S.Manohari And ORS. v. The Executive Engineer, Port Blair North Division, Apwd

CALCUTTA HIGH COURT

IN THE CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR

Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction (Appellate Side) WPA/107/2020 The Executive Engineer vs.

S. Manohari and Ors.

For the Petitioner : Mr. Shatadru Chakraborty, Adv.

Mr. Dibesh Dwivedi, Adv.

For the Respondents : Mr. Gopala Binnu Kumar, Adv.

With WPA/117/2020 S. Manohari and Ors.

vs.

The Executive Engineer, PBND, APWD, Port Blair. Before: The Hon'ble Justice Arijit Banerjee For the Petitioners : Mr. Gopala Binnu Kumar, Adv.

For the Respondent : Mr. Shatadru Chakraborty, Adv.

Mr. Dibesh Dwivedi, Adv.

CAV On : 01.08.2024 Judgment On : 12.11.2024 Arijit Banerjee, J.: - 1.

These two writ petitions involve common set of facts and common issues of law and were therefore taken up for hearing together. The two writ petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment and order.

2.

WPA 107 of 2020 was filed by the Andaman & Nicobar Administration through the Executive Engineer challenging an Award dated January 10, 2020, made by the Labour Court, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair in I.D. Case No. 01 of 2019. The operative portion of the said Award reads as follows:- "This Court sets aside the disengagement of the First Party workmen namely Smt. S. Manohari, Smt. Amisha Prasad and Shri Karlus Munda. This Court further orders that the above noted persons be reinstated immediately after communication of this order to the Second Party. This Court also orders the Second Party to pay the above noted persons all the back wages and the consequential benefits from the date of disengagement within two months from their date of reinstatement. This Court does not find any other relief, which the First Party members entitled to at present."

WPA 117 of 2020 was filed by Smt. Manohari and the other two persons for implementation of the aforesaid Award.

Facts of the case:- 3.

The writ petitioners in WP 117 of 2020 being S. Manohari and others were engaged as Daily Rated Mazdoors (in short 'DRM'), in the year 2014, under the Port Blair North Division of Andaman Public Works Department (in short 'APWD'). They were removed from service with effect from September 1, 2017. They contended that the work that they performed was of a regular nature. They also completed the statutory 240 days in a Calendar year. They were engaged in work against vacant posts. They further contended that a decision was taken by the concerned Executive Engineer to continue the services of all DRMs till finalization of the 1/30th of the Pay Plus DA issue.

4.

According to the three DRMs, with a view to denying them the benefits of the 1/30th of the Pay Plus D.A Scheme, they were disengaged from service by the Administration. No reason was assigned for such removal from service. A number of workmen who are junior to them in service were retained in service. Most of the departments of the Administration had decided to implement the 1/30th of Pay Plus DA Scheme of the Government in respect of DRMs. The Administration has arbitrarily denied such benefit to these DRMs.

5. The three DRMs further contended that while retrenching them, the Administration failed to comply with the provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25N of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (in short 'ID Act').

6. A conciliation proceeding was initiated by the Conciliation Officer/ Assistant Labour Commissioner, Port Blair, between the General Secretary, Andaman Sarvajanik Nirman Vibhag Mazdoor Sangh of which the petitioners were members, and the Executive Engineer Port Blair, North Division, APWD, in respect of the alleged illegal retrenchment of the 3 DRMs. The conciliation proceeding failed. The Conciliation Officer by his report dated December 19, 2018, recommended the Government to refer the case to the Labour Court for adjudication under Section 12(4) of the ID Act.

7. The Labour Court recorded evidence of the parties and came to the conclusion that:- (i) The Administration has admitted that the three concerned DRMs were retrenched.

(ii) That the provisions of Sections 25F, 25G and 25N of the ID Act were not followed; and

(iii) It was admitted that the Administration extracted work from the three petitioners and payments were made on the basis of such work. The Labour Court held the retrenchment of the three DRMs to be unlawful. The Labour Court directed reinstatement of the three DRMs and also ordered the Administration to pay them entire back wages and consequential benefits from the date of dis-engagement within two months from the date of reinstatement.

