Khalil Rehaman Shaikh v. State Of Maharashtra

Amberkar IN IN THE THE HIGH HIGH COURT COURT OF OF JUDICATURE JUDICATURE AT AT BOMBAY BOMBAY CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION BAIL APPLICATION NO. 4343 OF 2024 Khalil Rehaman Shaikh .. Applicant

Versus

State of Maharashtra .. Respondent ....................

 Mr. Aarif Ali for Applicant  Mr. Dinesh J. Haldankar, APP for State ...................

CORAM : MILIND N. JADHAV, J.

DATE : JANUARY 30, 2025 P. C.

:

1.

Heard Mr. Ali, learned Advocate for Applicant and Mr. Haldankar, learned APP for State.

2.

Applicant - accused has filed the present Application for regular bail under Section 439, 436-A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, "Cr.P.C.") and Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, "BNSS") in connection with Crime No. 28/2021 registered with Vanrai Police Station for the offences punishable under Sections 376-B, 377 and 380 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, "IPC") and Section 67 of the Information and Technology Act, 2005. Applicant is arrested on 03.02.2021. 3.

First informant is the wife of the Applicant. She was married to the Applicant in 2018. Mr. Ali would vehemently argue at the outset that invocation of Section 376 therefore is not applicable

considering this fact. FIR is appended at page No. 29. It is dated 02.02.2021 and the tenure / occurrences of the offences is from 24.07.2018 till the date of filing of the FIR. First informant is previously married to Ravindra Hanumant Dethe in the year 1999 and has one son and one daughter (21 years) and one son (18 years). First informant has stated that she was staying at Shivshakti Nagar, Goregaon along with her two children and her husband used to intermittently visit her rented accommodation in Goregaon and at other times, he used to stay with his mother in Matunga Labour Camp. 4.

According to the first informant and prosecution case, in 2018 she met the Applicant who was her school friend during their school get-together and she was attracted to him and their relationship blossomed into love for each other. First informant states that since Applicant was belonging to Muslim religion, on 24.07.2018 she embraced Muslim religion and got married to the Applicant under Muslim Law in the presence of Mufti Isamail Kazi at his office situated at Bandra (E), Mumbai. First informant has stated that thereafter she started residing with Applicant since 2018 along with her two children at Aarey Road, Aarey Colony, Goregaon, Mumbai in a rented premises. First informant has stated that post her marriage to the Applicant, she had regular physical relationship with the Applicant. She has stated that her father had given Rs. 25 Lakh cash amount and 25 Tolas of gold to her as Stridhan which she had kept in a cupboard and post her

marriage in 2018 with the Applicant, she found that some portion of the said cash amount and gold ornaments were missing from her cupboard. First informant has stated that she apprehended Applicant stealing cash of One Lakh rupees on one day and therefore questioned him but he did not give proper answers and evaded her question and thereafter physically abused her. Thereafter first informant left the Applicant and started residing in another accommodation / room on rental basis in Jayprakash Nagar, Goregaon (E), Mumbai. She thereafter changed her accommodation to Shivshakti Building, Shivshakti Nagar, Goregaon (E) on rental basis.

She has stated in her complaint that even after her separation from Applicant, Applicant persisted her to have physical relationship with him and she also allowed the Applicant to stay with her but since the abuse of the Applicant increased and escalated in 2018, she took khulanama (divorce) and started residing with her children separately. First informant has stated that this enraged the Applicant and he started harassing her by repeatedly showing her videos from his mobile phone about their compromising positions. She has stated that in order to save herself from the threats of the Applicant, she agreed to his demands and allowed the Applicant to maintain physical relationship with her even thereafter.

to maintain physical relationship. Thereafter in 2021 first informant once again changed her residence and in February 2021 lodged the FIR.

5.

From reading of the FIR, it is prima facie clear that first informant on her own volition married the Applicant in 2018 and until January 2021 maintained physical relationship with the Applicant. It is clearly seen that according to her since 2018 Applicant was harassing her and committing sexual intercourse against her wishes but the delay in filing the FIR is clearly evident of the fact that she did not raise any protest for the Applicant's Act. 6.

Mr. Haldankar, learned APP has vehemently argued that Applicant had recorded several videos of the first informant which have all been seized by the Investigation Officer (IO). He would submit that Applicant's act of harassment is such that he will repeat his conduct and force the informant to keep sexual relationship with him. He would submit that in that view of the matter, present Bail Application be rejected.

7.

