Shri.K.Rushkesh Rao v. Union Of India And ORS.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION [CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR] ******** PRESENT: THE HON'BLE JUSTICE SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA AND THE HON'BLE JUSTICE SMITA DAS DE WP.CT/19/2026 SHRI K. RUSHKESH RAO ...

PETITIONER

Versus

THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS ...

RESPONDENTS For the Petitioner :

Mr. Gopala Binnu Kumar, Ms. Vinita Devi For the respondents :

Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Mr. N. Naidu Heard on :

April 16, 2026 & April 17, 2026 Judgment on :

April 22, 2026 SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J.

1.

The petitioner was appointed under the respondent no. 2, the Deputy Inspector General of Police (HQ), Andaman and Nicobar Islands, in the year 2009 and was posted as a Home Guard at Car Nicobar under the respondent no. 3, the Commandant, Home Guard Organization, Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

2.

On November 08, 2012 the petitioner was travelling in the sea vessel 'MV Kalighat' and arrived at Mus Jetty, when he was apprehended, being allegedly in possession of 45 bottles of IMFL (Indian Made Foreign

Liquor). An FIR was registered, bearing no. 37 of 2012 dated November 18, 2012 of the Car Nicobar Police Station and, pursuant thereto, a criminal case was started against the petitioner under Section 32 of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands Regulation (Regulation-III) of 1876. 3.

Simultaneously, for the same offence, a disciplinary proceeding was also initiated against the petitioner under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Ultimately, the petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case. However, prior to the same, on August 09, 2014, the Inquiry Officer submitted report in the disciplinary proceeding, on the basis of which, vide Order No. 1392 dated October 13, 2014, the respondent no. 3/Disciplinary Authority held the petitioner to be guilty of the charge and dismissed the petitioner from service.

4.

The petitioner challenged the said decision before the respondent no. 2, the Appellate Authority, which was pending for a considerable period of time, prompting the petitioner to file Original Application No. 911 of 2020 before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, Kolkata (Circuit Bench at Port Blair). During pendency of the said challenge, the appeal of the petitioner was dismissed. The Tribunal, on December 23, 2020, disposed of the Original Application by permitting the petitioner to prefer a fresh appeal before the respondent no.2/Appellate Authority by enclosing the copy of the acquittal order dated September 04, 2019 passed by the criminal court.

5.

The Appellate Authority, however, vide Order No. 346 dated February 2, 2021, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner, affirming the order of dismissal from his service dated October 13, 2014. 6.

Being thus aggrieved, the petitioner preferred Original Application no. 351/01100/2021. By the impugned judgment dated March 23, 2026, the learned Tribunal disposed of the said Original Application by quashing and setting aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority, which had merged with the order of the Appellate Authority dated February 02, 2021, and remanding the matter to the Appellate Authority, directing it to reconsider the case of the applicant for imposing any lesser punishment then dismissal or removal from service, primarily on the premise that in case of similarly circumstanced other employee(s), lesser punishment than dismissal had been imposed.

7.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner argues that the case of the respondents against the petitioner was full of discrepancies. For example, PW-1 Dydicus, in his cross-examination, admitted that the petitioner was not carrying the seized bags of IMFL but it was in the bus which was transporting the petitioner after his disembarkation from the vessel to the gate of the Jetty. PW-7 Ashok Kullu also stated in his crossexamination that the petitioner was not holding the bags, although those were kept "nearby the seat" of the petitioner. Thus, it is argued that it was never proved that the petitioner was in possession of the incriminating bags of IMFL.

8.

Again, whereas PW-1 stated in his cross-examination that the seizure was effected at the Car Nicobar Police Station, PW-5 and PW-8 stated that the same took place at the main gate of Mus Jetty. Such contradiction, it is submitted, vitiates the case of the respondents. 9.

Moreover, all the seizure witnesses were police personnel and not a single independent witness signed on the seizure list, despite the admission by the respondents' witnesses that there were several private passengers present at the locale. It is argued that such fact itself vitiates the seizure and, consequentially the allegation levelled against the petitioner.

10.

