Dulal Shil v. Smt Dali Shil
INTHEHIGHCOURTOFTRIPURA AGARTALA MATAPP.No.15of2014 SriDulalShil,
Appellant -Versus- Smt.DaliShil,
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Respondent BEFORE THEHON'BLEMR.JUSTICEU.B.SAHA THEHON'BLEMR.JUSTICES.TALAPATRA )
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: YES NO √ JUDGMENT&ORDER
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% ) % 4 ' ) .=:.; ) % .=>7 D :6(1)Saveasprovidedin sub6section(2)andnotwithstandinganything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, c1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974) or in any other law, an appal shall lie form every judgment andorder,notbeinganinterlocutoryorder,of aFamilyCourttotheHighCourtbothonfacts andonlaw. [4] .=:1; ) % .=>7 -
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4 ManishAggarwalvs.Seema Aggarwalandothers ' - D 26.We,thus,concludeasunder: (i)inrespectoforderspassedunderSections 24 to 27 of the HM Act appeals would lie under Section 19(1) of the said Act to the Division Bench of this Court in view of the
provisionsofsubsection(6)ofSection19of the said Act, such orders being in the nature ofintermediateorders.Itmustbenotedthat sub6section(6)ofSection19ofthesaidActis applicable only in respect of sub6section (1) andsub6section (4) ofSection19ofthe said Act. [6] @P.T.LakshmanKumarvs.Mrs.Bhavani *
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4 *4 % - '% % '% &A 4 Mahesh Bhardwaj vs. Smt. Smita Bhardwaj, AIR 1995 Rajasthan 47, , 4 R. Varadaraj vs. Smt. Nirmala, AIR 2002 Karnataka 241 ) + 4 Swarna Prava Tripathy and anothervs.DibyasinghaTripathyandanother, AIR 1998Orissa173@ '
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5 A ' 'A ' % % ' Mohanlal Maganlal Thakker vs. State of Gujarat, AIR1968SC733, 8 A %
' - D 'Thereasonprobablyisthatajudgmentand order may be final for one purpose and interlocutoryforanotherorfinalastopartan interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words 'final' and 'interlocutory' has, therefore, to be considered separately in relationtotheparticularpurposeforwhichit is required. However, generally speaking a judgment or order which determines the principle matters in question is termed final. It may be final although a direct inquiries or is made on interlocutory application or reserves the liberty to apply. In some of the English decisions where this question arose one or the other of the following four tests wasapplied:
(i) Was the order made upon application such that a decision in favourofeitherpartywoulddetermine themaindispute? (ii) Was it made upon an application upon which the main dispute could havebeendecided? (iii)Dosetheorderasmadedetermine thedispute? (iv)Iftheorderinquestionisreserved wouldtheactionhavetogoon? [8]
8 - % MohanlalMaganlalThakkervs.StateofGujarat % D Theaforesaiddiscussionleadstheconclusion thatwhentheMagistrateorderedthefilingof the complaint against the appellant, the partiestothatcontroversywereteStateand the appellant and the controversy between them was whether the appellant had committed offence charged against him in that complaint.
The appeal filed by the appellant before the Additional Sessions Judge was against the order filing the complaint, the controversy therein raised beingwhethertheMagistratewasjustifiedin filing it, that is to say, whether it was expedientintheinterestofjusticeandforthe purpose of eradicating the evil of false evidence in a judicial proceeding before the Court. The controversies in the two proceedings were thus distinct thought the parties were the same.
When the additional Sessions Judge held that the complaint was justified in respect of the offence under Section205readwithSection114anwasnot justified in respect of the other offences his judgment in the absence of a revision by the Stateagainstitfinallydisposedofthatpartof the controversy, i.e, that the complaint in respect of offences under Ss. 467 and 468 readwithSection114wasnotjustified.When the appellant filed revision in respect of the complaint for the remaining offence under Section205readwithS.114theSingleJudge oftheHighCourtdismissedthatrevision.
