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Bombay High CourtCP/3/2026dismissed

Charkop Kandivali Ekta Nagar Cooperative Housing Society Ltd v. Vijay Kamal Properties Private Limited

2026-03-11Hon'Ble Shri Justice Amit Borkar4 pages

MPBalekar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CONTEMPT PETITION NO. 3 OF 2026 Charkop Kandivali Ekta Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.

... Petitioner V/s.

Vijay Kamal Properties Pvt. Ltd.

... Respondent Adv. G.L. Bjaj a/w Raunak Bajaj for the petitioner.

CORAM

: AMIT BORKAR, J.

DATED : MARCH 11, 2026 P.C.:

1.

The petitioner has approached this Court with a request that proceedings be initiated under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The grievance raised by the petitioner is that the respondents have deliberately failed to comply with the award passed by the learned Arbitrator. According to the petitioner, the award is binding on the parties and the respondents were under an obligation to act in accordance with the directions contained in the said award. It is his case that the respondents have intentionally ignored the same. The petitioner has therefore contended that such conduct amounts to willful disobedience of the authority of law.

2.

The principal submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that an Arbitrator, while deciding the dispute between the parties, performs functions which are judicial in nature. It is argued that an Arbitrator adjudicates the dispute after considering

the pleadings and evidence of the parties and thereafter passes a reasoned award. On that basis, the petitioner submits that an Arbitrator should be treated as falling within the expression "Subordinate Court" for the purpose of the Contempt of Courts Act. In support of this proposition, reliance has been placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Alka Chandewar Vs. Shamshul Ishrar Khan, decided on 6 July 2017. 3.

In order to examine the correctness of the above submission, it becomes necessary to consider the scope of the powers of this Court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This Court undoubtedly possesses jurisdiction to entertain proceedings where there is an allegation that an order passed by a subordinate court has been willfully disobeyed. The object of such jurisdiction is to ensure respect for the rule of law and to maintain the authority of courts. At the same time, the exercise of contempt jurisdiction is not intended to be used in every situation where a party alleges non compliance of an order. The law in this regard has been explained in several decisions of the Supreme Court. 4.

The Supreme Court in Kanwar Singh Saini Vs. High Court of Delhi, reported in (2012) 4 SCC 307, has clearly held that contempt jurisdiction should not be invoked where the law provides a specific and effective remedy for enforcement of the order or decree in question. The Court has observed that the purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the dignity of courts and not to provide an alternative method of executing a decree. If the statute itself provides a machinery through which the order can be enforced, the party must ordinarily pursue that remedy.

Similar principles have been reiterated in other judgments as well. The consistent view of the Courts is that contempt proceedings should not become a substitute for execution proceedings. 5.

In the present case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner has already taken steps for enforcement of the arbitration award by filing an execution petition before the competent court. The execution proceedings are specifically provided under the law for the purpose of enforcing an arbitral award. Once such proceedings have been initiated, the question of invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act does not ordinarily arise. The remedy of execution enables the Court to take appropriate steps for enforcing the award and for securing compliance from the judgment debtor.

6.

Having regard to this position, it becomes clear that the petitioner already has an effective statutory remedy available for enforcing the arbitral award. The law does not contemplate that a party should simultaneously pursue execution proceedings and also seek initiation of contempt proceedings for the same relief. If such course is permitted, it would lead to unnecessary multiplication of proceedings. Contempt jurisdiction must therefore be exercised with restraint, particularly where the law itself provides a specific mechanism for enforcement of the order. 7.

In these circumstances, this Court is of the view that the present case does not justify the initiation of proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The petitioner is already pursuing the appropriate remedy for enforcement of the award.

The grievance raised in the present petition can therefore be effectively addressed in the execution proceedings. 8.

Accordingly, the contempt petition stands dismissed. However, it is clarified that this order shall not affect the right of the petitioner to pursue and prosecute the execution proceedings for enforcement of the arbitral award in accordance with law. (AMIT BORKAR, J.)