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner further argues that in view of the acquittal of the petitioner on merits by the criminal court on the self-same charges and on the same set of evidence, the Disciplinary Authority ought to have discharged the petitioner as well. In support of such contention, learned counsel cites Ram Lal vs. State of Rajasthan and others, reported at (2024) 1 SCC 175, where the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge can only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. In view of the findings of the criminal court in the said case, that the charges against the appellant therein were "disproved", and that the charges were not just similar but identical in the disciplinary proceeding as well as the criminal case, and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were all

the same, the order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority ought to be quashed.

11.

Learned counsel for the petitioner also places reliance on a coordinate Bench judgment of this Court in Shri U. Mohan Babu vs. Union of India and others (WP.CT 43 of 2025), where the coordinate Bench, under similar circumstances, held that there was no justification for the Tribunal to have remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration but it should have set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority and Appellate Authority, as fresh consideration of the matter by the Disciplinary Authority would be an exercise in futility and completely unnecessary and that in view of the order passed by the Tribunal relying on Supreme Court decisions, the Disciplinary Authority was left with no choice in the matter but to close the departmental enquiry.

12.

Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondentauthorities places reliance on Subrata Nath -vs- Union of India and others (Civil Appeal Nos. 7941-7942 of 2022), decided along with Union of India and others vs. Subrata Nath (Civil Appeal Nos. 7939-7940 of 2022), for the proposition that judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. The power of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of law. The Court/Tribunal, in its power of review, it was held, does not act as an Appellate Authority to

reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence but may interfere where the authority held the proceeding against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evident. 13.

It is contended that in the instant case, the principle of natural justice were adhered to and opportunity of hearing and crossexamination of the respondents' witnesses was given to the petitioner. Thus, there was no violation of natural justice and this Court ought not to substitute its own views for that of the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority.

14.

Learned counsel also cites State of Karnataka and another vs. Umesh, reported at (2022) 6 SCC 563, for the proposition that acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising the power to conduct departmental proceeding in accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different and operate in different fields, having different objectives. It is argued that unless the rules of natural justice are violated or the finding of misconduct is based on no evidence, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be exercised. 15.

Next citing State Bank of India and others vs. P. Zadenga, reported at (2023) 10 SCC 675, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated therein that the nature of the

proceedings being wholly separate and distinct, acquittal in criminal proceeding does not entitle the delinquent employee to the benefit of automatic discharge in the departmental proceeding. 16.

Learned counsel for the respondents further contends that there was sufficient material before the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was guilty of the charges. Since the evidence was appreciated by the said authorities and reasoned conclusions were arrived at by them, it is submitted that there ought not to be any interference with the same. 17.

It is further argued by the respondents that since the petitioner belonged to the disciplined forces, higher standards of morality and conduct than ordinary citizens was expected of him. Hence, the parameters of adjudication by the Disciplinary Authority for such a person cannot be equated with that of an ordinary citizen. 18.

Lastly, learned counsel argues that the petitioner has no scope of being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, since the same is substantially in his favour, having set aside his dismissal/removal from service and directing the Appellate Authority to consider imposition of lesser punishment. Thus, it ought to be left to the domain of the Appellate Authority as to what would be the nature and quantum of punishment to be imposed.

19.

Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties, certain salient features are required to be noted.

20.

The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Car Nicobar, acquitted the petitioner of the offence under Section 32 of Regulation III of 1876 on September 04, 2019. Although the inquiry report was filed by the Inquiry Officer prior thereto on August 09, 2014, the order of the Disciplinary Authority was passed subsequently on October 13, 2014. 21.

Despite the earlier direction of the Tribunal in OA/351/00911/2020 for the Appellate Authority to take into consideration the acquittal order dated September 04, 2019, the Appellate Authority reiterated its earlier decision by reaffirming the order of dismissal of the Disciplinary Authority. 22.

In such backdrop, the Court comes to the following conclusions:- Discrepancies in the respondents' case 23.

