Shri.U.Mohan Babu v. The Union Of India And ORS.
CALCUTTA HIGH COURT
IN THE CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction (Appellate Side) WP.CT 43 of 2025 Shri U. Mohan Babu Vs.
The Union of India and Others Before: The Hon'ble Justice Arijit Banerjee & The Hon'ble Justice Apurba Sinha Ray For the Petitioner : Mr. Gopala Binnu Kumar, Adv.
Mrs. Vinita Devi, Adv.
For the Respondents : Mr. Rakesh Kumar, Adv.
Judgment On : 27.03.2026 Arijit Banerjee, J.:
1.
Under challenge in this writ petition is an order dated September 12, 2025, passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, Kolkata (Circuit at Port Blair) in O.A. 351/97/A&N/2016. 2.
The said Original Application was filed by the writ petitioner herein under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking, inter alia, the following reliefs.: -
"A)(i) An order be passed setting aside/quashing the impugned Order book No.55 dated 05.01.2016 passed by the respondent No.5, the Commandant, IRBn, A&N Islands, Port Blair whereby held the charge stood proved against the applicant and awarded the applicant penalty of forfeiture of three years of service with cumulative effect (Annexure A-11 to the Original Application) and Order Book No.755 dated 01.04.2016 passed by the respondent No.4, Appellate Authority whereby mechanically affirm the order passed by the respondent no.5 (Annexure A-12 to the Original Application):
(ii) An order be passed directing the respondent No.4 and 5 to exonerate the applicant from the memorandum of charges dated 16th February, 2015 (Annexure A-2 Collectively);"
3.
While allowing prayer A (i) of the Original Application, the Tribunal remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority for fresh consideration in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramlal vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors in Civil Appeal No. 7935 of 2023 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 33432 of 2018), dated 04.12.2023 and in light of the observations made in the order of the Tribunal. Being aggrieved by the portion of the order remanding the matter back to the Authority, this writ petition has been filed.
4.
The brief facts of the case relevant for the present purpose are that the petitioner was appointed as Constable under the Director General of Police, Andaman and Nicobar Administration, Port Blair (the respondent no 4 herein) in September, 2005.
5.
In November 2014, the petitioner got involved in a criminal case. The allegation was that he had assaulted one B. Sarita Devi with a stone. An FIR was registered against the petitioner and his father on November 19, 2014, under Sections 325/504/34 of IPC. The petitioner was arrested by the police and was released on bail on the same day.
6.
A preliminary inquiry was directed to be held against the petitioner. The Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated May 21, 2015, wherein it was mentioned that the petitioner was present at the place of occurrence and he had assaulted B. Sarita Devi with a stone causing grievous injury to her head.
7.
The Commandant IRBn, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Port Blair (respondent no. 5 herein) issued a Memorandum to the petitioner along with Articles of charge in terms of the applicable rules. The petitioner submitted his reply dated February 26, 2015, denying the charges levelled against him. As requested by the petitioner, the respondent no. 5 allowed him to appear in the orderly room where he submitted that he was not involved in the alleged incident of assault. The respondent no. 5, being the Disciplinary Authority, being dissatisfied with such explanation, appointed an inquiry officer and a presenting officer to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner.
8.
The petitioner participated in the departmental inquiry. The inquiry officer submitted his report dated October 12, 2015. A copy of the report was supplied to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his detailed representation dated October 29, 2015, in response to such inquiry report.
9.
By an order dated January 5, 2016, the respondent no. 5 concluded that charge nos. I and II had been proved against the petitioner. The penalty of forfeiture of three years of service with cumulative effect was imposed on the petitioner. The petitioner's appeal to the Appellate Authority was dismissed by an order dated April 1,2016.
10.
Challenging the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority, the petitioner filed the said Original Application. 11.
During the pendency of the said Original Application, by a judgment and order dated September 29, 2023, the Judicial Magistrate (1st Class), Second Court at Port Blair, South Andaman, acquitted the petitioner of the criminal charges brought against him. This factum was brought on record before the Tribunal. In view of such acquittal, it was argued on behalf of the petitioner that the punishment imposed on the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority, affirmed by the Appellate Authority, is unjustified. Reliance was placed in support of this contention on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., in Civil Appeal no. 7935 of 2023 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 33432 of 2018) dated December 4, 2023.