8. This is the Award which is under challenge in WPA 107/2020 at the instance of the Executive Engineer. On the other hand, the three concerned DRMs seek implementation of the Award by filing WPA 117/2020. Argument advanced on behalf of the Administration:-

9. Learned Advocate for the Administration argued that there is an error apparent on the face of the impugned order of the Labour Court in recording that the Administration has admitted that there has been retrenchment of the 3 DRMs without following due procedure prescribed by Sections 25F, 25G and 25N of the ID Act. There is no such admission on the part of the Administration. Learned Advocate placed the written objection filed by the Administration before the Labour Court. He submitted that the concerned DRMs were engaged in August 2016 and not in the year 2014 as incorrectly contended by them. Without holding any selection process, they were engaged on temporary basis and on sympathetic ground.

The decision to continue all DRM till the issue of 1/30thPay Plus DA was finally decided, taken at the meeting dated November 5, 2015, would not enure to the benefit of these DRMs since they were engaged subsequently. The Circular dated November 12, 2014 and April 8, 2015, issued by the Government imposed a ban on further engagement of DRMs.

and on sympathetic grounds. Initially the engagement was for a period of 2 months. From time to time such engagement was extended, in the case of Smt. Manohari and Shri Munda, till September 2017 and in the case of Smt. Amisha Prasad till June 2017.

10. Learned Counsel further submitted that nothing is on record to show that any of the three concerned DRMs completed 240 days of work as is statutorily required for coming under the umbrella of Sections 25F, 25G and 25N of the ID Act. Learned Advocate relied on a statement annexed to the written objection in arguing that Smt. Manohari was engaged during the period from August 2016 to September 2017 and she absented herself during the month of December 2016 and July 2017. Smt. Amisha Prasad was engaged from August 2016 to June 2017 and she absented herself during the month of December 2016. Shri Karlus Munda was engaged from September 2016 to September 2017. He absented himself during the months of December 2016 and June 2017. Total Man Days for which the 3 DRMs were engaged were as follows:- Total Man Days S.

No Name Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec - - - - - - - 26 25 26 25 Smti. Manohari W/O. Ravinder Singh 1.

23 26 22 - 26 22 - - - - - - - - - - 26 25 26 25 Smti.

Amisha Prasad W/o. Amar Prasad 2.

23 26 22 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25 26 25

3. Shri Karlus Munda S/O Birsa Munda 23 26 23 - 24 26 23 - - -

11. Learned Counsel further submitted that the bald allegation made by the 3 DRMs that other DRMs junior to them in service were retained and continued whereas they were made redundant, is not supported by any evidence. No particulars of such other DRMs have been furnished. The burden of proof in this regard was on them. They have not discharged such burden of proof.

12. Most fundamentally, learned Advocate argued that no question of retrenchment can arise in the present case since DRMs are contractual employees. If the contract of employment is not renewed, the same does not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of ID Act.

13. Learned Counsel relied on the following decisions:-

(i) GM, Tanda Thermal Power Project v. Jai Prakash Srivastava & Anr., reported at (2007) 14 SCC 98.

(ii) Management of the Express Newspapers (P) Ltd., Madras v. Workers and Ors., reported at AIR 1963 SC 569. (iii) District Development Officer & Anr. v. Satish Kantilal Amerlia, reported at (2018) 12 SCC 298.

(iv) General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, reported at (2005) 5 SCC 591.

I shall revert to these decisions later in this judgment. Argument on behalf of the writ petitioners in WPA 117/2020:-

14. Learned Advocate appearing for the concerned DRMs referred to Sections 25B, 25F, 25G and 25N of the ID Act, to which I will advert later in this judgment.

15. Learned Advocate submitted that the scope of the writ court interfering with the findings of a Labour Court is very limited. Unless there is patent illegality on the face of the order, no interference is warranted. Factual findings arrived at by the Labour Court should not be touched by the writ Court.

16. Learned Advocate submitted that since the Administration admitted before the Labour Court that these writ petitioners were retrenched without complying with the provisions of Sections 25F, 25G, and 25N of the ID Act, the Labour Court committed no error in holding the retrenchment to be illegal and directing reinstatement of these writ petitioners with full back wages.