The first gross lacuna which catches the eye is that all the material witness, in particular PW-1 Dydicus (Head Constable, Car Nicobar, PS), PW-5 (ASI V. Satyawati), and PW-8 (Inspector Edith Thomson), admitted in their cross-examination in the Disciplinary Proceeding that there were several other passengers /private persons present at the spot when the seizure was allegedly effected. From the cross-examination of the respondents' witnesses in the Disciplinary Proceeding, it has clearly come out that there were several private passengers apart from the petitioner travelling in the bus, which carried the passengers after disembarkation from the vessel to the gate of the jetty. It is elicited from the cross-examination of PW-8 that approximately 150 passengers

disembarked at Mus Jetty from M.V. Kalighat on the relevant date. The said witness further admitted that the carrying capacity of the police bus (which was carrying the petitioner and other passengers), including standing capacity, was about 40-50 passengers. 24.

Thus, since the seizure was made in broad daylight and there were numerous private individuals who were present at the spot at the time of seizure, the obvious and proper course of action for the law enforcement officials would be to take the signature of some members of the general public on the seizure list as independent witnesses. No explanation whatsoever comes forth as to why there was not a single independent witness' signature on the seizure list and all the seizure witnesses were members of the raiding party (police personnel). 25.

The second stark infirmity in the case sought to be made out against the petitioner is the contradictory deposition of the respondents' witnesses regarding the place of seizure of the IMFL. PW-1, the Head Constable of the Car Nicobar Police Station, admitted in his crossexamination that the seizure took place in the Car Nicobar Police Station itself. Such admission was categorical and cannot be brushed aside as a stray comment, since the witness stated in no uncertain terms that "it was taken to PS Car Nicobar and seizure was effected in the PS". 26.

As opposed thereto, PW-5, the ASI and PW-8, the Inspector, stated that the seizure was made near the gate of the Mus Jetty. Such patent contradiction remained unexplained throughout the proceeding.

27.

It may not be any of the above discrepancies which, in isolation, vitiate the case of the petitioner but the cumulative effect thereof. The fact that despite ample availability, not a single independent witness was asked to sign the seizure list, nor was the discrepancy regarding the place of seizure among the respondent witnesses explained, casts serious doubt as to the validity of the seizure, which is the very foundation of the chain of events linking the alleged offence to the petitioner. 28.

Adding to the suspicion is the fact that the seizure was made admittedly in a "Police Bus" which ferried the passengers from the vessel to the gate of Mus Jetty. Although, per se, it may not cast suspicion on the police personnel, since it is only for the convenience of the public that the police bus is apparently used for such purpose, such factor acquires importance as an additional component adding to the combined effect of the other suspicious circumstances surrounding the seizure. 29.

Although the present proceeding is not an appropriate one to comment on such aspect of the matter, it would be appropriate if the arrangement for transport for the short distance from the vessel to the gate of the jetty is made in a vehicle belonging to the Administration or, better still, the owners of the ferry, rather than using a police vehicle, which might overshadow an otherwise proper seizure with the nagging suspicion that there is an obvious conflict of interest, since the apprehension of foul play cannot be ruled out altogether if the vehicle where the contraband/prohibited substance is recovered belongs to the investigating agency itself.

30.

Be that as it may, it is also suspect as to whether the offending bottles of liquor were actually seized from the possession of the petitioner. Conspicuously, PW-1 stated that the petitioner was not carrying the incriminating materials but the bags were kept "in the Bus", without specifying as to the exact location in the bus where it was kept or the proximity of such location with the petitioner. 31.

PW-7 also stated that the petitioner was not holding the bag, but it was kept "nearby his seat". The said statement is vague as to the exact proximity of the incriminating bags from the petitioner, which becomes relevant in view of the bus being packed with other passengers than the petitioner, all of whom had disembarked from the vessel 'MV Kalighat' and were in the bus. The nexus between the petitioner and the possession of the incriminating materials, thus, was not established at all.

32.

The Court is aware of the legal position that "possession" may be of different shades and may not always meet the test of being actually found on the person of the accused. However, in order to come within the purview of "possession", at least control and custody of the accused vis-à-vis the contraband material ought to be proved. In the present case, we do not find anything of that sort having been established by evidence. 33.

Hence, even applying the yardstick of preponderance of probability, as opposed to "beyond reasonable doubt', we do not find any case worth the name being made out against the petitioner; rather, there are serious

discrepancies in the respondents' case and the seizure of the materials itself is patently suspect.

Acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case - effect 34.

As held in State of Karnataka vs. Umesh (supra)1 and reiterated in State Bank of India and others vs. P. Zadenga (supra)2, the principles governing a disciplinary enquiry are distinct from those which apply to a criminal trial and the yardsticks of assessment of evidence are different in the two.

35.

There cannot be any quarrel with such general proposition. However, it has to be noted that in P. Zadenga's case, one of the questions which fell for consideration was whether a criminal trial creates a bar to the continuance of a parallel departmental proceeding, in which context the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered its findings. 36.

Moreover, such general proposition stands qualified by the principles laid down in Ram Lal's case (supra)3. In the said judgement, the Hon'ble Supreme Court placed reliance, inter alia, on G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat, reported at (2006) 5 SCC 446, and observed that if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar and if evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. 1 (2022) 6 SCC 563 2 (2023) 10 SCC 675 3 (2024) 1 SCC 175

37.

The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment in that regard are quoted hereinbelow:

"13. Learned Senior Counsel made the following submissions: (a) that there is no evidence to hold the appellant guilty or delinquent for the charges framed against him in the departmental enquiry; (b) that the acquittal of the appellant in the special case is a relevant factor, as the appellant has been acquitted on merits and the acquittal is clean and not based on benefit of doubt or any technical proposition. The same evidence was led in the departmental enquiry and, therefore, the dismissal order is bad in law; (c) that the enquiry officer has given finding of fact in favour of the appellant and despite that the enquiry officer has found the appellant guilty of the charges;

(d) the additional fact was also brought to the notice of the Division Bench that the Special Court has honourably acquitted the appellant of the same charge on 30-1-2002 but the Bench has not considered the same. The Division Bench failed to note the difference between an exoneration and acquittal by giving benefit of doubt. It routinely held that the writ court does not reappreciate or re-examine the evidence led before the enquiry officer and that unlike in criminal trial, the degree of proof in the domestic enquiry is restricted to preponderance of probability and not beyond reasonable doubt. The LPA was accordingly dismissed and the order of the learned Single Judge was affirmed; (e) Since the appellant has been exonerated of the charge, the appellant is entitled to reinstatement with full salary, allowance and subsequent promotions. In support of his contention, Mr L.N. Rao relied on the following judgments:

1. Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. [(1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] (two Judges).

2. Union of India v. Jaipal Singh [(2004) 1 SCC 121 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 12] (two Judges).

3. Commr. of Police v. Narender Singh [(2006) 4 SCC 265 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 686 : (2006) 4 Scale 161 : JT (2006) 4 SC 328] (two Judges).

4. R.P. Kapur v. Union of India [(1964) 5 SCR 431 : AIR 1964 SC 787] (five Judges).

5. Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra [(1981) 2 SCC 714 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 455 : AIR 1984 SC 626] (three Judges). ...

....

....

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25. The rulings cited by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent are:

In Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh [(2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067] it was argued before this Court on behalf of the respondent Sangh that the Labour Court ought not to have brushed aside the finding of the criminal court which according to the learned Single Judge "honourably" acquitted the accused workmen of the offence before it. The learned Judges were taken through the judgment of the criminal court. The Bench was of the opinion that the acquittal by the criminal court was "honourable" as it was based on the fact that the prosecution did not produce sufficient material to establish its charge which was clear from the following observations found in the judgment of the criminal court: (SCC p. 211, para 25) "Absolutely in the evidence on record of the prosecution witnesses I have found nothing against the accused persons. The prosecution totally fails to prove the charges under Sections 147, 353, 329 IPC."

26. Before the learned Judges, Paul Anthony case [(1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] was relied on in regard to the above contentions. The learned Judges held that the decision in Paul Anthony case [(1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] would not support the respondent therein because in Paul Anthony case [(1999) 3 SCC 679 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 810] the evidence led in the criminal case as well as in the domestic enquiry was one and the same and the criminal case having acquitted the workmen on the very same evidence and this Court came to the conclusion that the finding to the contrary on the very same evidence by the domestic enquiry would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive. The Bench further held as follows: (Krishnakali Tea Estate case [(2004) 8 SCC 200 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1067] , SCC pp.