12.
The Tribunal noted that the following two questions, fell for consideration by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal's case (Supra): - "a) Whether the dismissal of the appellant from service pursuant to the departmental enquiry was justified?
B) On the facts of the case, what is the effect of the acquittal, ordered by the Appellate Judge in the criminal trial, on the order of dismissal passed in the departmental enquiry?"
13.
In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to its earlier decisions in G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat & Ors., reported at (2006) 5 SCC 446 and United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bharracharjee reported at (2022) 13 SCC 329 and held as follows, as noted by the Tribunal: - "11. ................ As part of that exercise, the courts exercising power of judicial review are entitled to consider whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority have ignored material evidence and if it so finds, courts are not powerless to interfere. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
13. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
23. With this above background, if we examine the criminal proceedings the following factual position emerges. The very same witnesses, who were examined in the departmental enquiry were
examined in the criminal trial. Jagdish Chandra, Bhawani Singh, Shravan Lal, Raj Singh and Karan Sharma were examined as PW2, PW3, PW6, PW9 and PW13 respectively at the criminal trial. Apart from them, eight other witnesses were also examined. The gravamen of the charge in the criminal case was that the appellant had submitted an application for recruitment along with his marksheet and he, by making alteration in his date of birth to reflect the same as 24.04.1972 in place of 21.04.1974, and obtained recruitment to the post of Constable. Though the Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 420 of IPC, the Appellate Court recorded the following crucial findings while acquitting the appellant:- "....Mainly the present case was based on the documents to this effect whether the date of birth of accused is 21.04.1972 or 21.04.1974.
Exh. P-3 is original Marksheet, in which, the date of birth of accused has been shown as 21.04.1972 and same has also been proved by the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution. Whatever the documents have been produced before the Court regarding the date of birth of 21.04.1974 are either the letters of Principal or are Duplicate T.C. or Marksheets.
birth was mentioned by accused in the Examination Form of Secondary, and nor after bringing the original records from the concerned witnesses, same were got proved in the evidence. In these circumstances, this fact becomes doubtful that date of birth of accused was 21.04.1974, and accused is entitled to receive it's benefit. In the considered opinion of this Court, the conviction made by the Ld. Subordinate Court merely on the basis of oral evidences and letters or duplicate documents, is not just and proper. It is justifiable to acquit the accused.
Resultantly, on the basis of aforesaid consideration, the present appeal filed by the Appellant/Accused is liable to be allowed."
[Emphasis supplied] XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
26. We are satisfied that the findings of the appellate judge in the criminal case clearly indicate that the charge against the appellant was not just, "not proved" in fact the charge even stood "disproved" by the very prosecution evidence. As held by this Court, a fact is said to be "disproved" when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes that it does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. A fact is said to be "not proved" when it is
neither "proved" nor "disproved" [See Vijayee Singh and Others v. State of U.P. (1990) 3 SCC 190].
27. We are additionally satisfied that in the teeth of the finding of the appellate Judge, the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon cannot be allowed to stand.
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30. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 31.03.2004; the order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.10.2004; the orders dated 29.03.2008 and 25.06.2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty respectively, are all illegal and untenable.
31. Accordingly, we set aside the judgment of the D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 484/2011 dated 05.09.2018. We direct that the appellant shall be reinstated with all consequential benefits including seniority, notional promotions, fitment of salary and all other benefits. As far as backwages are concerned, we are inclined to award the appellant 50% of the backwages. The directions be complied with within a period of four weeks from today.
32. The appeal is allowed in the above terms. No order as to costs."
14.
Having considered the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Tribunal went on to hold that in the instant case, the evidence, witnesses and circumstances were same and identical in the departmental enquiry and in the criminal proceeding. Therefore, the present case is squarely covered by the judgment in Ram Lal (Supra).
15.
Having so held, the Tribunal set aside the order of the Disciplinary Authority dated January 5, 2016, as also the Appellate Authority's order dated April 1, 2016, and remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority "to reconsider the case of the applicant taking into consideration the Order of his acquittal from the criminal case vide Order dated 29.09.2023 passed by the Judicial Magistrate (1st class), Second Court at Port Blair, South Andaman in Case No. G.R. 1705 of 2014 (T.R. 24 of 2015) and in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Lal (Supra) as well as our observations."