I have considered the submissions made by learned Advocate as also learned APP. It is prima facie seen that without obtaining divorce from the first husband, first informant kept consensual relationship with the Applicant by marrying him after conversion. Further even after obtaining khulanama (divorce) according to the

first informant, she persisted with the physical relationship with the Applicant for a period of more than three years. Prima facie relationship is consensual. In so far as the allegation of theft is concerned, it is not precise or definite in nature. First informant is a lady in her middle age having two grown up children and she is / was clearly aware about her acts. In so far as the apprehension expressed by learned APP is concerned, same can be taken care of by imposing stringent conditions.

8.

It is settled law that a Court while deciding a Bail Application has to keep in mind the principal rule of bail which is to ascertain whether the Accused is likely to appear before the Court for trial. There are other broad parameters also like gravity of offence, likelihood of Accused repeating the offence while on bail, whether he would influence the witnesses and tamper with the evidence, his antecedents are required to be considered in such cases. 9.

It is seen that while dealing with Bail Applications the material available for consideration and adjudication is limited. It is brought to the notice of the Court that trials are taking perpetuity to conclude and prisons are also simultaneously overcrowded in some segments. This Court regularly deals with Bail Applications of undertrials who have been in custody for long period and is also equally aware of the conditions of our prisons. To give an example in the city

of Mumbai, recently in one of the cases before me, a Report dated 12.12.2024 made by the Superintendent of Mumbai Central Prison addressed to the Chief Government Pleader was placed before me by the Public Prosecutor which stated that the Mumbai Central Prison (Arthur Road Jail) is overcrowded beyond its sanctioned capacity by more than 5 - 6 times and every barrack sanctioned to house 50 inmates as on date houses anywhere between 220 - 250 inmates. Such an incongruity leads us to answer the proposition: "How can Courts find a balance between the two polarities?"

10.

Argued before me is a case concerning liberty of an undertrial who has been incarcerated for 3 years 11 months and 27 days, a situation impacting the rights of under-trials conferred by Article 21 of Constitution to speedy justice as also personal liberty. In so far as the power of High Court to grant bail is concerned, when the case is such that involves a question of personal liberty of an under-trial who is incarcerated for a very long period, the powers are wide and unfettered by conditions, the principle rule being that bail is the rule and refusal is the exception, allowing accused persons to better prepare their defence.

11.

In the case of Emperor Vs. H.L. Hutchinson1, the Allahabad High Court, as far back as in the year 1931 held that power of granting bail conferred on High Court is entirely unfettered by any conditions. It AIR 1931 ALL 356

held that legislature has given the High Court and the Court of Session discretion unfettered by any limitation other than that which controls all discretionary powers vested in a Judge, viz. that the discretion must be exercised judiciously. The Court has given primacy to the fact that accused person if granted bail will be in a much better position to defend himself. In this very case, it was delineated that grant of Bail is the Rule and refusal is an exception. This was in the famous Meerut Conspiracy case. Justice Mukherjea writing for the Bench in paragraph No.9 held as under:- "9.

Speaking for myself, I think it very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules for the guidance of the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the Court entirely unfettered. The reason for this action on the part of the legislature is not far to seek. The High Court might be safely trusted in this matter and it goes without saying that it would act in the best interests of justice whether it decides in favour of the prosecution or the defence. The variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it will be dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes." 12.

In the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation2, in paragraph Nos.6 to 15 the Supreme Court considered the prevailing situation of prisons in India, definition of trial and bail, principle of presumption of innocence and reiterated the well recognized principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception in bail jurisprudence on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Paragraph Nos.6 to 15 of the said judgement read as under:- (2022) 10 SCC 51

"Prevailing situation 6.

Jails in India are flooded with undertrial prisoners. The statistics placed before us would indicate that more than 2/3rd of the inmates of the prisons constitute undertrial prisoners. Of this category of prisoners, majority may not even be required to be arrested despite registration of a cognizable offence, being charged with offences punishable for seven years or less. They are not only poor and illiterate but also would include women. Thus, there is a culture of offence being inherited by many of them. As observed by this Court, it certainly exhibits the mindset, a vestige of colonial India, on the part of the investigating agency, notwithstanding the fact arrest is a draconian measure resulting in curtailment of liberty, and thus to be used sparingly. In a democracy, there can never be an impression that it is a police State as both are conceptually opposite to each other.

Definition of trial 7.