controversy between the parties and the proceedings regarding that question as to whether the complaint in that regard was justified or not was finally decided. As observed in 196663 SCR 198= (AIR 1966 SC 1445) (supra) the finality of that order was nottobejudgedbyc6relatingthatorderwith the controversy in the complaint, viz., whether the appellant had committed the offencechargedagainsthimtherein.Thefact that the controversy still remained alive is irrelevant. It must consequently be held that the order passed by the High Court in the revision filed by the appellant was a final order within the meaning of Article 134(1) (c). [Emphasisadded] [9]
A % ' % D In a civil proceeding, an order is final if it finally decides the rights of the parties, See FirmRamchandManjilalv.FirmGoverdhandas Vishindas Ratanchand, 47 IND App 124 = (AIR1920PC86).Ifitdoesnotfinallydecide the rights of the parties, the order is interlocutory, though it conclusively determines some subordinate matter and disposes of the proceeding in which the subordinatematterisincontroversy.Forthis reason,evenanordersettingasideanaward is interlocutory, see Croasdell and Cammel LairdandCo.,Ltd.,Inre,(1906)2KB569.A similar test has been applied for determining whether an order in a criminal proceeding is final.
See 1947 FCR 180 = (AIR 1949 FC 1). For the purposes of this appeal, we do not propose to examine all the decisions cited at the bar and to formulate a fresh test on the subject. Whatever test is applied, an order directing the filing of a complaint and decidingthatthereisaprimafaciecaseforan enquiryintoanoffenceisnotafinalorder.It is merely a preliminary step in the prosecution and therefore an interlocutory order.Astheorderisnotfinal,theHighCourt wasnotcompetenttogiveacertificateunder Article 134(1) (c) of the Constitution. The appealisnotmaintainableandisdismissed.
[10]
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, ', @Tarapore&Co.vs.M/s.V/OTractorsExport,Moscowand Anr., AIR 1970 SC 1168, 8 - Mohanlal Maganlal Thakker vs. State of Gujarat. ' - @ ' - '
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8 Tarapore & Co. vs. M/s. V/O TractorsExport,MoscowandAnr. ' - D 11. In our judgment an order passed by the High Court in appeal which does not finally disposeofasuitorproceedingandleavesthe rights and obligations of the parties for determination in the suit or proceeding from which appeal has arisen, is not final within themeaningofArticle133(1)(a)and(b).The order refusing to grant an interim injunction did not determine the rights and obligations of the parties in relation to the matter in disputeinthesuit.
Weareunabletoholdthat because the plaintiff's suit as a result of the order of the High Court may become infructuous asframed,andtheplaintiffs may have to seek amendment of the plaint to get effective relief, an order which is essentially an interlocutory order may be deemed final for the purposes of Article 133(1)of the Constitution. In our judgment, makes no departure from the earlier judgments of the Judicial Committee, the Federal Court and this Court. The plaintiffs will pay the costs of the petitionersoftheapplicationforrevocationof thecertificate.
[11]
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% % MadhuLimayevs.The State of Maharashtra (1977) 4 SCC 551 - Mohanlal Maganlal Thakker vs. State of Gujarat MohanlalMaganlalThakker vs.StateofGujarat ' - B- C '- ' % %
% % KuppuswamiRoavs.TheKing, AIR1933PC58(V 20) '
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' ' - D Doesitstandtoreason,then,thatanaccused willhavenoremedytomovetheHighCourtin revision or invoke its inherent power for the quashing of the criminal proceeding initiated uponacomplaintorotherwiseandwhichisfit to be quashed on the face of it? The legislature left the power to order further inquiryintactinSection398.Isitnot,then,in consonancewiththesenseofjusticetoleave intacttheremedyoftheaccusedtomovethe High Court for setting aside the order adversely made against him in similar circumstances and to quash the proceeding? The answer must be given in favour of the just and reasonable view expressed by us above. [12]
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% KuppuswamiRoavs.TheKing MadhuLimayevs.TheStateofMaharashtra
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MadhuLimayevs.The StateofMaharashtra, ' % '% 8 D 'inouropinionwhetherthetypeoftheorder aforesaidwouldbeafinalorderornot,surely it would be not be an interlocutory order within the meaning of sub section (2) of Section397ofthe1973code'. + ' ' ' - A
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% %' - % [13] @ Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Anr, (1981)4SCC8, + 8
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113.Thus,undertheCodeofCivilProcedure, a judgment consists of the reasons and groundsfor adecreepassedbyacourt. As a judgment constitutes the reasons for the decree it follows as a matter of course that the judgment must be a formal adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy. The concept of a judgment as defined by the Code of Civil Procedureseemstoberathernarrowandthe limitations engrafted by Sub6section (2) of Section 2 cannot be physically imported into thedefinitionoftheword'judgment'asused inClause15oftheLettersPatentbecausethe Letters Patent has advisedly not used the terms 'order' or 'decree' anywhere.