17. Learned Advocate relied on a decision of a learned Judge of this Court in the case of the The Executive Engineer North Andaman Construction Division (NACD) vs. Smti. Rekha Nair and Ors., dated June 14, 2024, rendered in WPA 241 of 2019.

Court's view

18. Before considering the respective arguments of the parties let us note the provisions of Sections 25-B, 25-F, 25-G and 25-N of the ID Act:- "25-B. Definition of continuous service__ For the purposes of this Chapter,__

(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;

(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer- (a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than___ (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation

is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than__ (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case. Explanation .-For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which- (i) he has been laid off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;

(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous year; (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks. ] 25F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen. __ No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice: [* * *] [ Proviso omitted by Act 49 of 1984, S.3 (w.e.f. 18.8.1984).]

(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay [for every completed year of continuous service] [ Substituted by Act 36 of 1964, Section 14, for "for every completed year of service" (w.e.f. 19.12.1964).] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government [or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.] [Inserted by Act 36 of 1964, Section 14 (w.e.f. 19.12.1964).] 25G. Procedure for retrenchment. __ Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.

25N. [Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.__ (1) No workman employed in any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,- (a) the workman has been given three months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; and (b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that Government by notification in the Official

Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified authority) has been obtained on an application made in this behalf.

(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the prescribed manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed manner.

(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the appropriate Government or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned and the persons interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.

(4) Where an application for permission has been made under subsection (1) and the appropriate Government or the specified authority does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days.

(5) An order of the appropriate Government or the specified authority granting or refusing to grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (6), be final and binding on all the parties concerned and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order.

(6) The appropriate Government or the specified authority may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (3) or refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference.

(7) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the permission for any retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be illegal from the date on which the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no notice had been given to him.

(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the establishment or death of the employer or the like, it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such establishment for such period as may be specified in the order.

(9) Where permission for retrenchment has been granted under subsection (3) or where permission for retrenchment is deemed to be granted under sub-section (4), every workman who is employed in that establishment immediately before the date of application for permission under this section shall be entitled to receive, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days

'average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.]"

19. Now let us take a look at the decisions cited at the Bar:- (i) GM, Tanda Thermal Power Project v. Jai Prakash Srivastava & Anr., (supra). This decision was cited in support of the proposition that when existence of the relationship of an employer and employee is disputed, the same is required to be determined in the presence of all the parties who are interested in the subject matter of reference. Further, a direction for reinstatement cannot be issued when there does not exist any post. Even in a case where a workman is appointed on contractual basis, the Industrial Court would ordinarily not direct reinstatement. (ii) Management of the Express Newspapers (P) Ltd., etc. v. Workers and Ors., supra.

This judgment was relied upon in support of the contention that where an industrial dispute is referred for industrial adjudication in respect of certain persons described as workmen, the employer is entitled to raise the contention that the specified persons are not his/its workmen. Merely because the said persons are named as workmen in the reference, the employer is not precluded from disputing their status nor that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try such an incidental dispute.

(iii) District Development Officer & Anr. v. Satish Kantilal Amerlia, supra. Learned Counsel relied on paragraphs 12 and 13 of the reported judgment which read as follows:- "12. Having gone through the entire record of the case and further keeping in view the nature of factual controversy, the findings of the Labour Court, the manner in which the respondent fought this litigation on two fronts simultaneously, namely, one in the Civil Court and the

other in the Labour Court in challenging his termination order and seeking regularization in service, which resulted in passing the two conflicting orders - one in respondent's favour (Labour Court) and the other against him (Civil Court) and lastly, it being an admitted fact that the respondent was a daily wager during his short tenure, which lasted hardly two-and-half years approximately and coupled with the fact that 25 years have since passed from the date of his alleged termination, we are of the considered opinion that the law laid down by this Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Bhurumal [(2014) 7 SCC 177] would aptly apply to the facts of this case and we prefer to apply the same for disposal of these appeals.

13. It is apposite to reproduce what this Court has held in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra):

"33. It is clear from the reading of the aforesaid judgments that the ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back wages, when the termination is found to be illegal is not applied mechanically in all cases. While that may be a position where services of a regular/permanent workman are terminated illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of victimization, unfair labour practice, etc. However, when it comes to the case of termination of a daily-wage worker and where the termination is found illegal because of a procedural defect, namely, in violation of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, this Court is consistent in taking the view that in such cases reinstatement with back wages is not automatic and instead the workman should be given monetary compensation which will meet the ends of justice. Rationale for shifting in this direction is obvious.

