Shri. Abdul Aleem v. Shri. P. K. Sathyan

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR ...

CO/6/2021 Abdul Aleem ... Petitioner Vs.

P.K.Sathyan ...

Respondent Mr. N A Khan, Advocate ... for the petitioner Mr.Krishna Rao, Advocate ... for the Administration September 07, 2021 [GNC] Item No.6.

The present case exemplifies the well known observation of Justice Vivian Bose made several decades below that the real trouble starts after getting the decree. Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been explored to thwart the compromise decree passed on the agreement entered into by the parties in respect of the subject property. The salient feature of the compromise decree is that the opposite party shall be shifted at the temporary shed to enable the petitioner to demolish the existing wooden structure to make concrete structure and the opposite party shall be reinstated in the newly constructed structure as a tenant. The compromise decree was partially complied with/implemented as the opposite party in terms of the compromise decree shifted to the temporary shed provided by the petitioner with the

profound hope that the terms of the decree would be honoured and complied by the petitioner.

Amidst the aforesaid decree having passed the petitioner claimed to have divested his right, title and interest by executing a deed of family settlement in favour of his son and have taken out an application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure assailing executability of the compromise decree. The court below rejected the said application as it cannot go behind the decree. Though the deed of family settlement has been registered on 29th July, 2009 but it is merely an arrangement for the purpose of an occupation and the possession of the property in order to bring harmony and peace in the family but does not take away the valid title of the owner.

The scope under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure is limited and microscopic. It cannot be regarded as an independent proceeding for the purpose of getting away with the decree but restricted to executability, discharge and satisfaction. The conduct of the petitioner does not instill confidence in me that a genuine grievance has been raised but apparently it is intended to get away with the execution of the decree validly instituted in order to prolong the litigation as I am told that the executing Court allowed the parties to lead evidence in such proceedings. The time has come that litigation should not be protracted eternally more particularly at the execution

stage and the executing Court should not be baffled with the regular procedure of law inviting the parties to adduce evidence for the purpose of deciding the limited questions under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The executing Court must show alacrity when a frivolous application is filed under the aforesaid provisions and attempt must be shown to nip such proceeding in bud. The impugned order, therefore, does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity.

The Revisional application is hereby dismissed. ( Harish Tandon, J. )