Shahnawaz Ahmed S/O Enayat Waris v. Union Of India

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION FIRST APPEAL (ST) NO. 25831 OF 2023 Shahnawaz Ahmed S/o. Enayat Waris ..Appellant

Versus

ANAND SUDHAKAR SUDAME Union of India through the General Manager, ..Respondent Central Railway, Mumbai ANAND SUDHAKAR SUDAME Date: 2026.04.15 19:31:08 +0530 Ms. Priyanka Acharrya i/b. Mr. Vasim Siddiqui, Advocates, for the Appellant Mr. Niranjan P. Shimpi a/w. Ms. Bhagyashri Waghmare, Advocates, for the Respondent CORAM : RAJESH S. PATIL, J.

DATE : 10.04.2026 P. C.

1.

This First Appeal has been filed by the Appellant challenging the Judgment dated 21.07.2022 passed by the Member(Technical), Railways Claims Tribunal, Mumbai in Claim Application No. OA(II u)/MCC/0858/2014.

2.

Heard learned Counsel for both the sides.

3.

Admit.

4.

Call for R & P.

5.

A compilation of documents has to be filed within two weeks from today and a copy thereof be served on the other side. 6.

By consent, stand over to 05.05.2026 under the caption "For Final Hearing".

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 6542 OF 2025 1.

This Interim Application is filed for condonation of delay in filing the First Appeal.

2.

Heard learned Counsel for both the sides.

3.

I have gone through the contents of the Interim Application. 4.

Supreme Court in the judgment of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Katji and Others reported in 1987 SC 1353, has held that:

"Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every house's delay. Every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner."

5.

Supreme Court in the case of S. Ganesharaju (Dead) through Lrs V. Narasamma (Dead) through Lrs reported in (2013) 11 SCC 341, more specifically, paragraph Nos. 12 and 13, of the said judgment held that a liberal construction to the cause of delay should be given. The said paragraphs are reproduced herein below:

12. The expression "sufficient cause" as appearing in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has to be given a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice. Unless the respondents are able to show malafides in not approaching the court within the period of limitation, generally as a normal rule, delay should be condoned. The trend of the courts while dealing with

the matter with regard to condonation of delay has tilted more towards condoning delay and directing the parties to contest the matter on merits, meaning thereby that such technicalities have been given go-by.

13. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy or foreclose the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.

6.

Bombay High Court in the judgment of Kamalbai Narasaiyya Shrimal and Another Vs. Ganpat Vithalrao Gavare reported in 2007 (1) MH. L.J. 807, paragraph Nos.13 and 15 has held:

13. The factual position is manifestly clear on bare perusal of the application for condonation filed by the petitioners before the learned District Judge. The only relevant statement in the application is thus: "The delay caused in preferring the appeal is of six months. The caused delay is not intentional one. The appellants are poor and helpless persons. If the delay is not condoned appellant may cause irreparable loss which cannot be compensated in terms of money. The suit was for recovery of possession and present appellants are tenants. If the delay is not condoned then appellants will become shelterless."

15. The expression "sufficient cause" cannot be erased from section of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such "sufficient cause" stated in the application and as such no interference in the impugned order is called for." 7.

Considering the facts of the present case and the law laid down in the above Judgments, I am convinced that the present Interim Application deserves to be allowed.

8.

The Interim Application stands allowed in terms of prayer clause (a).

(RAJESH S. PATIL, J.)