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Bombay High CourtRPW/15/2026disposed off

Jayashree L. Katare v. State Of Maharashtra And ORS

2026-03-12Hon'Ble Shri Justice B.P. Colabawalla , Hon'Ble Shri Justice Firdosh Phiroze Pooniwalla7 pages

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION REVIEW PETITION NO.15 OF 2026 IN WRIT PETITION NO.4926 OF 2003 Dr.Jayashree L. Katare .. Petitioner

Versus

State of Maharashtra & Anr.

.. Respondents UTKARSH KAKASAHEB BHALERAO Mr.Atharva A. Date, Advocate for the Petitioner. UTKARSH KAKASAHEB BHALERAO Date: 2026.03.23 10:44:37 +0530 Mr.Kedar Dighe, Addl. G.P., for State/Respondent Nos.1 and 3.

CORAM

: B. P. COLABAWALLA & FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA, JJ.

DATE : MARCH 12, 2026 P. C.

1.

The above Review Petition is filed by the Petitioner seeking a review of the order passed by this Court on 28th February 2006. The delay in filing the above Review Petition was already condoned by order dated 22nd January 2026 passed in Interim Application (ST) No.3148 of 2025.

2.

We have heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State. The present Review Petition basically seeks a clarification of the observations made in paragraph 8 of the order under review. For the sake of convenience, paragraph 8 of the order under review reads thus:- "8.

Needless to say that the appointment will be from the date the letter of appointment is issued."

3.

The clarification sought by the Petitioner is that this paragraph reproduced above should not be construed to mean that the seniority of the Petitioner is affected by virtue of these observations. That is the issue that the Petitioner is currently agitating before the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal (MAT). In those proceedings, it is the State's contention that the seniority of the Petitioner would have to be taken from the date when the appointment letter was issued and relies upon this very paragraph to negate the seniority of the Petitioner. It is in this light that a clarification is sought that merely because the appointment will be from the date of the issuance of the letter of appointment, cannot affect the seniority of the Petitioner because that was never in issue in the Writ Petition which was disposed of by the order under review. It was submitted that this paragraph was basically inserted to ensure that even though the fault lay on the doorstep of the

State for not appointing the Petitioner earlier, the Petitioner would not be able to claim any backwages. The aforesaid paragraph was added only for this aspect was the submission of the Petitioner. 4.

On the other hand, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State, though not seriously opposing the clarification sought by the Petitioner, submitted that if such clarification is given, the same would run in the teeth of the order passed by the Ho'ble Supreme Court dated 2nd February 2007. It is the case of the State that being aggrieved by the order under review, the State preferred a SLP before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. That SLP was dismissed by order dated 2nd February 2007 in which it was stated that the SLP is dismissed, both on the ground of delay, as well as on merits. Once these are the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, any review of the order challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court would not be maintainable, and the same would have the effect of indirectly modifying the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 5.

The only other ground raised in the affidavit-in-reply to oppose the aforesaid review, is that at this belated stage, and after a period of decades, it is not possible and it would not be prudent to

review the order passed on 28th February 2006. This is also because it will disturb the seniority of other officers who were eligible and promoted since then. For these reasons it is submitted that the Review Petition be dismissed.

6.

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the papers and proceedings in the above Review Petition. As far as approaching this Court at the belated stage is concerned, we find this argument to be without substance for the simple reason that there was already an Interim Application filed seeking a condonation of delay, and that delay was condoned by order dated 22nd January 2026. The State has not challenged the aforesaid order, and hence, the ground of delay cannot be a legitimate reason for dismissing the above Review Petition. This argument is therefore rejected. 7.

The next ground canvassed on behalf of the State was that by allowing the Review Petition, the order dated 28th February 2006 would effectively amount to modifying the order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 2nd February 2007 dismissing the SLP filed by the State against the order under review. We find no substance in this

argument either. The order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court dated 2nd February 2007 reads thus:- "UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following

O R D E R

The Special Leave Petition is dismissed both on the ground of delay as well as on merits."

8.

As can be seen from the aforesaid order, no leave to appeal was granted and the SLP was dismissed. In our considered view, this order does not merge into the order under review, which would then preclude us from passing any order in this Review Petition. In the view that we take, we are supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Khoday Distilleries Limited & Ors. V/S Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited (under Liquidation) [(2019) 4 SCC 376]. In this decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 26.2 has stated as under:- "26.2. We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cares as under: (Kunhayammed case, SCC p. 384) (iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a nonspeaking order or a speaking. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed." (emphasis supplied)

9.

As can be seen from the aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, an order refusing special leave to appeal may be a nonspeaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. Once this is the case, and since the order under review has not merged with the order passed by the Hon'ble Surpeme Court, a review of the order challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court is certainly permissible. Hence, even this contention of the State holds no merit and is hereby rejected. 10.

As far as the clarification sought by the Petitioner is concerned, we find considerable force in the argument canvassed by the learned advocate for the Petitioner. It is evident and undisputed that the question of seniority was never in issue in the Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner, and in which the order dated 28th February 2006 came to be passed. In that Writ Petition the issue was that the Petitioner was wrongly not appointed, though entitled. On this plea, the Petitioner succeeded and the clarification at paragraph 8 was given which states that "the appointment will be from the date of the letter of appointment is issued". To our mind, this paragraph was only added to ensure that the Petitioner cannot claim any backwages from the State. This

paragraph was never to mean that the seniority of the Petitioner would be affected. The issue of the Petitioner's seniority is pending before the MAT. We, therefore, direct that the MAT shall decide the issue of seniority on its own merits, uninfluenced by the observations made in paragraph 8 of the order under review.

11.

We may hasten to clarify once again that the Petitioner on the strength of this order will not be allowed to claim any backwages from the State.

12.

The Review Petition is accordingly disposed of in the aforesaid terms. However, there shall be no order as to costs. 13.

Personal Assistant of this Court. All concerned will act on production by [FIRDOSH P. POONIWALLA, J.] [B. P. COLABAWALLA, J.]