211-12, para 26) "It is to be noted that in that case the finding by the Tribunal was arrived at in an ex parte departmental proceeding. In the case in hand, we have noticed that before the Labour Court the evidence led by the management was different from that led by the prosecution in the criminal case and the materials before the criminal court and the Labour Court were entirely different. Therefore, it was open to the Labour Court to have come to an independent conclusion dehors the finding of the criminal court. But at this stage it should be noted that it is not as if the Labour Court in the instant case was totally oblivious of the proceedings before the criminal court.

The Labour Court has in fact perused the order of the Judicial Magistrate and the exhibits produced therein and come to an independent conclusion that the order of the criminal court has no bearing on the proceedings before it; which finding of the Labour Court, in our opinion, is justified."

27. In Ajit Kumar Nag v. G.M. (PJ), Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2005) 7 SCC 764 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1020] this Court in para 11 held as under: (SCC p. 776) "11. As far as acquittal of the appellant by a criminal court is concerned, in our opinion, the said order does not preclude the Corporation from taking an action if it is otherwise permissible. In our judgment, the law is fairly well settled. Acquittal by a criminal court would not debar an employer from exercising power in accordance with the Rules and Regulations in force. The two proceedings, criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate in different fields and have different objectives.

Whereas the object of criminal trial is to inflict appropriate punishment on the offender, the purpose of enquiry proceedings is to deal with the delinquent departmentally and to impose penalty in accordance with the service rules. In a criminal trial, incriminating statement made by the accused in certain circumstances or before certain officers is totally inadmissible in evidence. Such strict rules of evidence and procedure would not apply to departmental proceedings. The degree of proof which is necessary to order a conviction is different from the degree of proof necessary to record the commission of delinquency. The rule relating to appreciation of evidence in the two proceedings is also not similar.

In criminal law, burden of proof is on the prosecution and unless the prosecution is able to prove the guilt of the accused 'beyond reasonable doubt', he cannot be convicted by a court of law. In a departmental enquiry, on the other hand, penalty can be imposed on the delinquent officer on a finding recorded on the basis of 'preponderance of probability'. Acquittal of the appellant by a Judicial Magistrate, therefore, does not ipso facto absolve him from the liability under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Corporation. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of the appellant that since he was acquitted by a criminal court, the impugned order dismissing him from service deserves to be quashed and set aside."

38.

Hence, while recognising the general principle that the scope of a disciplinary proceeding and a criminal trial are different, where charges, evidence and circumstances leading to both are identical and similar, the Court would be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceeding to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive.

39.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court clearly observed that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding there (as in the instant case) was after full

consideration of the prosecution evidence and the conclusion that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge could only be arrived at after a reading of the judgment in its entirety. 40.

Thus, in principle, the position consolidated in State of Karnataka vs. Umesh (supra)4 and P. Zadenga's (supra)5 case was noted and agreed with in Ram Lal (supra)6 but a distinction was drawn in respect of cases where the charges, materials, witnesses and circumstances in both the criminal proceeding and the disciplinary action are identical or similar. This takes us to the next issue.

Findings of the criminal court 41.

In the present case, the self-same set of witnesses, barring one, as well as the evidence which was placed before the criminal court in the proceedings under Section 32 of Regulation-III of the 1876 was also before the Disciplinary Authority.

42.

The criminal court arrived at the finding that on perusal of evidence and records, it appeared that no sample was taken from the alleged seized bottles and sent for chemical analysis to ascertain the nature of the liquid contained in the bottles. Such omission was held to be serious laches on the part of prosecution which could not be filled up by oral evidence. On such premise, it was observed by the criminal court that the prosecution had failed to prove that the seized materials were 4 (2022) 6 SCC 563 5 (2023) 10 SCC 675 6 (2024) 1 SCC 175

indeed liquor found from the possession of the accused, for which the accused person had no valid document. It is relevant to note that such aspect also vitiated the Disciplinary Proceeding of the petitioner. 43.

The next important observation of the criminal court was that there was no evidence as to how the alleged materials were sealed and labelled for future identification and so, the materials on record were shaky and not sufficient to hold that those were the same bottles which were seized from the accused person.

44.