The intention, therefore, of the givers of the Letters Patent was that the word 'judgment' shouldreceiveamuchwiderandmoreliberal interpretationthantheword'judgment' used in the Code of Civil Procedure. At the same time,itcannotbesaidthatanyorderpassed byaTrialJudgewouldamounttoajudgment; otherwisetherewillbenoendtothenumber of orders which would be appealable under the Letters Patent. It seems to us that the word'judgment'hasundoubtedlyaconceptof finalityinabroaderandnotanarrowersense.
6 A judgment which decides all the questions or issuesincontroversysofarastheTrial Judge is concerned and leaves nothing else to be decided. This would mean thatbyvirtueofthejudgment,thesuit or action brought by the plaintiff is dismissed or decreed in part or in full. SuchanorderpassedbytheTrialJudge indisputably and unquestionably is a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent and even amounts to a decreesothatanappealwouldliefrom suchajudgmenttoaDivisionBench. (2) !
6 This kind ofajudgmentmaytaketwoforms6(a) where the Trial Judge by an order dismisses the suit without going into the merits of the suit but only on a preliminary objection raised by the defendantorthepartyopposingonthe ground that the suit is not maintainable. Here also, as the suit is finally decided one way or the other, the order passed by the Trial Judge
would be a judgment finally deciding the cause so far as the Trial Judge is concerned and therefore appealable to the larger Bench. (b) Another shape whichapreliminaryjudgmentmaytake isthatwheretheTrialJudgepassesan order after hearing the preliminary objections raised by the defendant relating to maintainability of the suit, e.g.
,barof jurisdiction,res Judicata,a manifest defect in the suit, absence of notice under Section80and the like, andtheseobjectionsaredecidedbythe Trial Judge against the defendant, the suit is not terminated but continues and has to be tried on merits but the order of the Trial Judge rejecting the objections doubtless adversely affects a valuable right of the defendant who, ifhisobjectionsarevalid,isentitledto get the suit dismissed on preliminary grounds. Thus, such an order even though it keeps the suit alive, undoubtedly decides an important aspectofthetrialwhich affectsavital right of the defendant and must, therefore, be construed to be a judgment so as to be appealable to largerBench.
(3) " " !
# Most of the interlocutory orders which contain the quality of finality are clearly specified in clauses (a)to(w)ofOrder43Rule1andhave already been held by us to be judgments within the meaning of the Letters Patent and, therefore, appealable. There may also be interlocutory orders which are not covered by Order 43 Rule 1 but which also possess the characteristics and trappings of finality in that, the orders mayadverselyaffectavaluablerightof thepartyordecideanimportantaspect of the trial in an ancillary proceeding. Beforesuchanordercanbeajudgment the adverse effect on the party concerned must be direct and immediate rather than indirect or remote.
caseonhisownevidencewithoutbeing given a chance to rebut that evidence. As such an order vitally affects a valuable right of the defendant it will undoubtedly be treated as a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent so as to be appealable to a largerBench.Taketheconversecasein a similar suit where the trial Judge allowsthedefendanttodefendthesuit in which case although the plaintiff is adversely affected but the damage or prejudicecausedtohimisnotdirector immediatebutofaminimalnatureand rathertooremotebecausetheplaintiff still possesses his full right to show thatthedefenceisfalseandsucceedin thesuit.
Thus,suchanOrderpassedby the Trial Judge would not amount to a judgmentwithinthemeaningofClause 15 of the Letters Patent but will be purelyaninterlocutoryorder. [14] @ State represented by Inspector of PoliceandOrs.vs.N.M.T.