The word "trial" is not explained and defined under the Code. An extended meaning has to be given to this word for the purpose of enlargement on bail to include, the stage of investigation and thereafter. Primary considerations would obviously be different between these two stages. In the former stage, an arrest followed by a police custody may be warranted for a thorough investigation, while in the latter what matters substantially is the proceedings before the court in the form of a trial. If we keep the above distinction in mind, the consequence to be drawn is for a more favourable consideration towards enlargement when investigation is completed, of course, among other factors.

8.

Similarly, an appeal or revision shall also be construed as a facet of trial when it comes to the consideration of bail on suspension of sentence.

Definition of bail 9.

The term "bail" has not been defined in the Code, though is used very often. A bail is nothing but a surety inclusive of a personal bond from the accused. It means the release of an accused person either by the orders of the court or by the police or by the investigating agency.

10. It is a set of pre-trial restrictions imposed on a suspect while enabling any interference in the judicial process. Thus, it is a conditional release on the solemn undertaking by the suspect that he would cooperate both with the investigation and the trial. The word "bail" has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edn., p. 160 as:

"A security such as cash or a bond; esp., security required by a court for the release of a prisoner who must appear in court at a future time."

11.

Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 105 defines "bail" as: "to set at liberty a person arrested or imprisoned, on security being taken for his appearance on a day and at a place certain, which security is called bail, because the party arrested or imprisoned is delivered into the hands of those who bind themselves or become bail for his due appearance when required, in order that he may be safely protected from prison, to which they have, if they fear his escape, etc. the legal power to deliver him." Bail is the rule 12.

The principle that bail is the rule and jail is the exception has been well recognized through the repetitive pronouncements of this Court. This again is on the touchstone of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. This Court in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India [Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018) 11 SCC 1 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 302] , held that : (SCC pp. 22-23 & 27, paras 19 & 24) "19. In Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab [Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 465] , the purpose of granting bail is set out with great felicity as follows : (SCC pp. 586-88, paras 27-30) '27. It is not necessary to refer to decisions which deal with the right to ordinary bail because that right does not furnish an exact parallel to the right to anticipatory bail.

It is, however, interesting that as long back as in 1924 it was held by the High Court of Calcutta in Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re [Nagendra Nath Chakravarti, In re, 1923 SCC OnLine Cal 318 : AIR 1924 Cal 476] , AIR pp. 47980 that the object of bail is to secure the attendance of the accused at the trial, that the proper test to be applied in the solution of the question whether bail should be granted or refused is whether it is probable that the party will appear to take his trial and that it is indisputable that bail is not to be withheld as a punishment. In two other cases which, significantly, are the "Meerut Conspiracy cases" observations are to be found regarding the right to bail which deserve a special mention. In K.N. Joglekar v. Emperor [K.N. Joglekar v.

Emperor, 1931 SCC OnLine All 60 : AIR 1931 All 504] it was observed, while dealing with Section 498 which corresponds to the present Section 439 of the Code, that it conferred upon the Sessions Judge or the High Court wide powers to grant bail which were not handicapped by the restrictions in the preceding Section 497 which corresponds to the present Section 437.

was no hard-and-fast rule and no inflexible principle governing the exercise of the discretion conferred by Section 498 and that the only principle which was established was that the discretion should be exercised judiciously. In Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson [Emperor v. H.L. Hutchinson, 1931 SCC OnLine All 14 : AIR 1931 All 356] , AIR p. 358 it was said that it was very unwise to make an attempt to lay down any particular rules which will bind the High Court, having regard to the fact that the legislature itself left the discretion of the court unfettered. According to the High Court, the variety of cases that may arise from time to time cannot be safely classified and it is dangerous to make an attempt to classify the cases and to say that in particular classes a bail may be granted but not in other classes.

It was observed that the principle to be deduced from the various sections in the Criminal Procedure Code was that grant of bail is the rule and refusal is the exception. An accused person who enjoys freedom is in a much better position to look after his case and to properly defend himself than if he were in custody. As a presumably innocent person he is therefore entitled to freedom and every opportunity to look after his own case. A presumably innocent person must have his freedom to enable him to establish his innocence.

28.

Coming nearer home, it was observed by Krishna Iyer, J., in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor [Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, (1978) 1 SCC 240 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 115] that : (SCC p. 242, para 1) "1. ... the issue [of bail] is one of liberty, justice, public safety and burden of the public treasury, all of which insist that a developed jurisprudence of bail is integral to a socially sensitised judicial process. ... After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of "procedure established by law". The last four words of Article 21 are the life of that human right."

