Pratibha Baburao Jamdade v. Chetana Hiramani Sharma

Gadekar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO.14197 OF 2025 Pratibha Baburao Jamdade

...Petitioner

Versus

Chetana Hiramani Sharma

...Respondent

by KISHOR RAGHUNATH GADEKAR Date:

2025.12.06 20:46:55 +0530 KISHOR RAGHUNATH GADEKAR _______________________________________________________________ Mr. Abhaykumar Apte, for the Petitioner.

_______________________________________________________________ CORAM: MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.

DATED: 01 DECEMBER 2025 P.C.:

1.

Heard Mr. Apte, learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner. 2.

By the present Writ Petition, the challenge is to the legality and validity of the Order dated 22nd October 2024 passed by the Competent Authority, Rent Control Act, Pune Division, Pune below Exhibit-12 in Miscellaneous Application No.11 of 2024 as also to the Order dated 3rd March 2025 passed by the Additional Divisional Commissioner, Pune Division, Pune in Revision Application No.698 of 2024. 3.

By the impugned Order dated 22nd October 2024, the Competent Authority has rejected application for leave to defend in the said Miscellaneous Application No.11 of 2012. The said Order is confirmed by the learned Additional Divisional Commissioner, Pune Division, Pune.

4.

Perusal of record shows that the said Miscellaneous Application is filed under Section 24 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 (M.R.C. Act), on the ground that initially leave and license agreement has been executed in the year 2014 and the same was continued after eleven months till 2021. The last leave and license agreement is for the period from 1st January 2021 to 30st November 2021. The same is a written agreement.

5.

Admittedly, the Petitioner occupied the premises in question on the basis of first leave and license agreement of the year 2014 and continued the occupation thereafter on the basis of subsequent leave and license agreement. Both the Competent Authority and the Commissioner rejected the application seeking leave to defend on the ground that leave and license agreement is a written agreement and in view of the Explanation (b) to Section 24 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 which provides that an agreement of license in writing shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein rejected the leave application.

6.

It is required to be noted that as per the settled legal position leave and licence agreement, is conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein and no other evidence can be led inconsistent with the said facts by either of the parties and is conclusive between the parties of the facts stated therein. This Court in the case Ramesh Ramrao Hate v/s. Parvez

B. Bhesania1 held in the Paragraph No.9 as under:- "9. Once the legislature by explanation (b) of Section 13A(2) has provided that a written agreement of licence shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, it provided a special rule of evidence for the purpose of proceedings under section 13-A(2) of the Bombay Rent Act. The intention of the legislature was to give finality to the existence of a fact occurring in the written agreement of leave and licence. In other words legislature intended to shut out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence. The object of expression 'conclusive evidence of fact stated therein' is aimed to give finality to the establishment of the existence of the fact or facts stated in the written leave and licence agreement from the proof of another.

The argument of learned counsel for the Petitioner that explanation (b) only makes the written agreement of licence conclusive evidence as regards the licensor and not against the licensee is very difficult to be appreciated. Once it is provided by the legislature that an agreement of licence in writing shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein, it prohibits from leading any other evidence which may affect the conclusiveness of that evidence. The law laid down by the Apex Court in Smt. Somawanti case (supra) is clear answer to the contention of the learned counsel for the Petitioner wherein the Apex Court has held that once the law says that certain evidence is conclusive it shuts out any other evidence which would detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence.

Not only that when a certain evidence is made conclusive evidence, it prohibits any other evidence to be led which may detract from the conclusiveness of that evidence, but also the court has no option to hold the existence of the fact otherwise when such evidence is made conclusive. Once an execution of the agreement of leave and licence is not disputed before the Competent Authority in an application under section 13-A(2) based on such leave and licence agreement, it is conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein and no other evidence can be led inconsistent with the said facts by either of the parties and is conclusive between the parties of the facts stated therein. The Competent Authority has no option but to hold that the facts stated therein do exist. Same position 1997(1) Mh.

holds good also in a case where the execution of written agreement of leave and licence is denied and the Competent Authority after recording evidence reaches the conclusion that execution of such agreement for leave and licence has been proved by the licensor."

(Emphasis added) 7.

Although the above discussion is concerning Explanation (b) of Section 13-A(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 the same is squarely applicable to Explanation (b) to Section 24 of the M.R.C. Act, which is analogous provision, which reads as under :- "Section 24 : Landlord entitled to recover possession of premsises given on license on expiry

(1) ...

(2) ...

(3) ...

Explanation.- For the purposes of this section,- (a) ...

(b) an agreement of licence in writing shall be conclusive evidence of the fact stated therein." (Emphasis added) 8.

Thus, there is no illegality or irregularity in the impugned orders. The impugned orders are passed in accordance with the provisions of law.

9.

Accordingly, there is no substance in the Writ Petition. The Writ Petition is dismissed, however, with no order as to costs. [MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J.]