34. The reasons for denying the relief of reinstatement in such cases are obvious. It is trite law that when the termination is found to be illegal because of non-payment of retrenchment compensation and notice pay as mandatorily required under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, even after reinstatement, it is always open to the management to terminate the services of that employee by paying him the retrenchment compensation. Since such a workman was working on daily-wage basis and even after he is reinstated, he has no right to seek regularisation [see State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, reported at (2006) 4 SCC 1].

Thus when he cannot claim regularisation and he has no right to continue even as a daily-wage worker, no useful purpose is going to be served in reinstating such a workman and he can be given monetary compensation by the Court itself inasmuch as if he is terminated again after reinstatement, he would receive monetary compensation only in the form of retrenchment compensation and notice pay. In such a situation, giving the relief of reinstatement, that too after a long gap, would not serve any purpose.

35. We would, however, like to add a caveat here. There may be cases where termination of a daily-wage worker is found to be illegal on the ground that it was resorted to as unfair labour practice or in violation of the principle of last come, first go viz. while retrenching such a worker daily-wage juniors to him were retained. There may also be a situation that persons junior to him were regularised under some policy but the workman concerned terminated.

In such circumstances, the terminated worker should not be denied reinstatement unless there are some other weighty reasons for

adopting the course of grant of compensation instead of reinstatement. In such cases, reinstatement should be the rule and only in exceptional cases for the reasons stated to be in writing, such a relief can be denied."

(iv) General Manager, Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, Supra. Paragraph 8 of the reported decision was relied upon, which reads as follows:- "8. There is no rule of thumb that in every case where the Industrial Tribunal gives a finding that the termination of service was in violation of Section 25-F of the Act, entire back wages should be awarded. A host of factors like the manner and method of selection and appointment, i.e., whether after proper advertisement of the vacancy or inviting applications from the employment exchange, nature of appointment, namely, whether ad hoc, short term, daily wage, temporary or permanent in character, any special qualification required for the job and the like should be weighed and balanced in taking a decision regarding award of back wages.

One of the important factors, which has to be taken into consideration, is the length of service, which the workman had rendered with the employer. If the workman has rendered a considerable period of service and his services are wrongfully terminated, he may be awarded full or partial back wages keeping in view the fact that at his age and the qualification possessed by him he may not be in a position to get another employment. However, where the total length of service rendered by a workman is very small, the award of back wages for the complete period, i.e., from the date of termination till the date of the award, which our experience shows is often quite large, would be wholly inappropriate.

Another important factor, which requires to be taken into consideration is the nature of employment. A regular service of permanent character cannot be compared to short or intermittent daily wage employment though it may be for 240 days in a calendar year."

20. The Labour Court set aside the order of disengagement of the DRMs essentially on the basis of alleged admission on the part of the Administration that the said DRMs worked continuously for 240 days, they were retrenched and the relevant provisions of the ID Act were not followed.

21. From the written objection filed on behalf of the Administration before the labour Court, I do not find any such admission having been made by the Administration. It is true that the witness deposing on behalf of the Administration namely, one Mr. Devaraju, in his evidence said that the requirement of working continuously for 240 days in a calendar year is satisfied in the case of the concerned DRMs. He also stated in his deposition that the said DRMs were retrenched and although the relevant provisions of the ID Act were required to be complied with, the Administration did not do so. However, I find this to be very strange. The purport of the written objection filed on behalf of the Administration which was verified by the same gentleman i.e., Sri. Devaraju, is that the said DRMs did not work continuously for 240 days.

In the teeth of such pleadings, I find it very difficult to understand as to how that gentleman deposed to the contrary before the Labour Court. This raises a suspicion in my mind which I need not express in so many words. However, I do find the same to be quite unusual and irregular.

22. Further, whether or not the DRMs were retrenched within the meaning of the ID Act is, if not a pure question of law, definitely is a mixed question of law and fact. In my opinion, the Labour Court should not have passed the award impugned before me merely on the basis of the deposition of the sole witness of the

Administration who deposed contrary to the written pleadings filed on behalf of the Administration.