29. In Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] it was observed by Goswami, J., who spoke for the Court, that : (SCC p. 129, para 29) "29. ... There cannot be an inexorable formula in the matter of granting bail. The facts and circumstances of each case will govern the

exercise of judicial discretion in granting or cancelling bail."

30. In American Jurisprudence (2nd Edn., Vol. 8, p. 806, para 39), it is stated:

"Where the granting of bail lies within the discretion of the court, the granting or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. Since the object of the detention or imprisonment of the accused is to secure his appearance and submission to the jurisdiction and the judgment of the court, the primary inquiry is whether a recognizance or bond would effect that end."

It is thus clear that the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which must enter into the judicial verdict. Any one single circumstance cannot be treated as of universal validity or as necessarily justifying the grant or refusal of bail.'

* * * 24.

Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is concerned. It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. It is the only article in the Fundamental Rights Chapter (along with Article 20) that cannot be suspended even in an emergency [see Article 359(1) of the Constitution]. At present, Article 21 is the repository of a vast number of substantive and procedural rights post Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] ."

13.

Further this Court in Sanjay Chandra v. CBI [Sanjay Chandra v. CBI, (2012) 1 SCC 40 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 26 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 397] , has observed that : (SCC p. 52, paras 21-23) "21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon. The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.

22.

From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, "necessity" is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which, he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary circumstances. 23.

Apart from the question of prevention being the object of refusal of bail, one must not lose sight of the fact that any imprisonment before conviction has a substantial punitive content and it would be improper for any court to refuse bail as a mark of disapproval of former conduct whether the accused has been convicted for it or not or to refuse bail to an unconvicted person for the purpose of giving him a taste of imprisonment as a lesson." Presumption of innocence 14.

Innocence of a person accused of an offence is presumed through a legal fiction, placing the onus on the prosecution to prove the guilt before the court. Thus, it is for that agency to satisfy the court that the arrest made was warranted and enlargement on bail is to be denied.

15.

Presumption of innocence has been acknowledged throughout the world. Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 and Article 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 acknowledge the presumption of innocence, as a cardinal principle of law, until the individual is proven guilty."

13.

The Supreme Court in a landmark decision of 1978 in the case of Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. Vs. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh3 observed as under:- "6.

Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the 1978 (1) SCC 240

applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve sentence in the event of the court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective..."

(emphasis supplied) 14.

Thereafter the Supreme Court in a plethora of judgements have discussed the rights conferred by Article 21 qua grant of bail and that such rights cannot be taken away unless the procedure is reasonable and fair and in cases where there is unreasonable delay in trial it would undoubtedly impact the rights of an undertrial. Some of the important decisions of the Supreme Court and some of the High Courts are discussed herein under:- 14.1 In the landmark judgement of Maneka Gandhi Vs. Union of India4, the Supreme Court held that the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 is not limited to mere animal existence but includes the right to live with dignity. The court emphasized that the procedure established by law must be fair, just, and reasonable, and it cannot be arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable. 14.

2 In the case of Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secy., State of Bihar5 the Supreme Court held as under:- "Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of liberty cannot "reasonable, fair or just" unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as "reasonable, fair or just" and it would fall foul of Article 21.

the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. The question which would, however, arise is as to what would be the consequence if a person accused of an offence is denied speedy trial and is sought to be deprived of his liberty by imprisonment as a result of a long delayed trial in violation of his fundamental right under Article 21."

14.3 The Supreme Court in the case of Shaheen Welfare Association Vs. Union Of India6 dealing with a Public Interest Litigation seeking relief for under-trial prisoners charged under the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 due to gross delay in disposal of cases qua Article 21 of the Constitution of India held as under:- "10. Bearing in mind the nature of the crime and the need to protect the society and the nation, TADA has prescribed in Section 20(8) stringent provisions for granting bail. Such stringent provisions can be justified looking to the nature of the crime, as was held in Kartar Singh's case (supra), on the presumption that the trial of the accused will take place without undue delay.

No one can justify gross delay in disposal of cases when undertrials perforce remain in jail, giving rise to possible situations that may justify invocation of Article 21." 14.4 The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. K. A. Najeeb7 while commenting upon the possibility of early completion of trial and extended incarceration held as under:- "18. Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail.

An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's right 6 1996 SCC (2) 616 7 Criminal Appeal No.

to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent's rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected."

