M Lakshmanan v. The Andaman And Nicobar Administration And Another

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

[ CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR ] *** WPA(P)/107/2019 M. Lakshmanan Vs.

The Andaman and Nicobar Administration and others Mr.KMB Jayapal .... for the petitioner Mr. Tulsi Lall ... for the Union of India Mr. Shatadru Chakraborty Mr. Dibesh Dwivedi .... for the respondents June 12, 2024 [SR] Item No.13 In the present challenge, the petitioner claims that Clause 13 of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Rent Control Regulation, 1964 is ultra vires the Constitution of India, being patently violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Learned counsel for the petitioner takes us through the definition of "premises" as given in clause 2(f) of the 1964 Regulations which defines premises to mean any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately "for use as a residence or commercial use or for any other purpose....." However, in clause 13(1)(c)(i), the Legislature has restricted the ground on which the landlord may seek eviction for his personal requirement to occupation as residence for himself or any member of his family.

It is thus argued that since in the first place, the premises could be let out for either residential or commercial purpose, the restriction of the landlords' right to recover possession in Clause 13 only to residential and not commercial purpose is unreasonable and contrary to the definition of 'premises' contained in the Regulations themselves.

Moreover, it is argued that the said clause is violative of Article 14 inasmuch as an unreasonable distinction has been drawn between two classes of landlords, those requiring property for

residential use and those who require it for commercial or other non-residential purpose. It is argued that the reasonableness of the requirement may be equally valid for both residential and commercial purposes.

Learned counsel for the petitioner cites the judgment of Satyawati Sharma (Dead) By Lrs. Vs. Union of India and another reported at (2008) 5 SCC 287 in support of his contentions.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondent authorities submits that the said Regulations of 1964 is a dead piece of legislation since by the subsequent Regulations of 2023, the same has been repealed. Although by virtue of the saving clause of the 2023 Regulation pending litigations have been kept outside the purview of such repeal, it is contended that none of the landlords who have filed eviction suits till date from 1964 onwards from the promulgation of the impugned piece of legislation have come up to challenge the said provision successfully. As such, there could not be any valid justification at this belated juncture to revisit the veracity of the said legislation and to challenge the vires of the same.

That apart, learned counsel for the respondents points out that it is within the legislative domain to decide as to what component of protection is to be given to the tenants. As such, it is argued that there is no stark unreasonableness or violation of the fundamental right of equality in the impugned provision so as to strike down the said provision on the ground of the same being ultra vires.

Upon a consideration of the judgment cited by the petitioner, we are of the opinion that the same does not tally with the facts of the present case. The point which arose for consideration in the said judgment of the Supreme Court was as to whether there was an unreasonable discrimination between premises let out for residential and non-residential purposes giving rise to violation of the Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court, in such context, held that section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was violative of the doctrine of equality embodied under Article 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminates between the premises let out for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation for

himself or for any member of his family dependant on him and restricts the latter's "right to seek eviction of the tenant from the premises let for residential purpose only".

As opposed to the said context, in the present case, there is no discrimination made between premises which have been let out in the first place for commercial or for residential purposes. The line of distinction has been incorporated in the 1964 Regulations at the juncture when the landlord seeks eviction, where the personal requirement of the landlord has been confined to residence for himself or his family members as opposed to nonresidential purposes. The ratio laid down in Satyawati Sharma's case is, thus, not applicable in the present context.

Insofar as the challenge to the vires of Clause 13 of the 1964 Regulations is concerned, we find that as per the saving clause in the 2023 Regulations, the pending litigations are still governed under the 1964 Regulations. Even if there is a single litigation pending to which the 1964 Regulations still applies, we do not find any reason not to entertain the challenge to the vires merely on the ground that a subsequent legislation has come in. The moot question involved here is how far this Court can interfere with the legislative intent, since the provision under challenge is a part of the 1964 Regulations, which is a delegated piece of legislation having equal force as a regular statute. It is well settled that if the Legislature, in its wisdom, chooses through a particular statute to confer a cloak of protection to a certain class of people, it is not for the courts to decide as to what component of protection shall be extended to such class of persons by the legislature.

The landlords in the present case who are interested parties, cannot choose as to what component of protection shall be extended to tenants and what would not be. Under normal circumstances, the landlords have a right under the parent Act, that is, the Transfer of Property Act to evict tenants.

Rent control legislations throughout the country are, however, specifically designed to provide an additional cloak of protection to tenants, with the end in view to protect such tenants in view of the crisis of housing.

In the present case, the Legislature has chosen to provide a particular protection to tenants by way of withholding the right of the landlord to obtain eviction on the ground of personal requirement in the event such requirement is not for the purpose of residence.

The landlords, as a matter of right, cannot seek a Rule of Mandamus from the Courts of law on the Legislature to determine as to what components of protection should be specifically given to the tenant and what should not be.

Hence, there is extremely limited scope of interference, if at all, in the present case.

That apart, we find that the 1964 Regulations as a whole, including the impugned provision, has stood the test of time over the long period from 1964 till 2023 without having being declared ultra vires. The Courts also ought to be pragmatic while deciding questions of vires, by ascertaining the actual ground level implementation of such statute.

On such score also, we do not find any reason at this juncture, particularly, when the 1964 Regulations including Clause 13 has withstood the test of time and the subsequent Regulation of 2023 has already come in.

In view of the above, we do not find any reason to hold that the legitimate Legislative exercise undertaken in promulgating clause 13(1)(c)(i) ought to be interfered with in any manner by this Court. Accordingly, the challenge to the vires of the said provision fails.

WPA(P)/107/2019 is thus dismissed.

No order as to costs.

Urgent certified server copies, if applied for, be issued to the parties upon compliance of due formalities.

( Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J. ) ( Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J. )