms of demand notice dated 03.02.2024 (Annexure P-13).

2.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the petitioner joined the erstwhile Punjab State Electricity Board in March, 1975 and after serving the respondent/Corporation for more than three decades, he superannuated as Assistant Executive Engineer (AEE) on 30.04.2007. The primary grievance raised by the petitioner is with regard to incorrect refixation of his pay upon revision of pay-scales w.e.f. 01.01.1978. The pay of the petitioner was fixed at the minimum of the new scale despite being entitled to an increment on 02.01.1978. Aggrieved by the action of the respondents, the petitioner filed a civil suit which was decreed in his favour. Thereafter, the appeal filed by the respondents before learned Appellate Court was allowed, however, this Court in RSA No.

16 of 1985, titled as Sudhir Kant vs Punjab State Electricity Board, Patiala and others, vide judgment dated 11.01.2010 (Annexure P-1) allowed the petitioner's appeal and decreed the suit filed by the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner sough a change in his option date for pay fixation from 01.01.1986 to 01.01.1987, which was approved by a Committee on 04.10.2012 (Annexure P-2) and finely, the benefit was granted on 10.03.2015 (Annexure P-6). Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that despite a decree passed by the competent Court of jurisdiction and the approval by the competent authority, the petitioner was not paid full arrears and no interest was paid to him for the inordinate delay spanning decades. The petitioner filed a petition i.e. CWP No.16558 of 2016, which was disposed of on 29.01.

to serve a demand notice. Thereafter, respondent No.3 in pursuance of the notice rejected the legitimate claim of the petitioner by passing a cryptic and non-speaking order on 02.05.2024 (Annexure P-14). Learned counsel for the petitioner concedes that the claim of the petitioner arose in the year 2007. However, he could not provide any satisfactory reason to justify the delay in approaching this Court. 3.

Learned State counsel as well as learned counsel for respondents No.2 to 6, appearing on advance notice, submits that the claim of the petitioner is barred by delay and laches. The petitioner remained indolent for inordinate delay of more than 10 years. Consequently, by filing repeated representations, he cannot revive a dead claim. The right of the petitioner was initially crystallized on 30.04.2007, when he was superannuated and thereafter on 10.03.2015, whereby the option of revision of pay of petitioner was granted, however, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any exceptional circumstances justifying such prolonged inaction. 4.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance.

5.

It is trite law that the delay in approaching this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may be condoned if sufficient cause is indicated or a reasonable explanation is provided for the same. However, the facts of the matter at hand indicate otherwise. Learned counsel petitioner has failed to specify any compelling or extenuating circumstance which prevented him from approaching this Court for

such a long time. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by a three-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Limited and Others vs. Ram Gopal (2021) 13 SCC 225, wherein, the following was held:

"16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles or of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fencesitters cannot be allowed to barge into Courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, this Court observed thus:

"17. It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". .... It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment."

(emphasis added) 6.

Further, in Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others 2024 AIR SC 2717, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically

observed that the High Courts must factor in the delay, while exercising its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It was further opined that undue and unexplained delay may be reason enough to dismiss a petition as indolent litigants ought not to be encouraged by writ Courts.

7.

In State of Uttaranchal v. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, (2013) 12 SCC 179, while considering the issue regarding delay and laches and referring to earlier judgments on the issue, a Two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined that repeated representations made will not keep the issues alive. A stale or a dead issue/dispute cannot be got revived even if such a representation has either been decided by the authority or got decided by getting a direction from the court as the issue regarding delay and laches is to be decided with reference to original cause of action and not with reference to any such order passed. Delay and laches on the part of a government servant may deprive him of the benefit which had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of India, in a situation of that nature, will not be attracted as it is well settled that law leans in favour of those who are alert and vigilant.

8.

In Union of India and others v. M. K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has ruled that when a belated representation in regard to a 'stale' or 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh

cause of action for reviving the 'dead' issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a Court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. 9.

Moreover, with regards to issues regarding fixation of pay, the position of law has been settled by a two-Judge Bench Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628 and has been reaffirmed by a full bench decision of this Court in Saroj Kumari v. State of Punjab, 1998(3) SCT 664. Accordingly, so long as an employee is in service, a petition claiming refixation of pay is not barred by limitation or the doctrine of laches, as the denial of benefit occurs every month when the salary is paid, thereby giving rise to a fresh cause of action, based on continuing wrong. Such a case is not a case of one time action like the case of termination or dismissal from service. However, payment of arrears can be restricted to a reasonable period.

Three years and two months has been considered to be a reasonable period as that is the period for which a person can ask for the payment of arrears before a Civil Court. However, once an employee ceases to be in service, the wrong fixation of pay can no longer be treated as a continuing wrong.

delay, is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. Reliance can be placed on the judgement of the co-ordinate bench of this Court in Prem Nath v. State of Punjab, 2018(2) SCT 687, wherein the petitioners approached this Court seeking correct fixation of pay much subsequent to their superannuation. While dismissing the petition on the ground of delay and laches, the Court held as follows: "10. The reliance placed by counsel upon the judgment in Saroj Kumar's case, is wholly misplaced. The observations and aspect of delay in Saroj Kumar's case, were in the light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.R. Gupta v. Union of India and others, 1996(1) S.C.T 8 : 1995(4) RSJ 502. In M.R.

Gupta's case (supra), it had been categorically held that so long as an employee "is in service" a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is getting his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong calculation made contrary to rules.

11. In the present case, however, the petitioners choose not to agitate their claim while in service. It is much subsequent to their superannuation that they have woken up and seek to gain impetus from certain decisions that may have been rendered in the case of similarly situated employees." (emphasis supplied) 10.

In the present case, the petitioner has approached this Court after a considerable lapse of time. Repeated representations will not keep the issues alive and no plausible explanation has been offered by

learned counsel for the petitioner for the delay in filing the present petition.

11.

In view of the above discussions, this Court does not find it appropriate to invoke its extraordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, the present petition stands dismissed.

(HARPREET SINGH BRAR) JUDGE 23.09.2025 yakub Whether speaking/reasoned:

Yes/No Whether reportable:

Yes/No