Thirdly, the criminal court, after consideration of the evidence on record, come to the conclusion that the prosecution must prove the signature of the accused on the paper label pasted over the seized materials, which was missing in the case.

45.

It was further observed that the alleged seizure was made in broad daylight in a public place but the police did not obtain any signature of the public on the seizure list. The court went on to observe further that if there had been no independent witness at the time and place of seizure, then the lack of independent witness of seizure would not have much consequence; but when there was possibility of having independent witnesses, they had to be made witnesses to the seizure. The prosecution, it was held, did not explain as to why they did not take independent witnesses to the seizure.

46.

It was also held that the prosecution had failed to bring any iota of evidence that the accused had committed the alleged offence. The criminal court went on to observe that no guilt of the accused was

proved beyond reasonable doubt but added that "the essential ingredients to connect the accused person with the offence" were very much absent.

47.

Thus, the acquittal in the criminal case was not done in a cursory manner only on the cornerstone of "beyond reasonable doubt". Rather, on a thorough examination of the material evidence, the Chief Judicial Magistrate came to the conclusion that even the essential ingredients to connect the accused with the offence was absent. 48.

Moreover, the same maladies that afflicted the prosecution case in the criminal case vitiated the case made out by the respondents in the Departmental Proceeding as well.

49.

While elaborating on the first issue, this Court also independently arrived at the same conclusions as the criminal court. However, surprisingly, nether the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority took into consideration such crucial aspects of the evidence at all.

50.

The Appellate Authority, even after the remand order having specifically granted the petitioner leave to rely on his acquittal order in the criminal case, failed to take into consideration substantively the judgment of the criminal court, thereby flouting the order of remand by passed by the Tribunal on the earlier occasion. Rather, in a cryptic fashion, the Appellate Authority arrived at the conclusion that there was nothing material to rebut "utterly" the allegation made against the charged officer. Thus, neither the Disciplinary Authority nor the

Appellate Authority adverted to the most germane discrepancies in the prosecution case and as such, the findings of both the said authorities are clearly vitiated by patent perversity.

51.

Although in Subrata Nath (supra) 7, the Hon'ble Supreme Court cautioned against the reappreciation of evidence by the Division Bench of the High Court by arrogating itself to the position of an Appellate Authority, even without reappreciation of evidence, on an ex-facie glance at the materials on record in the instant case, it is evident that the findings and conclusions of both the authorities were based on no evidence and that the said authorities failed to take into consideration the most germane lacunae in the respondents' allegations against the petitioner. This tantamounts to patent perversity, which is one of the grounds of interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, even going by the ratio laid down in Subrata Nath (supra)8 as well as State of Karnataka Vs. Umesh (supra)9.

52.

In view of the above discussions, the ratio laid down in Ram Lal (supra)10 is squarely applicable and even independently, we come to the conclusion that the observations of the criminal court in identical circumstances/allegations and on the basis of self-same set of evidence corroborate our independent observations as to the glaring lacunae in the prosecution case.

7 Civil Appeal Nos. 7941-7942 of 2022 8 Civil Appeal Nos. 7941-7942 of 2022 9 (2022) 6 SCC 563 10 (2024) 1 SCC 175

53.

The coordinate Bench judgment of this Court in Shri U. Mohan Babu (supra)11 is apt in the context, where, under similar circumstances, the said Bench relied on Ram Lal (supra)12 and G.M.Tank (supra)13 and observed that if the charges in the criminal action and the departmental proceeding are identical or similar and the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are also the same, the Court, sitting in judicial review, can come to the conclusion that the acquittal was after due appreciation of the facts of the case and assimilation of the evidence and quash the disciplinary proceeding as unjust, unfair and oppressive. Higher Standard for Discipline Forces 54.

Learned counsel for the respondents places much reliance on the fact that the petitioner was a member of the disciplined forces and as such has to be adjudged on higher standards of morality and integrity than an ordinary citizen. This Court has absolutely no qualms with the above proposition. However, such higher standard is only a yardstick of judging the conduct and deciding the punishment, provided the threshold of foundational evidence of the charges and the alleged "misconduct" are crossed. Even in order to apply such touchstone of higher standard, the prosecution /disciplinary authority has to traverse the stage of proving the foundational facts for establishing the misconduct of the accused person.

