High Court of Punjab and HaryanaRA-CW/559/2025disposed of

Rajender Singh And Others v. State Of Haryana And Others

2026-04-07Mr. Justice Harkesh Manuja13 pages

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<Learned counsel for the parties agree that the judgment on the implementation of Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has been rendered by the Hon9ble Supreme Court of India in Banwari and others vs. HSIIDC Ltd. and another, 2025(1) RCR (Civil) 232, which will govern the issue hence, the dismissal of the writ petitions vide impugned order(s) by the learned Single Judge of this Court by placing reliance upon the decision of the Single Bench of this Court in CWP 11992019 titled as Mahabir and another vs. State of Haryana and others decided on 24.01.2019 needs reconsideration. 2.

Learned counsel for the appellant(s) submits that present bunch of appeals may kindly be disposed of having been not pressed any further with the liberty to the appellant(s) to file a review petition before the learned Single Judge of this Court in view of the judgment of the Hon9ble Supreme Court of India in Banwari9s case (supra). 3.

Ordered accordingly.

Civil miscellaneous application pending, if any, is also disposed of.

A photocopy of this order be placed on the files of connected cases.= A C

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"15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the First Appeal which was allowed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 2nd May 2016 was in respect of the land which was covered by the same notification under which notification the appellants' land is also covered. It is also not in dispute that the amount awarded by the High Court in the said First Appeal is in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 of the 1894 Act in the case of the land of the appellants. It is also not in dispute that the appellants had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It is also not in dispute that the application made by the appellants under Section 28A of the 1894 Act to the Collector was within a period of three months from the

6 date of the judgment and order of the High Court. 16.

From the perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari (supra), it is clear that the limitation for moving the application under Section 28A of the 1894 Act will begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which redetermination of the compensation is sought. The appellants are seeking redetermination of the compensation on the basis of the judgment and order of the High Court in First Appeal No. 429 of 2023 dated 2nd May 2016. It is not disputed that the application of the appellants under Section 28A of the 1894 Act is within a period of three months from 2nd May 2016." ?,

" Banwari9s case (supra) *

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of 'Union of India and another v. The Special Land Acquisition Collector cumSubDivisional Magistrate, Pathankot and others, 2025(3) RCR (Civil) 786.

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8 Haryana and others (CWP No.1199 of 2019). C

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Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat and another [2018(3)RCR(Civil)114]. 6 + 3/2.32.= , , <Bolstered by the decision of this Court, application under Section 28A was filed and the same had been dismissed. The Apex Court in Ramsinghbhai (supra) has restated the earlier judgments and framed the following question:

<2. Whether an application under Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short <the Act=) for redetermination of the compensation can be filed within a period of 3 months from the date of judgment of the High Court or Supreme Court passed in appeal under Section 54 of the Act is the question that arises for consideration in this case.= Resultantly, it was held that the appellant is only entitled for the relief in terms of Section 28A passed on the award of the Reference Court and not any enhancement which has been passed in the appeal. Relevant para reads as under:

<5. What the appellant seeks is redetermination of compensation under the Act in terms of the judgment of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the Act. In view of the settled legal position which we have explained above, the appellant is not entitled to such a relief; his entitlement, if any, is only in terms of Section 28A of the Act based on the award of the Reference Court.

6. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of. No costs.= Resultantly, the order passed by the LAC does not suffer from any infirmity, which would warrant interference by this Court and accordingly, the present appeal is dismissed in limine= +

Banwari9s case (supra),

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Ramsingbhai9s case (supra) Union of India versus Pradeep Kumari [1995(2)SCC736]. C

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, <18. It is further to be noted that the cases of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra) and Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), both have been decided by a Bench strength of three learned Judges of this Court. The case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra) is decided on 10th March 1995, whereas Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has been decided on 24th April 2018.

19. A perusal of the judgment rendered in Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), would reveal that the said case does not take note of the earlier view taken by three learned judges of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra).

20. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the observations of a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi and Others (2017) 16 SCC 680 : 2017 INSC 1068. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under:

"27. We are compelled to state here that in Munna Lal Jain, the threeJudge Bench should have been guided by the principle stated in Reshma Kumari which has concurred with the view expressed in Sarla Verma or in case of disagreement, it should have been well advised to refer the case to a larger Bench. We say so, as we have already expressed the opinion that the dicta laid down in Reshma Kumari being earlier in point of time would be a binding precedent and not the decision in Rajesh.

28. In this context, we may also refer to Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra [Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 558] which correctly lays down the principle that discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of a decision on the application of the per incuriam rule is of great importance, since without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a coequal or larger Bench.

There can be no scintilla of doubt that an earlier decision of co equal Bench binds the Bench of same strength. Though the judgment in Rajesh case was delivered on a later date, it had not apprised itself of the law stated in Reshma Kumari but had been guided by Santosh Devi . We have no hesitation that it is not a binding precedent on the coequal Bench."

21. It can thus be seen that, this Court in unequivocal terms has held that an earlier decision of a Bench of particular strength would be binding on the subsequent Benches of this Court having the same or lesser number of judges.

22. While considering the rule of per incuriam, the Constitution Bench of this Court has held that a decision or judgment can be said to be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co equal or larger Bench.