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".1 # ' - : This decision has been distinguished in the aforesaid second decision of this Court by sayingthatitisessentiallyonthebasisofthe provision contained in Order 43, Rule 1 read with Section104Civil Procedure Code and applies to internal appeals in the High Court against the judgment of a single judge in exercise of original jurisdiction. Though reference has also been made to the corresponding provision of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Bombay High Court but the decision of the Supreme Court was independent of the provisions contained in clause 15.
It may be mentioned here that Clause10oftheLettersPatentoftheNagpur High Court is similar to the aforesaid Clause 15 of the Bombay High Court. The Supreme Court has clearly mentioned in the judgment thatrefusingtoappointareceiverortogrant an ad interim injunction is undoubtedly a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent. So the earlier view has been reiterated.
decisionofthisCourtithaswronglybeenheld that no letters patent appeal lies against the interlocutory order passed in appeal by the singlejudgeofthisCourt,byreferringtothe aforesaid decision in Shah Babulal Khimji theSupremeCourtmadeitapplicable in cases of interlocutory orders passed in original proceedings by the single judge. Though that was a case arising out of the interlocutoryorderintheoriginaljurisdiction oftheBombayHighCourt,theSupremeCourt hasnotlaiddownthatnoappealliesagainst the interlocutory order passed in appeal. Therefore, an appeal will lie against an interlocutoryorderifitisajudgment.
Clearly the order passed under Section24of the HinduMarriageActisajudgmentasitdecides the question of maintenance during the pendency of the suit and therefore, there is final adjudication so far tins question is concernedandanappealliesagainstsuchan order. We are fortified by the view taken by the Bombay High Court in $% & ' "( ) * )+, that pendente lite maintenance under Section24of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, raises controversy independentlyofthesuitanddecisionthereon concludescontroversyfinallybetweenparties and as such letters patent appeal is maintainable. [16] , 4 T.V. Satyanarayana vs.
% % Shah Babulal Khimjivs.JayabenD.KaniaandAnr, 8 D 10. We are entirely in agreement with the submissionsmadebythelearnedCounselSri B.P. Holla. While we agree with the submission of Sri G.S. Rao that an interlocutory order made under Section24of theHinduMarriageActcertainlyamountstoa 'judgment', the very fact that it is an interlocutory order makes it non appeal able in view of the express words of Section19(1)oftheAct.Ascanbeseenfrom thePreambletotheAct,oneoftheobjectsof this special enactment is to provide for speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriages and family affairs. Therefore, it is obviousthattheParliamentintendedtoavoid
procrastination of the proceedings and for that purpose barred appeals and revisions against interlocutory orders by incorporating Sub6section (1) and Sub6section (4) to Section19. 11. The learned Counsel for the appellant made a feeble attempt to say that an order grantingmaintenanceunderSection24ofthe Hindu Marriage Act should be regarded only as a 'judgment' and not an 'interlocutory order.'
Theveryfactthatanapplicationunder Section24of the Hindu Marriage Act is contemplated only as an interlocutory applicationinamainproceedingandthevery fact that an order made under Section24of the Hindu Marriage Act automatically comes to an end with the disposal of the main proceedings, makes it impossible to accept the submission that the order is not an interlocutoryorder. 12.Fortheaforesaidreasons,weanswerthe questionoflawsetoutinthefirstparagraph, asfollows: "An appeal does not lie against an order made by the Family Court on an application presented under Section24of the Hindu Marriage Act granting interim maintenance under Section19oftheFamilyCourtsAct." [17] @ Sunil Hansraj Gupta vs.
' - D Next question is what is the scope and ambit of word 'judgment' used in section19(1)of the FamilyCourtsAct.Todecidethisissuewewillhave toconstrueprovisionsofsections24and28ofthe H. M. Act and section19of the Family Courts Act harmoniously. section24of the H. M. Act makes provision for maintenance pendente lite and expenses of proceedings. Application under this section proceeds on the assumption that the relationship between the parties to the Hindu Marriage Petition, as husband and wife legally subsists. If husband or wife is unable to maintain himselforherself,asthecasemaybe,intermsof section24oftheH.M.Act,theCourtmaymakean order of maintenance as also the order of costs
which may appear to it reasonable. On plain readingofsection24oftheH.M.Act,itappearsto usthatitisastatutoryobligationuponahusband or wife, as the case may be, to provide such maintenanceandcoststodefendtheproceedings, andCourtisunderobligationtomakeappropriate orderinfavour ofcomplainingspouse. Such order does not decide any issue of controversy in the mainpetitionfiledandpendingundertheH.M.Act. It is this character of order passed under section24of the H. M. Act being decisive to interprettheword'judgment'or'order'butnotan interlocutoryorderusedinsection19oftheFamily Courts Act. The object of section24of the H. M.
