Smti.T.Madhavi v. The State And ORS
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
[ CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR ] *** CRR/12/2025 Smti. T. Madhavi Vs.
The State and Others Mr. Gopala Binnu Kumar .... for the petitioner Mr. Sumit Karmakar ... for the respondents March 12, 2025 [SR] Item No.5 1.
The petitioner claims to be a bonafide purchaser for value without notice and has submitted that the principal disputes appears to be between the complainant and the broker who was engaged for the purpose of sale of immovable property. 2.
It is further submitted a suit has been instituted by the complainant against the broker concerning the aforesaid transaction. It is strenuously argued that the order under section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code corresponding to section 173(4) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has not been complied with and the learned Magistrate has proceeded to direct FIR directly under section 156(3) of the Criminal Procedure Code corresponding to section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023.
3.
It is submitted that the said order of the learned Magistrate suffers from total non-application of mind. The
learned Magistrate has failed to appreciate the dispute is essentially civil in nature.
4.
Learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to the following observations of the learned Magistrate that had resulted in the registration of FIR.
"From the enquiry conducted, statements of the complainants and witnesses, and from the documents on record, it transpired that Anita Bahadur, Sheela Kumari, Kingku Adhikari and Lalitha Bai had approached a broker namely Mohammed Baksh, who had got them into sale agreements with different people. However, through this entire deal, all the vendors/sellers obtained their token money from respective purchasers. However, they did not receive the remaining sale consideration amount from the purchasers. When asked the purchasers, they said that they had given the remaining sale consideration money through various cheques and cash to Mohammed Baksh and Sahazadi Begum, however, those money were never given to the original sellers by Mohammed Baksh.
Further the purchasers were also never got introduced to the registered seller/vendor by Mohammed Baksh,. Although alleged Mohammed Baksh claims to have given the sale consideration money to the vendors, he doesn't have any supporting document to ascertain the same. The disputed land in the instant matter is situated at Dhannikhari which falls in the jurisdiction of PS Humphrey Gunj.
Having gone through the petition under section 156(3) Cr.P.C and the preliminary inquiry report, I find cognizable case has been made out therein. So, the prayer of the complainants to direct the SHO, PS Humfrigunj to register the complaint or to chalk out the FIR is hereby allowed. Since no FIR has yet been registered by the SHO, PS Humfrigunj it is expedient that the instant application under section 156(3) Cr.P.C should be referred to PS Humfrigunj with a direction to treat the same as an FIR."
5.
Mr.
Sumit Karmakar, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the state, in opposing the prayer, has submitted that it is well settled that the FIR is not considered to be an encyclopedia of what is mentioned therein and the matter requires further investigation. In fact the petitioner was granted
anticipatory bail and any apprehension that the petitioner may be named in the charge sheet at this stage is without any basis. Unless the investigation is complete any decision in favour of the petitioner at this stage may vitally affect the investigation. 6.
Ms. Anjili Nag, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant has adopted the submissions made on behalf of the State.
7.
On a conjoint reading of section 173(4) and 175(3), it appears that section 173(4) of BNSS, 2023 gives a right to the complainant to make a complaint to the Superintendent of Police once the Officer Incharge of the Police Station has refused to record the information furnished under section 173(1) while in section 175(3) if an application is filed by the applicant for non-registration of the FIR, the Court being satisfied with an affidavit affirmed in terms of section 173(4) and on consideration of a preliminary enquiry that may be conducted by the police authority direct registration of an FIR. 8.
The FIR was never treated to be a substantive piece of evidence and can be only used to corroborate as contradict the informant's evidence in the court. FIR is not an encyclopedia disclosing all facts and details relating to the offence. The true test of a valid FIR is to ascertain whether the information furnished provides reason to suspect the commission of an offence to be investigated by a police officer under section
175(1) of the BNSS. In Amish Devgan vs. Union of India1, it has been stated thus:- "113. Acronym FIR, or the first information report, is neither defined in the Criminal Procedure Code nor is used therein, albeit it refers to the information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence. This information, if given orally to an officer in charge of the police the police station, is mandated to be reduced in writing. Information to be recorded in writing need not be necessarily by an eyewitness, and hence, cannot be rejected merely because it is hearsay. Section 154 does not mandate nor is this requirement manifest from other provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Further, FIR is not meant to be a detailed document containing chronicle of all intricate and minute details.
In Dharma Rama Bhagare v.
State of Maharashtra2 it was held that an FIR is not even considered to be a substantive piece of evidence and can be only used to corroborate or contradict the informant's evidence in the court.
...
115. The true test for a valid FIR, as laid down in Lalita Kumari, is only whether the information furnished provides reason to suspect the commission of an offence which the police officer concerned is empowered under Section 156(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code to investigate. The questions as to whether the report is true; whether it discloses full details regarding the manner of occurrence; whether the accused is named; or whether there is sufficient evidence to support the allegation are all matters which are alien to consideration of the question whether the report discloses commission of a cognizable offence. As per sub-sections (1)(b) and (2) of Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code, a police officer may foreclose an FIR before investigation if it appears to him that there is no sufficient ground to investigate.
At the initial stage of the registration, the law mandates that the officer can start investigation when he has reason to suspect commission of offence. Requirements of Section 157 are higher than the requirements of Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Further, a police officer in a given case after investigation can file a final report under Section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking closure of the matter." 9.
Although it prima facie appears that the disputes are essentially between the owners of the properties and brokers as would appear from the observations made by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Port Blair while directing registration of 1 (2020) SCC OnLine SC 994 2 (1973) 1 SCC 537
FIR, it would be inadvisable at this stage to quash the FIR as the investigation has not yet been concluded and no charge sheet has been filed. It is equally possible that at the conclusion of the investigation, the final report may not include the name of the petitioner.
10.
On such consideration, this Court refuses the prayer for quashing at this stage.
11.
With the above observations, the CRR/12/2025 stands dismissed.
( Soumen Sen, J. )