16.
The writ petitioner is aggrieved by the portion of the Tribunal's order whereby the matter has been remanded to the Disciplinary Authority for fresh consideration. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that having held that the present case is covered by the decision in Ram Lal (Supra), the Tribunal should have only set aside the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority and stop at that. An order of remand was not warranted. Reconsideration of the matter by the Disciplinary Authority will be a futile exercise in view of the conclusion reached by the Tribunal which has not been challenged by the administration. The Disciplinary Authority will be bound by the Tribunal's observation that the present case is covered by the decision in Ram Lal (Supra). Hence, the Disciplinary Authority will be bound to drop the disciplinary proceedings or return a verdict of the charges not having been proved. 17.
Learned Advocate for the Administration argued that acquittal of a delinquent employee in a criminal case does not automatically result in the delinquent employee being held not guilty in a disciplinary proceeding. The
standards of proof in a criminal case and in a disciplinary proceeding are different. While the prosecution in a criminal case has to bring home the charges beyond reasonable doubt, in a domestic enquiry, the employer is required to establish the charges on a preponderance of probability. Hence, merely because the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case does not mean that he must be given a clean chit in the domestic enquiry. 18.
Learned Advocate further argued that the petitioner has not suffered any prejudice by the order of remand. He will have full opportunity of placing his case afresh before the disciplinary authority. The order of the Tribunal does not warrant interference.
19.
Learned Advocate for the Administration relied on the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Dalbir Singh in Civil Appeal No. 5848 of 2021 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 24095 of 2019) and The Deputy Inspector General of Police & Anr v. S. Samuthiram in Civil Appeal No. 8513 of 2012 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 31592 of 2008) 20.
We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties. 21.
It is ordinarily true that dismissal of a criminal case against a delinquent employee does not automatically result in nullification of the disciplinary proceedings which may have been initiated against him. The reason, as argued by learned Counsel for the Administration is that the standards of proof in a criminal action and in a domestic enquiry are different. To that extent, the learned Advocate for the Administration is correct.
22.
However, as noted by the Supreme Court in Ram Lal (Supra), referring to its earlier judgments in G.M. Tank (Supra) and United Bank of
India (Supra), if the charges in the criminal action and the departmental proceeding are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are also the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the Court sitting in judicial review comes to a conclusion that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after due appreciation of the facts of the case and assimilation of the evidence on record comes to a conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charge, the Writ Court can grant relief if allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceeding to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. 23.
The decisions in G.M. Tank (Supra) and Ram Lal (Supra) have been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its recent decision dated April 23, 2025, rendered in Maharana Pratap Singh v. The State of Bihar & Ors in Civil Appeal No. 5497 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 9818/2017).
24.
In the present case, the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances were the same in the criminal proceeding and the departmental enquiry and hence the decision in Ram Lal (Supra) shall squarely apply. There is no challenge to this finding by the respondents.
25.
Even otherwise, we have gone through the records of the departmental enquiry and the judgment of the Criminal Court. It seems fairly clear to us that the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal action are similar. Both the proceedings involve the same evidence, witnesses and circumstances. Hence, the present case is squarely covered by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court's decision in Ram Lal (Supra) and Maharana Pratap Singh (Supra).
26.
If that be so, we see no justification for the Tribunal to have remanded the matter to the Disciplinary Authority for reconsideration. In our opinion, the Tribunal should have merely set aside the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. We are in agreement with learned Advocate for the petitioner that fresh consideration of the matter by the Disciplinary Authority will be an exercise in futility and completely unnecessary. In view of the order passed by the Tribunal relying on Supreme Court decisions, the Disciplinary Authority is left with no choice in the matter but to close the departmental enquiry. 27.
In view of the aforesaid, this writ petition succeeds. The portion of the Tribunal's order under challenge remanding the matter for fresh consideration by the Disciplinary Authority, stands set aside. We clarify that in view of the orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority having been quashed by the Tribunal, the petitioner shall be entitled to receive all consequential benefits. 28.
WP.CT 43 of 2025 is disposed of.
29.
Urgent certified website copies of this judgment and order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all the requisite formalities.
(Arijit Banerjee, J.) I agree.
(Apurba Sinha Ray, J.) Date: 27.03.2026 Place: Kolkata