Applicant in present case has been in custody for 3 years 11 months and 27 days. There is no possibility of the trial commencing in the near future. Detaining an under-trial prisoner for such an extended period further violates his fundamental right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution. At this juncture I deem it appropriate to list certain observations of the Supreme Court shedding light on concerns underlying the "Right to speedy trial" from the point of view of an accused in custody whose liberty is affected. In the case of Abdul Rehman Antulay & Ors. Vs R.S. Nayak & Anr.8 the Supreme Court held as under:- "86. In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge, meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:

(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial is also in public interest or that it serves the societal interest also, does not make it any-the-less the right of the accused. It is in the interest of all concerned that the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined as quickly as possible in the circumstances.

(2) Right to Speedy Trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, revision and retrial. That is how, this Court has understood this right and there is no reason to take a restricted view.

(3) The concerns underlying the Right to speedy trial from the point of view of the accused are:

1992 (1) SCC 225

(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to his conviction;

(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry or trial should be minimal; and (c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the accused to defend himself, whether on account of death, disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.

(4) - (11) -------x-------"

(emphasis supplied) 16.

The Supreme Court has also held in a series of judgements and orders that in situations where the under-trial-prisoner / accused persons have suffered incarceration rather long incarceration for a considerable period of time and there is no possibility of the trial being completed within the foreseeable future, Constitutional Courts can exercise power to release the accused under-trial on bail, as bail is the rule and jail is the exception.

17.

In the case of Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing undertrial prisoners) Vs. Union of India9, the Supreme Court has held that:- "17. We are conscious of the fact that the menace of drug trafficking has to be controlled by providing stringent punishments and those who indulge in such nefarious activities do not deserve any sympathy. But at the same time we cannot be oblivious to the fact that many innocent persons may also be languishing in jails if we recall to mind the percentage of acquittals. Since harsh punishments have been provided for under the Act, the percentage of disposals on plea of guilt is bound to be small; the State Government should, therefore, have realised the need for setting up sufficient number of Special Courts immediately after the amendment of the Act by Amendment Act 2 of 1989. Even after the Division Bench of the (1995) 4 SCC 695

Bombay High Court refused to grant en bloc enlargement on bail on 1-2-1993 in Criminal Application No. 3480 of 1992 and B.D. Criminal No. 565 of 1992, no substantial improvement in the pendency is shown since new cases continue to pour in, and, therefore, a one-time exercise has become imperative to place the system on an even keel. We also recommend to the State Government to set up Review Committees headed by a Judicial Officer, preferably a retired High Court Judge, with one or two other members to review the cases of undertrials who have been in jail for long including those released under this order and to recommend to the State Government which of the cases deserve withdrawal. The State Government can then advise the Public Prosecutor to move the court for withdrawal of such cases. This will not only.

help reduce the pendency but will also increase the credibility of the prosecuting agency. After giving effect to this order the Special Court may consider giving priority to cases of those undertrials who continue in jail despite this order on account of their inability to furnish bail."

18.

In view of the above, present Application is allowed in terms of prayer clause (a) subject to the following terms and conditions:- (i) Applicant is directed to be released on bail on furnishing P.R. Bond in the sum of Rs. 25,000/- with one or two sureties in the like amount;

(ii) Applicant shall report to the Investigating Officer of concerned Police Station once every month on the third Saturday between 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. for the first three months and thereafter as and when called; (iii) Applicant shall co-operate with the conduct of trial and attend the Trial Court on all dates unless specifically exempted and will not take any unnecessary adjournments, if he does so, it will entitle the

prosecution to apply for cancellation of this order; (iv) Applicant shall not leave the State of Maharashtra without prior permission of the Trial Court;

(v) Applicant shall not make any attempts to re-associate with the Complainant in any manner either through a device or in-person and shall not reside in the jurisdiction of the Police Station wherein the First Informant and her two children are residing until the Trial is concluded. Investigating Officer shall specifically ensure that this condition is followed;

(vi) Applicant shall not influence with any of the witnesses or tamper with the evidence in any manner;

(vii) Applicant shall keep the Investigating Officer informed of his current address and mobile contact number and / or change of residence or mobile details, if any, from time to time;

(viii) Any infraction of the above conditions shall entail the prosecution to seek cancellation of this order. 19.

It is clarified that the observations in this order are limited for the purpose of granting Bail only and I have not made any observations on merits of the case.

20.

Bail Application stands allowed and disposed. Amberkar [ MILIND N. JADHAV, J. ] by RAVINDRA MOHAN AMBERKAR Date:

2025.01.30 20:32:29 +0530 RAVINDRA MOHAN AMBERKAR