11 WPCT 43 of 2025 12 (2024) 1 SCC 175 13 (2006) 5 SCC 446

55.

In the present case, the evidence is heavily balanced in favour of the accused person and against the respondent-authorities. Both from the findings of the criminal court and the evidence led in the disciplinary proceeding itself, we conclusively find that the connection between the petitioner and the alleged offence was never established, even apart from there being serious lacunae, such as omission of any independent witness in the seizure list despite the admitted presence of several private individuals on the spot, which vitiated the very process of seizure. There are too many missing links between the petitioner and the alleged offence to incriminate the petitioner, even on the test of preponderance of probabilities, and the so-called 'higher standard' for disciplined forces does not come into play, since no misconduct has been proved against the petitioner at all. Such standards would apply only upon the misconduct being prima facie proved, which is conspicuous by its absence in the present case.

Legality of the remand 56.

We find from the impugned judgement of the Tribunal that the learned Tribunal entirely omitted to advert to the foundational challenge by the petitioner in his Original Application on the merits of his indictment. The learned Tribunal, by adopting a peripheral approach, merely adverted to other similarly circumstances accused persons having been let off with lesser punishment and remanded the matter to the

Appellate Authority in a cursory manner, merely for the purpose of ascertaining the quantum of such lesser punishment. 57.

It is no longer res integra, that a decision which ignores the 'foundational challenge' that is, the core legal or factual basis upon which the petitioner's case rests, is considered a violation of principles of natural justice. In a plethora of cases, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that reasons are the 'live links' between the mind of the decision maker and the controversy. It is a well settled proposition of law, as held in the case of S. N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India reported at (1990) 4 SCC 594, that the Administrative and Quasi Judicial Authorities must record reasons. If a petitioner challenges the very legality of the charges (the indictment) the Tribunal cannot skip to the procedural aspects without first determining if the foundation of charge is legally sustainable. 58.

However, the learned Tribunal failed to advert to the gross lacunae in the case of the respondents, in view of which, read in conjunction with the acquittal in a criminal case upon assessment of the entire evidence, the petitioner was entitled to total exoneration without being saddled with any punishment whatsoever.

59.

Thus, the remand order, although on the face of it in favour of the petitioner, hits at the root of the rights of the petitioner by not setting aside the observations of both the authorities below as to the alleged involvement of the petitioner in the crime altogether. The learned Tribunal, in the circumstances of the present case as discussed above, ought to have set aside the orders of both the authorities outright and

exonerate the petitioner honourably from the entire allegations against him. Instead of doing so, the learned Tribunal left it to the Appellate Authority to impose lesser punishment for an offence which has not even been proved against the petitioner.

60.

We say so all the more because it is found from the grounds taken in the Original Application that the petitioner had preferred a comprehensive challenge before the Tribunal, not merely seeking lesser punishment but also hitting at the legality and validity of the findings of guilt against him in its totality. Thus, the learned Tribunal failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it by law in merely remanding the matter on the ground of parity with other co-accused and not acquitting the petitioner entirely of the allegations of misconduct made against him. 61.

If the record is clear and the indictment is ex facie, illegal or barred by law, the superior Court may exercise its own power to quash the proceeding to prevent further miscarriage of justice. Conclusion 62.

Accordingly, WPCT/19/2026 is allowed on contest, thereby setting aside the impugned judgment dated March 23, 2026 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, Kolkata (Circuit Bench sitting at Port Blair) in O.A.No.351/0110/2021 as well as quashing and setting aside the impugned Order No. 346 dated February 02, 2021 passed by the Appellate Authority and the order dated October 20, 2014 passed by the Disciplinary Authority and acquitting and exonerating the

petitioner honourably on all charges levelled against him by the respondents in the disciplinary proceeding.

63.

The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service in his previous post immediately and to restore all consequential benefits to the petitioner.

64.

There will be no order as to costs.

65.

Urgent Photostat certified copies of this judgment, if applied for, be supplied to the parties upon compliance with all requisite formalities. (SABYASACHI BHATTACHARYYA, J.) I agree.

(SMITA DAS DE, J.)