Act is to protect the weaker spouse and particularly if it is a wife to protect her from vagrancy. Moreover, life of such order is for a limited period namely during the pendency of substantive petition under the H. M. Act. To emphasisetheobjectofsection24oftheH.M.Act, Smt.Nanavatidrewourattentiontothedecisionof this Court in $, - .
% / ' "( 0+* * 10 , wherein this Courtobservedthus(atpage130ofAIR): "The object behind section 24 appears to be two6fold, firstly to prevent vagrancy resulting from the strained relationship between the husband and the wife and secondly to ensure that the indigent litigating spouse is not handicapped in defending or prosecuting the Case for want of money.ThisiswhyCourtshavealways insistedthatwheneveranapplicationis made under section 24 it must be disposed of before any further steps aretakeninthemaincase." Weareinagreementwiththeseobservations. Orderundersection24oftheH.M.Act,does notdecideanyissue,eitherinthesubstantive petition or in the application under section24of the H. M.
Act except the quantumofmaintenanceandcosts. Substantive petition is still alive. In these circumstances,itisdifficulttoholdthatsuch order answers the description of judgment under section17of the Family Courts Act. It must,therefore,followthatitisanorder.The next question that needs to be considered is whether it is an order "not being an interlocutory order" in terms of section19(1)oftheFamilyCourtsAct.
Thus, having regard to the object of section24of the H. M. Act, the wife of such order and the fact that such order does not decide any issue arising between the parties intheH.M.Petitiononewayortheother,and that the lis continues, an order under section24oftheH.M.Actisnota'judgment' intermsofsection17oftheFamilyCourtsAct butitisanorderinthenatureofinterlocutory order falling outside the scope of section19(1)oftheFamilyCourtsAct. [18]
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% Sunil Hansraj Gupta vs. Payal Sunil Gupta 0701309 4 * %
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- ' 8 '% 4 Swarna Prava Tripathy and another vs. Dibyasingha Tripathy and another @ 4 - - %
D 'the main controversy is whether an order passed under Sections 24 & 26 of Hindu Marriage Act is an interlocutory order or a finalorder.' [20] 4- ShahBabulalKhimjivs.JayabenD.KaniaandAnr Swarna Prava Tripathy and another vs. DibyasinghaTripathyandanother ' - D
6. At this juncture it is necessary to pigeonhole which can be called interlocutory orders and final orders. Interlocutory orders areofvariouskinds;somelikeordersofslay, injunction, or receiver, are designed to preservethestatusquopendingthelitigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the Court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any mannerthemeritsofthecontroversyinissue inthesuitanddonot,ofcourse,putanendto it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, thoughnormallyonlyonproofofnewfactsor new situations which subsequently emerge.
As they do not impinge upon the legal rights ofpartiestothelitigation,theprincipleofres judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if application weremadeforrelief onthesame basis after the same has once been disposed of, the Court would be justified in rejecting thesameasanabuseoftheprocessofCourt. An order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another.
The expression 'interlocutory order as used in restricted and not in any broad or artistic sense, denotes ordersofapurelyinterimortemporarynature which do not decide or touch the important rightsorliabilitiesoftheparties,inWebster's ThirdInternationalDictionary,theexpression 'interlocutory' has been defined as, 'not final ordefinite,madeordoneduringtheprogress of an action; intermediate, provisional'. The emphasisis,therefore,atthestagewhenthe order is passed. Interlocutory stage is decidedly the state between the cognisance taken by the Court and the judgment pronounced. The interlocutory order is supplementalproceedingwhichisameansto an end and not an end itself.