23. In any case, the judgment in Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra) has been rendered by three learned Judges of this Court after considering the relevant provisions of the Statute and the principles of interpretation. However, the judgment in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra) is a short judgment only referring to the text of Section 28A(1) of the 1894 Act.

24. As already discussed hereinabove, the provisions of Section 28A(1) of the 1894 Act have been elaborately considered by a three Judges Bench of this Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari and Others (supra). In the said case, it has been held that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Section 28A would reveal that the object underlying the enactment of the said provision is to remove inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality of land. It has been held that the said provision is for giving benefit to inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the Act.

It has been held that this is sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from the reference court under Section 18 of the Act. The same benefit would be available to the other landholders under Section 28A.

10 principle of interpretation which would be required to be adopted is the one which advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred by it.

25. We are, therefore, inclined to allow the appeal. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court dated 25th November 2021 is quashed and set aside and the order of the LAC dated 15th September 2020 is upheld.

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@* ,"% Directorate of Revenue Intelligence Versus Raj Kumar Arora & Ors. 2026(2)SCC 401

, <94. While addressing the issue of the temporal and retrospective effect of a judicial decision and declaring that a tribunal or court is bound by a higher court's decision on the point in issue, irrespective of whether it is declared either prior to or subsequent to the order which is sought to be called into question by a party, this Court in Assistant Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot v. Saurashtra Kutch Stick Exchange Limited reported in (2008) 14 SCC 171 stated that a judicial decision acts retrospectively by placing reliance on the Blackstonian theory. According to this theory, it is not the function of the court to pronounce a "new rule" but to maintain and expound the "old one". Therefore, if the subsequent decision alters or overrules the earlier one, it cannot be said to have made a new law.

The correct principle of law is just discovered and applied retrospectively. In other words, if in a given situation an earlier decision of the court operated for quite some time and it is overruled by a subsequent decision, the decision rendered subsequently would have retrospective effect and would serve to clarify the legal position which was not clearly understood earlier. Any transaction would then be covered by the law declared by the overruling decision. The overruling is generally retrospective with the only caveat being that matters that are res judicatae or accounts that have been settled in the meantime would not be disturbed.

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122.

On a conspectus of the aforesaid discussion on the doctrine of prospective overruling, the following can be summarised: i.

The default rule is that the overruling of a decision generally operates retrospectively. This is because a judgement which interprets a statute or provision declares the meaning of the statute as it should have been construed from the date of its enactment and what has been declared to be the law of the land must be held to have always been the law of the land. This rationale also stems from the Blackstonian rule that the duty of the court is not to "pronounce a new law but to maintain and expound the old one". The judge rather than being the creator of the law, is only its discoverer. Therefore, if a subsequent

11 decision alters or overrules the earlier one, it cannot be said to have made a new law. The correct principle of law is just discovered and applied retrospectively.

ii.

Since resorting to the doctrine of "prospective overruling" is an exception to the normal rule that a judgement or decision applies retrospectively and to the general rule of doctrine of precedent, an express declaration by the court that its decision is prospectively applicable is absolutely necessary. Prospectivity as a concept cannot be considered to be inhered in situations since the intention to attribute prospectivity to a decision must be limpid and clear. &&&&&&&&

134. The Blackstonian theory also lends great support to our conclusion since it underscores the principle that it is not the function of the court to pronounce a "new rule" but to maintain and expound the "old one". Therefore, the overruling of a decision cannot be equated to the creation of a new law. The correct principle of law is merely clarified and applied retrospectively&..= C

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27.

As a result of my aforesaid discussion, I come to the following conclusions :

1) That in the matters which have not been specifically dealt with by the Writ Rules, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, so far as they can be made applicable, would apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

2) That the explanation added to Section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code, by Amendment Act, does not in any way nullify the effect of rule 32 of the Writ Rules.

3) Then when a writ petition is dismissed after contest by passing a speaking order, then such decision would operate as res judicata in any other proceeding such as suit, a petition under Article 32 etc.

4) That if a petition is dismissed only on the ground of laches or the availability of an alternate remedy or on a ground analogous thereto, then any other proceeding will not be barred on principle of res judicata.

5) That even in cases where a petition is dismissed on the ground of alternate remedy or on a ground analogous thereto, a second petition on the same cause of action under Article 226 would be barred.

6) That there is an exception to proposition (5) that where the first petition is dismissed on the ground that alternate remedy under the Act has not been availed of, then after availing of the statutory remedy under the Act, a second petition may be maintainable on the principle that the same has been filed on a cause of action which has arisen after the decision of the appropriate authority under the Act.

7) That a second petition on similar facts and in respect of the same cause of action by the same party would not be maintainable even if his earlier petition has been disposed of by one word 'Dismissed'.

8) That the provisions of Order 22, Civil Procedure Code would apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution.

9) That provisions of Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code would apply to the writ proceedings and that a petition which has simply been got dismissed as withdrawn would be a bar to the filing of a second petition on the same facts and in respect of the same cause of action.

10) That the provisions of the Limitation Act are not applicable to the writ proceedings or the miscellaneous applications filed in the writ proceedings.= HEmphasis supplied) ./ C +

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