23. Furthermore, the Labour Court proceeded on the basis that the 3 DRMs were engaged in the year 2014. This is contrary to the depositions of the said DRMs, all of whom stated in their evidence that they were engaged in August 2016. This is also the case of the Administration. Hence, I also find an error apparent on the face of the Award of the Labour Court which is a material error.

24. Whether or not a person engaged in an industry is a workman within the meaning of the ID Act and whether or not in case of termination of his service or his disengagement from service, the provisions relating to retrenchment are attracted, is a point the Labour Court ought to have addressed. However, the Labour Court did not do so. It proceeded entirely on the basis of the concession made by the sole witness of the Administration which runs contrary to the written pleadings filed on behalf of the Administration.

25. It is also established law that in case of disengagement of DRMs, ordinarily the Court does not direct reinstatement. If the termination is held to be illegal, normally compensation is directed to be paid.

26. The onus of proving that the workman concerned worked continuously for 240 days is squarely on the workman. In the present case, no material has been produced by the concerned DRMs in support of their claim that they worked continuously for 240 days and, therefore, the provisions pertaining to retrenchment embodied in various Sections of the ID Act would apply. This contention of the DRMs was disputed by the Administration. Therefore, it was obligatory for the concerned DRMs to establish their claim by producing material evidence. There is no such evidence on record. The Labour Court passed the impugned order solely on the basis of the admission made by the sole witness for the Administration which

was contrary to the pleadings filed on behalf of the Administration, verified by the same gentleman, as indicated above.

27. I am conscious that the writ court will ordinarily not interfere with a finding of fact arrived at by the Tribunal. However, if such factual finding is based on no evidence or on deposition which is contrary to the pleadings, in my opinion, it may not be unjustified for the writ court to interfere. After all, the writ Court is a court of equity, a court of conscience. The Government/Administration is an inanimate entity which has to function necessarily through human agents being its employees and officers. If the writ court finds that an officer of the Administration filed pleadings disputing the claim of the concerned DRMs and then a few months later, in the witness box the same officer admits the claim of the DRMs, a reasonable suspicion arises as regards the credibility and even integrity of such officer.

In such a situation it would be the bounden duty of the writ court to intervene to prevent injustice being caused to the Administration for possible dubious conduct of one of its officers. As indicated above, I find the impugned award of the Labour Court to be lacking in discussion of the material facts of the case and the applicable law including the relevant provisions of the ID Act. The Award is too sketchy and warrants interference.

28. The case of Smti. Rekha Nair, supra, relied upon by Learned Counsel for the DRMs, is completely distinguishable on facts. In that case, the learned Judge found that the DRMs had led cogent evidence before the Labour Court to establish that they had worked for 240 days in a calendar year. The Labour Court on appreciation of such evidence arrived at the findings as recorded in its order which was impugned before the learned Judge. Further, the Labour Court in that case had come to a finding that Section 25F of I.D. Act had not been complied with. In the present case, there is no finding by the Labour Court by independent application of mind that the DRMs are entitled to claim benefit of the relevant provisions of I.D.

Act pertaining to retrenchment. Merely on the basis of the deposition of the sole witness for the Administration, which is contrary to the pleadings filed on behalf of the Administration, the Labour Court made the impugned Award.

29. In view of the aforesaid, I set aside the impugned Award and remand the matter to the Labour Court for considering the matter afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment and pass a fresh Award in accordance with law. I clarify that even if the Tribunal comes to a factual finding on the basis of material records that the concerned DRMs in fact worked continuously for 240 days in a year and the provisions pertaining to retrenchment embodied in the ID Act would apply, the Tribunal should consider whether or not reinstatement of the said DRMs should be ordered in the light of the period of service rendered by them and the principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the decisions discussed in this judgment. Since, the matter has been pending for about 4 years, I request the tribunal to give some precedence to this matter and arrive at a fresh decision, if necessary by calling for further evidence, as expeditiously as possible.

30. WPA 107 of 2020 is accordingly allowed consequently, WPA 117 of 2020 is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

31. Urgent certified website copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all the requisite formalities. (Arijit Banerjee, J.) Date: 12.11.2024 Place: Jalpaiguri