The word 'interlocutory'meansaccordingtotheimport of the dictionary 'intermediate' and the interlocutory order is one passed during the progress of the proceeding that is to say, interlocutory order must be an order passed after the initiation of the proceedings and beforethefinalorderdisposingofthematter. InNewWebster'sDictionary,CollegeEdition, the meaning given is 'of the nature of, pertainingto,oroccurringin,conversationor dialogue; spoken intermediately, as interlocutoryconversationinterjectedintothe main speech.
provisionaldecision.'Interlocutoryordersare stepstakentowardsthefinaladjudicationfor assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceedings. - * / " % 2 - ' "( 3) - ) Interlocutory inter alia means not that which decides the case, but that which only settles some intervening matter relatingtothecause.Asinterlocutoryorderis one which is made pending the cause and before a final hearing on the merits. An interlocutory order is made to secure some end and purpose necessary and essential to the progress of the suit, and generally collateral to the issues formed by the pleadings and not connected with the final judgment. 7.
The position in law relating to the controversy at hand has been indicated in ( - 4 % 5 4 ' "( )0 - 06) as follows (Para 6); "Broadly stated and as an abstract proposition, it is valid to assert, as Sri Desai did, that a final determination of a civil right by a civil Court must prevail againstalikedecisionbyacriminalCourt. But here two factors make the principle inapplicable.
Firstly, the direction by the Civil Court is not a final determination under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act but an order pendente lite, under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act to pay the expenses of the proceeding, and monthly during the proceedingsuchsumas,havingregardto the petitioner's own income and the incomeoftherespondent,itmayseemto the Court to be reason6 able. Secondly, thisamountdoesnotincludetheclaimfor maintenanceofthechildrenalthoughthe order does advert to the fact that the respondent has their custody. This incidental direction is no comprehensive adjudication." 8.
In view of the law as laid by the Apex Court, the inevitable conclusion is that an orderpassedunderSection 24 or 26 ofMarriage Act is an interlocutory order and as such, no appeal would lie in terms of Section 19(1) of the Act. The question is whether revision wouldlie.Inviewofwhathasbeenstatedin Sub6section(5),revisionwouldnotlie.
[21] @ ' ' '
8 RameshChanderKaushalv. Mrs.VeenaKaushal:AIR1978SC1807, 8
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% [22] T.V. Satyanarayana vs. Subba Aruna Meenakshi '% , 4 Sunil Hansraj Gupta vs. Payal Sunil Gupta '% +'% 4 Swarna Prava Tripathyandanothervs.DibyasinghaTripathy'% 4 - ' '% F, 4 Rahul Samarat Tandon vs. Smt. NeeruTandon, ManishAggarwalvs.SeemaAggarwaland others '%
4 P.T. Lakshman Kumar vs.
Mrs. Bhavani '% * 4 Rahul Samarat Tandon vs.Smt.NeeruTandon '
- % Manish Aggarwal vs. Seema Aggarwal and others P.T. LakshmanKumarvs.Mrs.Bhavani. [23] 4- ShahBabulalKhimjivs.Jayaben D. Kania and Anr + ' Smt. Kiran Bala Srivastava vs. Jai Prakash Srivastava:(2005)23LCD1AmarNathvs.State ofHaryana, AIR1977SC2185MadhuLimaye vs. The State of Maharashtra ' Rahul SamaratTandonvs.Smt.NeeruTandon D 17.
The present appeal has been filed by the husbandchallengingtheorderofmaintenance pendente lite under Section24of the Act of 1955, yet we are concerned with the larger impact of a judgment in such cases, where primarily the issue of maintenance is crucial to a party to a litigation. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court, referred above, after discussing all the relevant law, including the law cited by the learned Counsel for the respondent came to the conclusion that an appealunderSection19(1)oftheActof1984 ismaintainableagainstanorderpassedunder Section24of the Act of 1955.
We are in completeagreementwiththeobservationsof the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court, and we feel that it is necessary that a broad meaning to the word "judgment" must be assigned and therefore, we hold that the impugned order dated 206362010 was in the nature of a "judgment" and the instant Special Appeal preferred by the appellant is maintainable, under Section19(1)of the FamilyCourtsAct,1984. 18.
above. Let the appeal be listed for final disposalinordinarycourse. [24]
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